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Introduction to the
Fordham University Press
Edition

Thinking about why any one should be interested in reading this reissue of a
book published twenty years ago brings to mind George Santayana’s admonition: “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.” This
book is being republished at a time that bears a striking resemblance to the
nation’s political and constitutional history at the turn of the twentieth century.
The events of the last third of the twentieth century in many ways repeated the
history of the last third of the nineteenth century. The nation’s commitment to
constitutional freedoms and equality generated by the Civil War climaxed during Reconstruction, but it gradually diminished from the 1870s into the twentieth century. This commitment surged again a century after the Civil War, in the
middle of the twentieth century, peaking during the 1960s to the early 1970s. But
this resurgence ended in a gradual decline that began in the 1970s and continues
to the present. Contemporary values and constitutional principles of individual
liberty and equality were created from the bloody experience of the Civil War,
and the legal doctrines and legal processes devised to implement these principles
originated in the gory aftermath of the Civil War. This introduction to the new
edition will briefly recount this history as context for the contents of this book.1
The primary result of the Civil War era was the abolition of slavery and the
admission of former slaves to full and equal citizenship. At the height of
Reconstruction, Congress proposed and secured the ratification of three constitutional amendments and several statutes to implement them. The framers of
this legislative program of rights guarantees believed that the first of these
amendments, the Thirteenth Amendment, secured individual liberty for all
Americans. The framers of the Fourteenth Amendment defined this individual
liberty more precisely as the status and rights of United States citizenship. They
believed citizenship rights included the generic rights to life, liberty, and property, and rights incident thereto, such as rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights,
and that these constitutional guarantees delegated to Congress plenary power to
secure and enforce them. The Fourteenth Amendment also guaranteed to each
inhabitant of the United States due process of law and the equal protection of
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the law to ensure their personal safety and personal freedom. The third amendment, the Fifteenth Amendment, secured to black American citizens the equal
right to vote free from racial discrimination. Congressional Republicans enacted
civil rights acts in 1866, 1870, 1871, and 1875 to make the guarantees of these
amendments practical realities.2
This book shows that, despite the opposition of President Andrew Johnson,
the Freedmen’s Bureau and the United States military in the former slave states
made significant efforts to enforce the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Remarkably, the
United States attorney and federal district court in Kentucky exercised jurisdiction the Act conferred upon them to dispense criminal justice in cases arising
under state law because Kentucky rules of evidence prohibited blacks from testifying in cases in which whites were parties. Consequently, black victims of
crimes committed by whites could not bring these criminals to justice in state
court. The federal court therefore supplanted state courts and enforced state
criminal law in these cases.3
With the election of Ulysses S. Grant to the presidency in 1868, the executive
branch of the federal government put its full weight behind the enforcement of
the Reconstruction Amendments and implementing statutes. Grant appointed
Amos T. Akerman as attorney general to head the newly created Department of
Justice, and he appointed Benjamin H. Bristow as the department’s first solicitor
general. Bristow was the federal attorney who brought criminal defendants to
justice in Kentucky.
Threats to constitutional freedom and racial equality became extreme during
President Grant’s first administration. The Ku Klux Klan and similar organizations embarked on a reign of terror to keep southern blacks under white control
and to eliminate the Republican Party from southern politics. As I note in this
book, the Klan was a paramilitary wing of the Conservative Democratic Party of
the South, and it was actually fighting a guerilla war as a continuation of the Civil
War. The threat to the nation presented by KKK. terrorists during Reconstruction
was as dangerous as the threat posed by al Qaeda terrorists today. But, unlike
today, Congress and the president during Reconstruction chose to combat terrorism through federal criminal process, observing rules of due process and fairness without sacrificing civil liberties.4
Congress utilized its delegated powers under the Reconstruction Amendments
to enforce the rights they secured when it enacted the Enforcement Act of 1870 and
the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871. These statutes greatly expanded the federal system of
civil and criminal justice. This book recounts that the Grant administration’s
enforcement of constitutional rights reached its high point during Akerman’s
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tenure as attorney general. Federal legal officers reported that, under his enforcement policies, they were effectively destroying the Ku Klux Klan through the criminal prosecutions brought under the recently enacted federal enforcement statutes.5
One of this book’s major conclusions is that all three branches of the federal
government cooperated with one another in enforcing the constitutional rights
of all Americans through the early 1870s. This intergovernmental harmony and
cooperation enabled Justice Department lawyers to curtail the violence and terrorism that motivated the federal government to act, and to destroy the Ku Klux
Klan, which was responsible for the mayhem that pervaded many of the former
Confederate states. This book shows that, at this very moment of success,
President Grant decided to cut back on his administration’s efforts to enforce
constitutional rights.
Despite this early success, the federal effort to prevent racial violence and discrimination ultimately failed. This failure is attributable, in part, to Congress’s
and the president’s unwillingness to put the nation on a war footing to combat
the racial and political insurrection with which the Klan confronted the nation.
Admittedly, the decision to fight guerrilla warriors through criminal process may
have been misconceived. Legal process is probably the wrong way to combat
rebellion and insurrection under any circumstances. This means that Congress
and the president’s methods to secure constitutional rights from Ku Klux Klan
terrorism may have been doomed to failure, especially since they were unwilling
to commit the extraordinary human and financial resources the effort required.
Nevertheless, the Reconstruction Amendments conferred on Congress plenary
power to enforce and protect the rights they secured, and the statutes Congress
enacted to enforce the Reconstruction Amendments were sufficient to remedy
violations of the constitutional rights they protected. This book concludes that
any failure to redress constitutional rights violations during Reconstruction cannot be attributed to inadequate legal authority. Although some scholars disagree,
this critical conclusion has never been successfully challenged.6
George H. Williams replaced Akerman as attorney general in early 1872 and continued Akerman’s enforcement policies through the presidential election of 1872. As
this book shows, southern conservatives met with Williams in September 1872 to
ask that President Grant curtail his administration’s vigorous enforcement policy.
Williams informed them that the president would consider cutting back if the terrorist organizations disbanded and southern violence ceased. Southern conservatives responded by helping to make the election of 1872 the most peaceful election
since before the Civil War. The Grant administration reciprocated by curtailing
federal prosecutions and eventually abandoning them during the spring and sum-

xvi

Introduction to the Fordham University Press Edition

mer of 1873. These changes in enforcement policy were motivated by a variety of
political considerations, also discussed in this book.
Coincidentally, as the president was cutting back on constitutional rights
enforcement, the United States Supreme Court issued its first interpretations of
the Reconstruction Amendments and the statutes Congress had enacted to enforce
them. The Court interpreted Congress’s power to enforce the rights these amendments secured more narrowly than had lower federal court judges. The president’s
decision to withdraw from constitutional rights enforcement, combined with the
Supreme Court’s decisions regarding the scope of the federal government’s power
to enforce the rights secured by the Reconstruction Amendments, began a decline
in federal rights enforcement that continued into the next century.
The Supreme Court issued the first of these decisions in April 1873. In the
Slaughter-House Cases, New Orleans butchers asked the Court to interpret
broadly the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of the privileges and immunities of United States citizenship and to strike down a Louisiana statute they
claimed infringed their right to engage in their trade. In a 5–4 decision, the
Court rejected the butchers’ claim and interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment
narrowly, declaring that the right to pursue a lawful calling, along with other
fundamental rights, was a right secured to individuals by virtue of their state citizenship and, consequently, was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the states.7
This book explains that the impact of the Slaughter-House decision on
Congress’s power to enforce civil rights did not become apparent until the Grant
administration attempted to bring to justice the perpetrators of the bloodiest
racial massacre in Louisiana history. Known as the Grant Parish massacre, some
60 blacks were killed and their bodies mutilated in a struggle for control of local
political offices, which Democratic Conservatives viewed as a test of white
supremacy. Attorneys for the white defendants successfully challenged the constitutionality of these prosecutions and the federal court’s jurisdiction to try them.
Extending the reasoning of the Slaughter-House decision to crimes of racial violence, the Court in United States v. Cruikshank held that Congress’s power to
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment was limited to violations of individuals’ constitutional rights attributable to the actions of the states. Congress’s enforcement
powers did not extend directly to the actions of private individuals.8
The Court continued to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment in ways that
were hostile to civil rights enforcement. In the Civil Rights Cases decided in 1883,
it declared unconstitutional provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1875. Congress
enacted the 1875 Act to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal
protection of the law by outlawing racial discrimination in places of public
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accommodations, such as hotels, restaurants, theaters, railroads, etc. The Court
extended its ruling in Cruikshank, explaining that the federal statute acted
directly on private proprietors of these business, which exceeded Congress’s
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement powers.9
Although the overall effect of the Court’s interpretations of the Fourteenth
Amendment was to sharply constrict constitutional guarantees of civil rights,
the Court’s interpretations of the Constitution’s guarantees of voting rights,
especially the Fifteenth Amendment, preserved sufficient constitutional
authority to protect the voting rights of United States citizens to the end of the
nineteenth century. Presidents Hayes, Garfield, Arthur, and Harrison attempted
in different ways to build a political base in the South, but they all realized that
free and honest elections and federal protection of voting rights in the South
were essential to this goal. All of these presidents supported the federal government’s enforcement of federal election statutes. Federal circuit and district
court judges uniformly upheld the constitutionality of these statutes after
Reconstruction ended in 1877, and the legal and administrative structure for
voting rights enforcement remained largely intact through the end of the nineteenth century. However, the federal government’s commitment to enforcing
citizens’ voting rights was problematic through the last third of the nineteenth
century.10
Like the Fourteenth Amendment, the Fifteenth Amendment prohibits the
states, as well as the federal government, from infringing upon the right of
United States citizens to vote on the basis of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude. The Supreme Court held that it clearly authorized Congress to enforce
these prohibitions. However, the Court also declared that the Fifteenth
Amendment conferred the right to vote free from denials or infringements
motivated by racial animus. Consequently, this amendment empowered
Congress to protect the voting rights of all qualified voters in state and local elections against private individuals who infringed upon their right to vote because
of racial animus. The Court also held that Congress enjoyed the power to protect the right to vote in federal elections against any violations. It was not until
the turn of the twentieth century that the Supreme Court, in a reversal of its
prior decisions, held that Congress’s enforcement powers under the Fifteenth
Amendment were limited to state action, like its powers under the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Court also rejected its earlier rulings that Congress could
enforce voting rights against the actions of state officials who violated Fifteenth
Amendment rights whether they acted in conformity with state law or in violation of state law.11
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It was during the closing decades of the nineteenth century that white
supremacy and black subordination hardened into a legal system known as Jim
Crow. Segregation was not inevitable; it, too, was a matter of choice, according to
C. Vann Woodward, the foremost authority on the subject. The Supreme Court
had held that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited states from denying or
infringing upon the right of every person to the equal protection of the law
because of racial discrimination. But, just before the turn of the twentieth century,
the Court held that states may require the proprietors of hotels, theaters, and railroads—as well as local school districts—to discriminate on the basis of race, so
long as they provided separate but equal accommodations for blacks and whites.
The Court thus put the authority of the Constitution at the service of white
supremacists and declared that the United States Constitution permitted the states
to require racial segregation by law. The Court gave legal force to racial bigotry.12
By the beginning of the twentieth century, the federal government had all but
abandoned the Reconstruction policies of enforcing civil and political rights and
racial equality. The nation’s political system of constitutional law sunk to a nadir
in these areas. Southern blacks were reduced to a state of peonage analogous to
slavery. They were disenfranchised, and their subordination was enforced through
lynching and other forms of racial violence. The cumulative effect of the Supreme
Court’s interpretations of the Reconstruction Amendments and the policy decisions made by political leaders contributed to making black Americans secondclass citizens. No one decision was responsible for this result. The steps leading to
the degradation of black Americans occurred over several decades. The Court
explained its decisions as attempts to restore a states’ rights–centered federalism
and to protect states’ rights against a misconceived centralization of power in the
federal government. Political leaders sought to build political power, promote economic development, and restore peace and social stability. The ultimate degradation of black Americans may not have been foreseen.13
This low-water mark sprouted organizations such as the National Association
for the Advancement of Colored People, the Urban League, and the American
Civil Liberties Union, which adopted litigation strategies to combat legal and
political oppression. Over the decades of the first half of the twentieth century,
they were increasingly successful in extending constitutional freedom and in
enforcing the equality portion of “separate but equal.” Then, in 1954, the United
States Supreme Court, speaking through Chief Justice Earl Warren, announced
that the principle of racial segregation in public schools was unconstitutional.14
The civil rights movement exploded during the 1950s and 1960s, bringing
down Jim Crow and opening new opportunities for black Americans. The rise of
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civil rights organizations such as the Congress of Racial Equality, the Southern
Christian Leadership Conference, and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating
Committee, and civil rights leaders such as Martin Luther King, Jr., Ralph
Abernathy, and Fred Shuttlesworth, supplemented the litigation strategy of the
NAACP with direct political action to press demands.15
The federal government eventually put its weight behind eliminating Jim
Crow and combating racial bigotry. Though reluctant at first to alienate the
southern wing of the Democratic Party, President John F. Kennedy ultimately
committed the moral authority of the presidency to end racial discrimination,
announcing to the nation in a presidential address that racial segregation and
the racial prejudice which motivated it were immoral. He used the powers of his
office to promote racial equality in voting, in public schools, in employment, in
public facilities, in housing, and in the practices and policies of the federal government. Shortly before his death, Kennedy initiated the impetus behind civil
rights legislation that was enacted after his assassination. Kennedy’s successor,
President Lyndon B. Johnson, committed the presidency even more completely
and vigorously than did Kennedy to combating racial prejudice and securing
racial equality, getting Kennedy’s programs adopted, and going beyond them.
Nevertheless, both presidents intervened to combat anti–civil rights violence
only reluctantly, and only when the failure of local authorities to suppress white
terrorists forced them to act.16
In other respects, President Johnson demonstrated his commitment to civil
rights, declaring, “I’m going to be the President who finishes what Lincoln
began.” Like Congress in the 1860s and 1870s, Congress in the 1960s enacted three
statutes that outlawed segregation and authorized the Department of Justice to
enforce racial equality in virtually all aspects of American life. The Civil Rights
Act of 1964 outlawed racial discrimination in public accommodations and
employment. Significantly, it empowered the attorney general to initiate civil
suits to desegregate public schools and allowed the Departments of Health,
Education, and Welfare (HEW) to withhold federal education funds from school
districts that failed to desegregate. The enforcement of these provisions by the
Department of Justice and HEW, rather than the Supreme Court’s decision in
Brown v. Board of Education, accounted for the sharp increase of black children
attending desegregated schools in the South—from 1.18 percent in 1964 to about
90 percent in 1973. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 prohibited racial discrimination in voting rights and quickly opened the political process to southern blacks.
It contributed to a sharp increase in voter registration and voting in the South,
which increased the number of black officeholders from a few hundred in 1965
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to 6,000 in 1989. The Open Housing Act of 1968 outlawed racial discrimination
in the rental and sale of housing.17
The United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the 1964
Civil Rights Act, the 1965 Voting Rights Act, and the 1968 Open Housing Act. The
1960s, like the 1860s, was a period in which the president, Congress, and the federal judiciary expanded constitutional and statutory protections of Americans’
civil and political rights and racial equality. This period understandably became
known as the Second Reconstruction. But there was a switch in the parties supporting and opposing federal guarantees of civil rights. Democratic presidents
and Democrat-controlled Congresses in the 1960s were supporters of civil rights
and racial equality, and their efforts to achieve racial equality cost the Democratic
Party the “Solid South;” southern white voters began to flee the Democratic Party
for the Republican Party in 1964, and they have contributed to the election of
Republican presidents in 8 of the 11 presidential elections from Richard M. Nixon
in 1968 to George W. Bush in 2004.18
The turning point in federal civil rights enforcement occurred when Richard
Nixon ran for the presidency in 1968. He developed his “Southern Strategy” during his 1968 election campaign, which he devised to take advantage of the southern white backlash to civil rights reform and liberal Supreme Court decisions on
race and civil liberties. George Wallace contributed to the anti–civil rights politics that were an increasing reaction to the liberal reforms of the 1960s. Wallace
was an outspoken segregationist who, as governor of Alabama, stood in the
doorway of the University of Alabama, blocking the path of students led by
Deputy Attorney General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach and a team of federal marshals to integrate the university. Nixon and Wallace won a combined 57 percent
of the popular vote against Hubert Humphrey, a longtime and unswerving
fighter for racial equality and other liberal causes. As president, Nixon changed
White House policy, endeavoring to curry favor among southern and northern
blue-collar and white-collar workers, ethnics, and Catholics who became disaffected with the liberal policies of the Democratic Party on civil rights and civil
liberties. Although the president quietly contributed to continued desegregation
of southern public schools and advanced equal rights in other areas, Justice
Department lawyers opposed the integration of public schools in legal arguments presented to federal courts. Nixon ultimately came out publicly against
busing to achieve desegregated public schools, and he supported Republican
efforts in Congress to prohibit busing to achieve desegregation.19
President Nixon began a reversal of President Johnson’s policies of vigorous
civil rights enforcement that his Republican successors broadened and accelerated.

Introduction to the Fordham University Press Edition

xxi

Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush retarded federal enforcement
efforts in the areas of school desegregation, affirmative action, equal employment
opportunities, fair housing, and voting rights, they claimed, for many of the same
reasons that nineteenth-century political leaders curtailed civil rights enforcement: to preserve states’ rights and state autonomy; to stop what they considered
to be an inordinate centralization of power in the federal government and to
return that power to the states; to curtail what they considered inordinate federal
spending and to reduce the size of a bloated federal government; and to eliminate
policies, judicial decisions, and enforcement of statutory provisions they believed
actually violated the constitutional principles of equal rights.20
Republican presidents from Richard Nixon to George H. W. Bush were also successful in appointing judges to the United States Supreme Court who reflected their
conservative views. The Supreme Court under Earl Warren strove to enforce constitutional rights, expanding the body of constitutional rights enforceable in the
federal courts, broadening federal protection available to racial minorities, and
increasing the number of groups entitled to protected status. The Court’s liberal
orientation began to change when President Nixon appointed Warren Burger to
succeed Earl Warren as Chief Justice in 1969. He also appointed Harry Blackmun
and the very conservative William Rehnquist with the intention of shifting the
Court in a more conservative direction. In a series of decisions, the Burger Court
complemented President Nixon’s policies regarding school desegregation by limiting the power of federal courts to order affirmative action to desegregate public
schools. Federal courts were constitutionally empowered to issue such orders only
in cases involving school districts which officially discriminated on the basis of race.
Limiting federal relief to de jure segregation, thus excluding de facto segregation, the
Court eliminated the legal authority of the federal government to desegregate public schools that were the result of segregated housing. This doctrine insulated many
segregated school districts in the North from federal desegregation orders, and it
produced the ironic consequence that public schools in the South were desegregated while those in the North largely remained segregated. Moreover, many segregated school districts that were desegregated under federal court orders became
segregated again because of white flight.21
Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush extended the conservative
path of the Supreme Court by appointing to the Court additional conservative justices, namely, Sandra Day O’Connor, Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, and
Clarence Thomas. President Reagan appointed Justice Rehnquist to succeed
Warren Burger as Chief Justice when Burger retired in 1986. The five-justice majority of the Rehnquist Court adopted legal doctrines that limit the constitutionality
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of state and federal affirmative action programs to instances of proven racial discrimination, and these doctrines allow racial preferences only if race-neutral
strategies have failed to remedy the effects of discriminatory actions. The Rehnquist
court also diminished the scope of civil rights statutes enacted by the Reconstruction
Congresses, and it curtailed the power of Congress to enforce the rights secured
by the Fourteenth Amendment and to remedy their violation, which its framers
intended to give to Congress.22
Looking back at the history of racial decline in the late nineteenth century, one
cannot identify a single action or moment in which blacks were degraded to second-class citizenship and quasi-slavery. Rather, this degradation occurred gradually in a series of small steps. The cumulative effect of these actions, however, was
to generate deep racism and to place the federal and state governments in support of racism. One of the lessons of this book is that it shows how actions of the
Grant administration and decisions of the Supreme Court after the Civil War
contributed to the degradation of black Americans, even though these actions
were not taken for that purpose. In retrospect, the decision of President Grant to
curtail federal civil rights enforcement in order to restore peace in the South
looks like a sellout of southern blacks. The Supreme Court’s decision in the
Slaughter-House Cases, which held that the Fourteenth Amendment did not protect the fundamental rights of white butchers in order to preserve the states’
police powers, actually proclaimed that the Fourteenth Amendment was
adopted to protect black Americans from racial subjugation. Few recognized at
the time that it set out a constitutional doctrine that would render the federal
government incapable of protecting blacks from white violence and racial degradation. It is important for us today to be cognizant of the history recounted in
this book because it can sharpen our awareness that governmental policies and
Supreme Court decisions in the present and recent past may be contributing to
another downward trend in the fortunes of black Americans.
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Publications Edition

American leaders of the 1860s and the 1870s greatly relied upon law and legal
institutions to solve some of the nation’s most important political problems.
Indeed, the history of the Civil War and Reconstruction is distinguished by the
way in which politics affected the development of law, and the way in which law,
in turn, influenced the contours of American politics.
The most urgent political issues leading to the Civil War involved the definition of American federalism and the division of legal authority between the
national and state governments over the status of slaves. The North went to war
in 1861 to establish as political reality the legal doctrine that the Union is perpetual and indestructible. The emancipation of slaves became a Union objective
two years later. The Union’s victories secured the nation against secession and
emancipated the Southern slaves. These military victories, however, once again
confronted the nation with the political questions that had led to the Civil War:
which government, national or state, possessed primary legal authority to determine the status and enforce the rights of the citizens and inhabitants of the
United States.
The Union’s military victory seemed to resolve this question in favor of the
national government. In the years following the Civil War, however, Southerners
continued to resist national authority and emancipation. With the support of
local and state governments, they opposed political groups and economically
intimidated and physically assaulted individuals associated with the Union’s
Civil War objectives. The Southern defiance forced Congress to amend the
Constitution and enact statutes to protect fundamental rights in order to implement the Union’s Civil War objectives.
The adoption of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments and
the various civil rights statutes was predicated on the primacy of national authority over the rights of citizens. These amendments and statutes gave federal officers
and federal courts criminal jurisdiction over civil rights cases. This jurisdiction,
previously held under state authority by state officers, was a novel one for the
federal judiciary. Federal jurisdiction over criminal violations of citizens’ civil
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rights required judicial acceptance of legal theories that affirmed the primacy of
national authority to enforce and protect fundamental rights. Congress’s civil
rights legislation thus encompassed revolutionary constitutional and legal theories and revolutionary changes in federal functions.
The nation’s judicial and legal officers played a far more important role in
shaping the political and constitutional history of Reconstruction than historians and legal scholars have realized. Almost without exception, federal judges
affirmed the primacy of the national government’s authority over the rights of
American citizens. Armed with judicially sanctioned constitutional authority to
prosecute civil rights violators, the Department of Justice and federal courts
became extensively involved in the administration of criminal justice after 1870.
The federal administration of criminal justice was inherently political. As this
study will show, the enforcement of civil rights required that the federal courts
affirm constitutional theories and apply substantive law over which political
parties were divided. Moreover, the federal prosecutions were invariably brought
against groups associated with the Democratic Conservative Party for crimes
committed against individuals connected with the Republican Party.
Republicans’ support of a nationalistic federal protection of civil rights
extended their Civil War commitment to national supremacy and emancipation.
Democratic Conservative opposition to federal enforcement of civil rights represented a parallel evolution of the Confederate commitment to states rights and
slavery. In enforcing civil rights, therefore, the federal courts preserved the
Republican Party’s Civil War aims and advanced the Party’s interests during
Reconstruction.
The efforts of federal judges and Justice Department officers ultimately failed
to bring about lasting peace in the South. In retrospect, Congress seems astonishingly presumptuous in expecting the federal courts successfully to eliminate
and punish Southern lawlessness of a magnitude that prostrated local law
enforcers. Yet, the success with which the federal courts initially met this challenge is equally astonishing. Federal prosecutions succeeded, where local law
enforcement failed, in destroying organized terrorist groups and in bringing to
the South a period of relative peace.
Federal success depended, however, on the commitment of the national
government to enforce civil rights statutes, and that commitment was short
lived. In 1873, President Grant ordered the Department of Justice to stop bringing prosecutions against Southern lawbreakers, and he pardoned those who earlier had been convicted and incarcerated by the federal courts. As Southern
United States attorneys and marshals had predicted, the president’s clemency
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invited a revival of large-scale violence by the fall of 1874. When the attorney
general ordered a resumption of federal prosecution of civil rights violators, he
discovered that the federal courts no longer recognized federal jurisdiction over
the administration of criminal justice. He thereupon ordered legal officers to
discontinue their efforts to enforce civil rights until the Supreme Court clarified
the government’s authority.
The United States Supreme Court’s 1873 decision in the Slaughterhouse Cases
was responsible for the shift by the federal courts after 1873. This decision took
much of the Civil War victory away from the Union nationalists and transferred
it to Southern states’ rights proponents by declaring that primary authority over
the status and rights of citizens is a part of state power, not national power. The
Court expanded this states rights ruling two years later in United States v.
Cruikshank, by eliminating much of the national government’s legal authority to
secure the civil rights, personal safety, and property of American citizens.
The elimination of national jurisdiction over civil rights relegated Southern
blacks and white Republicans to the protection of local law and law enforcement
agencies. These agencies were unable or unwilling to redress civil rights violations. The result was the virtual re-enslavement of Southern blacks and the eventual destruction of the Republican Party in the South. The supremacy of
national authority and black emancipation were replaced by states’ rights and
black peonage.
This study is a history of an ignored aspect of the Civil War and
Reconstruction era. It analyzes the legal theory of national authority over citizens and citizens’ rights expressed in the rulings of federal judges that interpreted the Reconstruction Amendments while enforcing federal civil rights
legislation. It recounts the efforts of federal judges and legal officers to protect
American citizens in the South and to punish civil rights violators, and it
describes the difficulties confronted by legal and judicial officers who were
involved in the federal administration of criminal justice. It concludes with an
explanation of the Supreme Court’s rejection of the primacy of national authority to protect civil rights—a rejection that prevented the federal courts from
enforcing and protecting the civil rights of American citizens for almost 100
years.
The study concludes that the Civil War and Reconstruction had a far more
revolutionary impact on American constitutionalism than scholars have appreciated. This revolution was achieved by federal judges and attorneys who used
federal authority to combat politically and racially motivated terrorism in the
South. The revolution was short lived. But, its brevity was due to conscious
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choices made by the president and the Supreme Court to withdraw and curtail
federal authority to secure civil rights. The choices were made at the very
moment when federal officers believed they were winning their struggle against
Southern terrorism. One wonders what the political and racial history of the
United States might have been if the president and the Supreme Court had made
other choices.

1

B

Judicial Interpretations
of National Civil Rights
Enforcement Authority,
1866–1873

etween the years 1866 and 1873, a legal theory of national civil rights
enforcement authority emerged in the courts of the United States that
manifested a revolutionary impact of the Civil War upon the constitutional and legal structure of American federalism. The constitutional grounding
of this theory was the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments; its first expression was the product of judicial interpretations of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, of
the concept of United States citizenship, and of the national government’s authority to fix the status and to secure the fundamental rights of American citizens.
The legal theory of national civil rights enforcement authority affirmed by
judges may be succinctly stated. Judges defined United States citizenship under the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments as the status of freemen. They equated
the rights of United States citizenship to the natural rights of freemen. Judges reasoned that, since natural rights were now secured by the United States
Constitution to United States citizens as such, Congress possessed plenary authority to protect these rights in whatever manner it deemed appropriate, consistent
with the Constitution. The Constitution therefore authorized Congress to confer
upon the federal courts primary jurisdiction directly to enforce these fundamental rights and directly to punish their violation. In short, the legal theory of
national civil rights enforcement authority under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments posited a virtually unlimited national authority over civil rights.
The primacy of national civil rights enforcement authority was a revolutionary legal theory because the states had traditionally determined the status and
rights of individuals and provided for their security. For example, Southern
states before the Civil War legally sanctioned slavery and defined in law the status of Afro-American slaves as chattel, virtually without any rights recognizable
in law. Northern as well as Southern states relegated free blacks to a second-class
citizenship by legally withholding from them some of the basic rights that state
statutes extended to white citizens as “inalienable rights” of freemen. At the
same time the states functioned as the traditional guardians of life, liberty, and
property. This guardianship was exercised through state institutions, statutes,

2

The Politics of Judicial Interpretation

and judicial decisions that served to punish crimes and resolve civil disputes that
involved the basic rights of citizens.
Although the states functioned as the primary guarantors of the fundamental rights of citizens, they did so without a settled legal theory that authorized
their exercise of this power. Legal theories of citizenship and the primacy of state
as opposed to national authority over the status and fundamental rights of citizens were still disputed at the outbreak of the Civil War. Legal theorists agreed
that citizenship conferred on individuals a right to the governmental protection
of a broad range of rights and privileges. However, individuals were citizens of
both the nation and a state. National and state citizenship were considered to be
different aspects of the same status. Therefore, both the national and the state
governments theoretically possessed the constitutional authority and obligation
to enforce and protect the fundamental rights of citizenship.1
Ambiguities in legal theory became urgent political questions as disagreements over the power to determine the status and rights of slaves, fugitive slaves,
and free blacks increasingly divided North and South. The conflict over slavery
forced the nation to resolve the ambiguities of the past and to determine where
primary authority over the status and rights of individuals was located, in the
nation or in the states. The resolution of this question was a corollary of the
more fundamental constitutional issue that was central to the Civil War, namely,
whether ultimate sovereignty was constitutionally delegated to the national or to
the state governments. This constitutional conflict between national supremacy
and union on the one side and state sovereignty and secession on the other side
determined whether the United States was a sovereign political community that
transcended state boundaries or a federation of sovereign and independent
states. The determination of this question also resolved the issue of where primary authority over the status and rights of citizens was located, for sovereignty
of necessity encompasses such primary authority.
The North and national sovereignty prevailed on the battlefields. The
Northern Republican–controlled Reconstruction Congresses expressed this
nationalist military victory in constitutional amendments and statutes that
attempted to resolve the antebellum ambiguities concerning citizenship by
defining the status and some of the rights that individuals enjoyed as citizens of
the United States. Congress’s formulation of American citizenship and its determination of the status and rights of American citizens manifested its assertion
of primary authority over citizenship. The nationalization of citizenship
expressed in law the military determination of the United States as a sovereign
political community that transcends state boundaries.2

Judicial Interpretations of National Civil Rights Enforcement Authority

3

Congress understood the primacy of national citizenship to be a consequence
of the supremacy of national sovereignty. National authority over citizenship
was primary because national rather than state citizenship now determined the
status and rights of individuals as citizens. Since this status and its attendant
rights were conferred upon individuals by the Constitution and laws of the
United States, Congress was authorized to secure these rights in any manner that
it deemed appropriate, consistent with the Constitution. The scope of this
authority was potentially destructive of American federalism. If Congress chose,
it could legislate criminal and civil codes that displaced those of the states.
Furthermore, Congress could confer upon the federal courts jurisdiction over
ordinary crimes and civil disputes that supplanted the jurisdiction of state
courts. In short, the supremacy of national sovereignty so centralized power in
the national government that the states as separate and autonomous political
entities could have been destroyed.
Congress chose not to destroy the states as separate political entities. Indeed,
Congress wanted to preserve the states and expected them to continue their traditional functions. Congress therefore articulated a theory of national citizenship and federally enforceable rights that assumed concurrent responsibility and
authority between the nation and the states to enforce and protect the civil rights
of Americans. Federalism was preserved. But, it was a new federalism that
required the courts of the United States to redefine the lines of jurisdiction
between national and state authority under the post–Civil War constitutional
amendments and civil rights acts.
The analysis of judicial opinions that follows examines how federal judges
redefined and applied national jurisdiction over citizenship and citizens’ rights
under the Reconstruction Amendments and civil rights statutes. The issues that
this analysis addresses include judicial interpretations of the rights that the
congressional framers of the amendments and statutes intended to secure; it
explores the judicial understanding of the procedures Congress provided in
statutes for the enforcement of citizens’ civil rights. It also presents the legal theory of citizenship and civil rights enforcement that judges derived from the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments and the statutes enacted by Congress
to enforce them. It was this theory that provided judges with the legal basis for
asserting primary authority over the fundamental rights of citizenship.
Congress involved the United States government in the judicial enforcement
of civil rights when it enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1866. This statute was a legislative precursor of the Fourteenth Amendment, for it defined United States citizenship and enumerated some of the civil rights that the courts of the United
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States were to secure. The rights to testify, to sue and be sued, to enter into legally
enforceable contracts, to own and dispose of property, and to the equal protection of personal rights under law were among the rights that Congress specifically enumerated as nationally enforceable rights under the act. The Civil Rights
Act declared that the infringement of these rights under color of law or custom
was a federal crime. However, the law not only authorized the federal courts to
punish and redress these wrongs, but it also provided for the removal of state
court proceedings to the federal courts where a party claimed that he was not
able to protect or enforce his rights in the state court. In such cases, the Civil
Rights Act provided that the federal courts sit as courts of original criminal or
civil jurisdiction and try the cases.3
The legal theory that affirmed the primacy of national civil rights enforcement authority was initially expressed judicially in cases that challenged the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Congress had enacted the Civil
Rights Act to implement the Thirteenth Amendment, which, on its face, merely
abolished slavery. In explaining how an amendment that abolished slavery could
provide constitutional authority for a statute that secured civil rights, judges resurrected the theory of natural rights asserted before the Civil War by radical
abolitionists to insist that slavery was illegal and coupled it with the nationalist
tradition of constitutional interpretation that attributed broad powers to the
national government.4
All federal and most state appellate judges who considered challenges to the
Civil Rights Act upheld its constitutionality under the Thirteenth Amendment.
They explicitly or implicitly interpreted the Thirteenth Amendment as conferring upon Congress primary authority over citizens’ civil rights. Citing Supreme
Court decisions, such as McCulloch v. Maryland, that expressed the nationalist
tradition of constitutional interpretation, they asserted that the recognition of
rights by the United States Constitution confers upon Congress the requisite
power to secure those rights. They found a constitutional guarantee of civil
rights in the Thirteenth Amendment by broadly interpreting it as accomplishing
more than the abrogation of chattel slavery. In abolishing slavery, the amendment provided the more significant constitutional guarantee of personal liberty.
They reasoned that in recognizing the personal right to liberty, the Thirteenth
Amendment conferred upon Congress the requisite power to secure personal
liberty and all of the rights that are incidents of personal liberty. In other
words, the Thirteenth Amendment was understood as conferring upon all
Americans the status of “freemen.” Citing such legal authorities as Blackstone,
Kent, and Story, judges who espoused this view equated the status of “freeman”

Judicial Interpretations of National Civil Rights Enforcement Authority

5

with the status of “citizen.” Consequently, in making all Americans “freemen,”
the Thirteenth Amendment conferred citizenship upon them. The Thirteenth
Amendment thereby authorized Congress to secure the civil rights of “freemen”
as federally enforceable rights of United States citizenship. This legal theory was
a direct outgrowth of antebellum radical abolitionist natural rights theory. A
certain propriety, therefore, accompanied its incorporation into the Constitution
of the United States through judicial interpretations of the Thirteenth
Amendment. However, judges who embraced this revolutionary interpretation
of national civil rights enforcement authority under the Thirteenth Amendment
in upholding the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act declared that they were
merely implementing the intent and understanding of the statute’s congressional
framers.5
Judges expressed the belief that the Reconstruction Amendments and the
Civil Rights Act were intended to establish the primacy of national citizenship
and national authority over the rights of citizens. Supreme Court Justice Noah
H. Swayne acknowledged this change wrought by the Thirteenth Amendment as
circuit justice for Kentucky. In the first reported interpretation of the Civil
Rights Act by a federal judge, he observed that the states had “always claimed and
exercised the exclusive right to fix the status of all persons living in their jurisdiction.” However, the Thirteenth Amendment, he declared, “reversed and
annulled the original policy of the Constitution.” Not only did it prohibit the
states from deciding whether slavery should or should not exist, but it also conferred upon the national government the power to fix the status of persons
within the United States. For Swayne, it was the Thirteenth Amendment, and not
the Civil Rights Act, that conferred citizenship on the former slave by making
him a “freeman.” Insofar as the act confers citizenship, Swayne concluded, it is
“unnecessary and…inoperative.”6
States’ rights-oriented judges resisted this revolutionary impact of the
Thirteenth Amendment and Civil Rights Act by sometimes invoking an alternative legal tradition that was central to the states’ rights view of American federalism. This tradition characterized the authority of the national government as
limited to those powers that are explicitly delegated to it by, or are necessarily
implied in, the Constitution of the United States. The Supreme Court’s decision
in Barron v. The Mayor and City Council of Baltimore was compatible with this
view, for it held that the negatively worded provisions of the Bill of Rights were
limitations upon the exercise of the nation’s governmental powers and not delegations of legislative authority to the national government to secure fundamental rights. States’ rights-oriented judges argued by extension that the original
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Constitution left the governing power over fundamental rights to the states, and,
applying a literalist interpretation to the Thirteenth Amendment, they declared
that it merely abolished slavery.7
Unlike the Bill of Rights, this amendment contains an express delegation of
legislative authority to enforce it. However, states’ rights-oriented judges circumvented a potentially broad application of the Thirteenth Amendment with their
narrow interpretation of its scope. In other words, they interpreted the
Thirteenth Amendment as authorizing Congress merely to prohibit the reestablishment of chattel slavery, not as an expansive authorization to secure personal
liberty. They thereby continued to assert the primacy of state authority over
citizenship and citizens’ rights.
However, even states’ rights-oriented judges who held that the act was unconstitutional acknowledged the natural rights and nationalist interpretation of the
Thirteenth Amendment as the congressional understanding of national civil
rights enforcement power. They conceded that the legislative supporters of the
Civil Rights Act considered the Thirteenth Amendment to be a constitutional
guarantee of the civil rights of citizens that authorized Congress to enforce and
protect these rights. Legislative intent notwithstanding, these judges warned that
if the act was constitutional and “this be the correct theory, and if the Thirteenth
Amendment embraces so wide a scope as this, it results of necessity that
Congress has supreme authority over all our civil rights….” Recognizing the
revolutionary implications of the nationalist legal theory of civil rights enforcement, they feared that the national government would supplant the states’
authority over state citizens and usurp the most important function of local government—securing the lives and property of their citizens. They felt it incumbent upon themselves to declare the Civil Rights Act unconstitutional and to
repudiate the nationalist legal theory upon which it was based to preserve a
states’ rights-centered federal constitutionalism.8
For example, the Kentucky High Court of Error and Appeals in 1867 reversed
a lower court conviction of a white man for grand larceny. The conviction was
based on the testimony of a black witness that was admitted at trial under the
Civil Rights Act. The Kentucky Court reversed the conviction, affirmed the
Kentucky statute prohibiting the testimony of the black witness, and struck down
the act as an unconstitutional invasion of the sovereign power of the state to
confer and secure the rights of its citizens. However, such explicit judicial rulings
upholding the primacy of state authority over citizens’ rights were rare.9
State judges who disapproved of the Civil Rights Act were reluctant directly
to challenge the legal theory on which it was based. They instead sought to
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preserve state control over citizens’ rights with oblique challenges to the Civil
Rights Act that sidestepped the question of the primacy of Congress’s authority
over citizens’ rights. For example, in an 1867 case involving the admissibility of
Negro testimony contrary to state law, the Delaware Court of General Sessions
characterized the right to testify as a state rule of judicial procedure instead of a
civil right of citizenship. The court declared the Civil Rights Act unconstitutional “so far as it attempts directly, to regulate the proceedings in the State
Courts. . . .” This retreat to the narrow ground of state authority over rules of
civil and criminal procedure in state courts as a bar to the Civil Rights Act suggests how authoritative among even unsympathetic judges was the legal theory
that sustained the Civil Rights Act of 1866. The Maryland Court of Appeals disagreed with the policy contained in the act, but it nevertheless upheld it because
of the supremacy of federal law. Decisions adverse to the constitutionality of the
Civil Rights Act under the Thirteenth Amendment were exceptional, and the
primacy of congressional authority to secure the civil rights of citizens was generally established throughout the courts of the United States by 1869.10
Regardless of whether judges approved or disapproved of the Civil Rights
Act, they shared a common understanding of its intended objectives and scope.
Judges expressed the belief that the act’s congressional supporters intended to
confer upon the federal courts complete authority directly and effectively to
secure civil rights as federally enforceable rights of American citizenship. Indeed,
some state judges who declared the Civil Rights Act unconstitutional did so, in
part, precisely because they understood this to be its intended purpose. What
judges understood to be the specific rights Congress intended to secure will be
discussed below. The important point here is that judges uniformly understood
that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 expressed a legal theory that assumed that
Congress and the federal courts possessed primary authority to protect civil
rights because these rights were recognized and secured by the United States
Constitution as rights of American citizenship.11
The specific rights secured by the Civil Rights Act were more problematical
than the enumeration of rights in the act would have suggested. The natural
rights theory by which judges interpreted the Thirteenth Amendment and
American citizenship accounts for this uncertainty. If, as judges ruled, the rights
of American citizenship consisted of the natural rights of freemen, that is, the
rights to life, liberty, and property and rights incidental thereto, then the specific
rights of American citizenship enforceable in the federal courts transcended the
specific rights enumerated in the Civil Rights Act. Thus, black Americans
invoked the Civil Rights Act to challenge their exclusion from public facilities,
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and they were often successful. The United States District Court at Mobile,
Alabama, for example, ruled in the summer of 1867 that the right to ride on a
privately operated city railroad car was a personal right secured by the Civil
Rights Act of 1866. It ordered the president of the Davis Avenue Railroad
Company to stand trial under section 2 of the act for refusing access to a black
passenger. In some cases, money damages were awarded to black plaintiffs,
while, in others, proprietors were fined who excluded black patrons from their
establishments or common carriers. Blacks were also admitted to juries under
the Civil Rights Act even though access to juries was not expressly guaranteed.
Of course, judges did not always agree that access to public accommodations
constituted a natural right of American citizenship. Nor did the enforcement of
the right of blacks to public accommodations necessarily result in integrated
facilities. Separate but equal was usually regarded by the courts as consistent
with the ideal of equal rights. However, judicial applications of national civil
rights enforcement power to these areas manifested judges’ understanding of the
scope of national civil rights enforcement authority as including an undefined
and indefinitely broad body of natural rights as rights of American citizenship.12
The exercise of national civil rights enforcement power within a continuing
American federal constitutional structure raises the additional question of how
judges interpreted the civil rights jurisdiction conferred upon the federal courts
by the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Judges believed that Congress intended that
American citizens, white as well as black, be allowed to employ federal legal and
judicial process when they were unable to protect or enforce their rights in the
state courts. They therefore interpreted the Civil Rights Act as conferring upon
the federal courts concurrent jurisdiction over civil rights. Judges rejected
attempts of defense attorneys to read into the Civil Rights Act an interpretation
that limited its application to cases in which rights were infringed by some form
of racially discriminatory state action. Federal jurisdiction was applied whether
or not state discrimination was involved; federal courts sat as courts of primary
jurisdiction and tried cases that ordinarily would have been heard only in state
courts; federal courts tried cases whether the parties were state officials or private
individuals.
Justice Swayne’s 1867 circuit court opinion is illustrative. The case involved
a federal prosecution of the crimes of burglary and robbery. Three white defendants were convicted in the United States District Court at Louisville of robbing
the home of a black family living in Nelson County, Kentucky. The case was tried
in the federal court because the United States attorney, Benjamin H. Bristow,
had reason to believe that the criminals would not have been brought to justice
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if the crime had been left to local law enforcement agencies. The obvious reason
is that the state laws of evidence prohibited blacks from testifying in cases in
which whites were parties. The legal inability of blacks to testify against whites
permitted whites to terrorize and otherwise commit crimes against blacks with
impunity, because blacks were often the only witnesses to the crimes. The federal court therefore assumed primary criminal jurisdiction under section 3 of
the 1866 Civil Rights Act as soon as the crime was reported, before the local
authorities had an opportunity to act.13
The defense demurred to the prosecution on several grounds. In addition to
challenging the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act, defense counsel narrowly interpreted the law as merely securing an equality in the rights enumerated in its first section and, then, only against discriminatory state action.
Observing that the indictment did not aver a denial of equal rights and that discriminatory state action was not present since the local courts had not been
given the opportunity to try the case, counsel insisted that the indictment was
defective and the federal court lacked jurisdiction in the case. The government’s
case was presented by United States Attorney Bristow who simply argued for
jurisdiction on the grounds that the victims of the crime were unable to enforce
in the state courts a right secured to them by the Constitution and laws of the
United States.14
In a subtly reasoned opinion, Justice Swayne upheld the constitutionality of
the Civil Rights Act and federal jurisdiction. To sustain jurisdiction, he had to
reject the defense’s interpretation of the Civil Rights Act, for the court only
would have been authorized to set aside the discriminatory state statute under
that interpretation. The federal court would not have been able to try the defendants for crimes against the substantive civil rights of citizens. Furthermore, the
basis of federal jurisdiction would have had to be the discriminatory state
statute, but Bristow had not argued state discrimination as the basis for federal
jurisdiction. Therefore, Justice Swayne upheld these prosecutions on the
grounds that citizens were denied substantive rights secured to them by the
Thirteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act. It was the infringement of
nationally secured rights, not discriminatory state action or inaction, that conferred
jurisdiction upon the federal courts under the Civil Rights Act.15
Judges sometimes explicitly stated that Congress intended the Civil Rights
Act to secure the civil rights of black citizens against the racial prejudices that
frequently prevented them from enjoying their rights. In an 1866 charge to the
Federal Grand Jury at Huntsville, Alabama, United States District Judge Richard
Busteed expressed this view and added that the statute was to be applied against
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“any person, official or non-official, legislator, Governor, magistrate, or citizen . . .”
who acted under law or custom. The United States District Judge for Mississippi,
Robert A. Hill, charged the Grand Jury at Jackson in July 1871 to enforce the Civil
Rights Act in a similar way even though he observed that the state legislature had
“wisely repealed all laws in conflict . . .” with its provisions. The Texas Supreme
Court in 1873 agreed that the Civil Rights Act secured civil rights even in the
absence of discriminatory state statutes, for “[a]ny other construction . . .”
the court declared, “would render the whole act almost entirely useless for any
good purpose whatever.” Even the United States Supreme Court thought this
was the obvious interpretation of the law in 1872:
It is also well known that in many quarters, prejudices existed against the colored race, which naturally affected the administration of justice in the state
courts, and operated harshly when one of that race was a party accused.
These were evils, doubtless, which the Act of Congress had in view, and which
it intended to remove. And so far as it reaches, it extends to both races the
same rights, and the same means of vindicating them.
With very few exceptions, federal and state appellate courts either expressly
applied federal protection against private infringements of citizens’ rights, or
they rejected attempts to impose state action limitations upon national civil
rights enforcement power.16
Although these rulings prescribed a uniformity in the rights of citizens, they
also allowed for variations among the states in the conditions under which these
rights were to be exercised so long as the variations were reasonable. For example,
they permitted the states to vary the enjoyment of civil rights according to age, sex,
mental capacity, and alienage, since such discriminations were considered reasonable and even necessary. This interpretation of the Civil Rights Act maintained the
concurrence in national and state authority over civil rights. Consequently, private
law, such as property law, contract law, torts, etc., remained under state jurisdiction
even though natural rights were nationalized. The same was true of criminal law.17
However, judges interpreted the Civil Rights Act as additionally securing the
right to nondiscriminatory state law and administration of state law. The act
explicitly secures to citizens the same rights as are enjoyed by whites. Judges
interpreted this clause to mean that all citizens were to enjoy civil rights under
the same conditions established by state law for their most favored citizens,
whites. Thus, Justice Swayne found that the Kentucky rules of evidence violated
the Civil Rights Act because they prohibited blacks from enjoying “the same
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right to testify ‘as is enjoyed by white citizens,’” because blacks could not testify
under the same conditions as whites. The California Supreme Court explained
the broader implications of this clause in 1869:
If in a given State the title to real property of any character may be conveyed
by writing not under seal, then all citizens, of every race and color, may convey property of that character in the same mode…. And so of statutes regulating the competency of witnesses.
Nevertheless, that California might allow such a conveyance did not bind
another state to make such allowance. While the right to convey property was
secured to all citizens under national law, the conditions under which that right,
and other civil rights, was to be enjoyed continued to be prescribed by the states
so long as the states did not illegally discriminate or until Congress exercised
that power.18
The Civil Rights Act contained a feature that could potentially limit its seemingly indefinite reach. The weakness was recognized by United States Attorney
Bristow when he was preparing his argument in the Rhodes case. Bristow
observed that the third section gives to the federal courts jurisdiction over “all
causes, civil and criminal, affecting persons who are denied or cannot enforce in
the courts…the rights secured to them by the first section of this act. . . .” The
essential question raised in cases involving crimes committed by white defendants against black victims was whether a criminal prosecution was “a cause
affecting” the victims of the crime. Judicial precedent appeared to be against
federal jurisdiction, for the United States Supreme Court had ruled years earlier
in United States v. Ortega that a criminal prosecution was a “case” that affected
only the defendant and the state against whose laws the crime was committed.
The victim of the crime was not a party to the case. Bristow wrote to the law’s
author, Senator Lyman Trumbull, and expressed grave concern that a ruling
based on Ortega would preclude federal prosecutions of white defendants for
crimes committed against black victims, such as the prosecution in the Rhodes
case. The source of Bristow’s concern was his reluctance
to rely on state authorities to furnish protection to the colored race. To deliver
these people over to the State Courts now would be equivalent to a national
decree authorizing a general destruction of the race.
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He asked the senator for corrective legislation that would “furnish the colored people of Ky. complete & ample protection from outrage & oppression.” In
the meantime, Judge Ballard wrote to Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase requesting
that Justice Noah H. Swayne preside over the constitutional challenge to the Civil
Rights Act that was brought before Ballard’s court.19
Justice Swayne adroitly resolved the problem in favor of federal jurisdiction.
He distinguished between the wording of the statute and the Supreme Court’s
ruling in Ortega by defining “case” and “cause” differently. A “case,” he said, was
a specific legal action in which, if it is a criminal prosecution, the only parties
affected are the defendant and the state. A “cause,” on the other hand, was “the
origin or foundation of a thing, as of a suit or action; a ground of action.” The
Ortega decision did not apply to the Civil Rights Act because the act referred to
causes of civil actions and criminal prosecutions, not to the specific cases themselves. Swayne concluded that the victims of a crime were parties affected by the
prosecution within the meaning of the Civil Rights Act, and the federal courts
could assume primary criminal jurisdiction in the prosecution of crimes when
the state courts failed to bring defendants to justice.20
The circumstances of the Rhodes opinion gave it a much greater significance
than it enjoys as the first reported federal judicial interpretation of the scope and
constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. It appears to have been the result
of a cooperative effort among the United States attorney, the United States district
judge, justices of the United States Supreme Court, and the legislative author of the
statute. Their purpose was to assure a federal judicial interpretation of the law that
was not only consistent with the intent of its legislative framers, but also broad
enough to authorize the federal judiciary to replace selectively local law enforcement agencies in the administration of justice. The magnitude of this expansion
of national power ensured a continuing challenge by anti-civil rights forces until
the issue was finally resolved by the Supreme Court of the United States. How the
Supreme Court responded to this challenge will be discussed in Chapter 7.
Not surprisingly, judicial interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment and
the civil rights statutes enacted to enforce it expressed a similar legal theory of
national civil rights enforcement authority. This similarity is not surprising
because judges understood the Fourteenth Amendment as virtually identical in
meaning, scope, and objectives to the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and they understood the Enforcement Acts of 1870 and 1871, statutes enacted to implement the
Fourteenth Amendment, as extensions of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. In short,
judges understood section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment as the product of its
legislative framers’ efforts to clarify and incorporate more explicitly into the
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United States Constitution the legal theory that provided the constitutional
authorization for the Civil Rights Act of 1866.
The first section of the Fourteenth Amendment contains four clauses. The
first clause explicitly constitutionalizes the meaning that most judges attributed
to the Thirteenth Amendment as it relates to citizenship. It fixes the status of all
persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to its jurisdiction as
citizens of the nation and of the states in which they reside. The language of the
next three clauses constitutes a threefold prohibition on the exercise of state
powers. The states are prohibited from enacting or enforcing any law that
abridges the “privileges or immunities” of United States citizens; from depriving
any person, citizen or not, of life, liberty, or property without due process of law;
and from denying any person the equal protection of the law.
Judicial examinations of the Fourteenth Amendment addressed the following
questions. What is the impact of the amendment upon the primacy of national
or state authority over citizens’ rights? What rights constitute the privileges and
immunities of United States citizenship? What are the rights of state citizenship?
What authority does the Fourteenth Amendment confer upon Congress to
secure and enforce citizens’ rights?
Federal judges addressed these questions relating to the Fourteenth
Amendment as they considered the scope and constitutionality of the
Enforcement Acts of 1870 and 1871. The act of May 31, 1870, was primarily aimed
at securing the Fifteenth Amendment right of citizens to vote free from racially
discriminatory interference by the state or private individuals and groups. It was
secondarily intended to protect against racially and politically motivated interference by disguised or conspiratorial groups with any right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. Federal courts
were given exclusive jurisdiction to try these offenses. The Ku Klux Klan Act of
April 20, 1871, was a more elaborate legislative attempt to ensure against violations of nationally enforceable political and civil rights of American citizens by
conspiratorial terrorist groups such as the Klan. It defined as federal crimes
activities in which the Klan was engaged to prevent citizens from exercising their
civil rights. It also empowered the president to declare martial law and suspend
habeas corpus under certain conditions.21
National civil rights enforcement authority under the Fourteenth
Amendment and Enforcement Acts was most seriously challenged in those
Southern federal judicial districts in which the Klan was most active. Alabama
was one such district, and a case that was prosecuted in the United States
Circuit Court at Mobile is illustrative of the legal reasoning judges employed in
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seeking answers to the difficult and novel questions raised in this new area of
federal law.
About one year after his appointment to the newly created Circuit Court for
Alabama, future Supreme Court Justice William B. Woods was confronted with
the prosecution of a group of Ku Klux under the Enforcement Act of 1870. A federal grand jury at Mobile found that, during the fall 1870 election campaign, the
suspects raided a political meeting of Republicans at Eutaw, Greene County,
Alabama out of political and racial animosity. Two persons were killed and over
fifty others wounded during the melee. As a result of the grand jury’s findings,
the defendants were indicted and charged with conspiring to injure, oppress,
threaten, and intimidate the victims with the intent and for the purpose of
depriving them of their rights of freedom of speech and of assembly.22
The defense demurred on grounds that forced Judge Woods to resolve two of
the constitutional questions with which the federal courts were confronted in
Enforcement Acts cases. These questions were whether First Amendment guarantees had been transformed by the Fourteenth Amendment into federally
enforceable rights of American citizenship, and whether crimes committed by
private individuals that infringed these rights were punishable in the federal
courts.
The political as well as legal consequences of these issues may have been too
grave for Judge Woods to resolve on his own, because he turned to Circuit Justice
Joseph P. Bradley for help. Justice Bradley’s elevation to the Supreme Court of
the United States was even more recent than Woods’s appointment to the circuit
court. Bradley nevertheless accepted the challenge. His comments suggest that
this was the first occasion in which he gave serious thought to the application of
the Fourteenth Amendment to private infringements of civil rights, for he initially missed the point of Judge Woods’s inquiry. His comments betray a lack of
familiarity with the legal nuances of the challenge to national civil rights
enforcement authority. His discussion is also noteworthy for the absence of any
references to the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice
Bradley instead analyzed the amendment purely on the basis of his own ideas
concerning citizenship and the constitutional principles expressed in the language of the Fourteenth Amendment. His unfamiliarity with the amendment’s
legislative history is not surprising for a New Jersey corporate attorney who
eschewed politics.
Justice Bradley’s legal analysis of national civil rights enforcement authority
under the Fourteenth Amendment represented a curious blend of conflicting
legal traditions. He unequivocally asserted that “[t]he right of the people to

Judicial Interpretations of National Civil Rights Enforcement Authority 15

assemble together and discuss political questions…is one of the most sacred
rights of citizenship. . . .” However, he also viewed these First Amendment
guarantees as prohibitions against the national government, and he applied
them to the states in his interpretation of the negatively worded Fourteenth
Amendment. He concluded that these fundamental rights were federally
enforceable rights of citizenship “and cannot be abridged by any state.”23
Judge Woods quickly pointed out that the issue before him dealt specifically
with violations of First Amendment guarantees committed by private individuals without any state involvement. He reminded Justice Bradley that he had to
decide whether “the breaking up of a peaceable political meeting, by riot and
murder, when committed simply for that purpose . . .” was a felony against the
First Amendment punishable in a court of the United States. He pressed the
question of whether that offense was punishable in the federal courts in view of
the wording of the First Amendment.
Until the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, Justice Bradley
responded, such an offense was not punishable in a federal court. However, the
Fourteenth Amendment authorized Congress to protect the fundamental rights
of citizenship against state action and state inaction. This apparent state action
interpretation notwithstanding, Bradley believed that the amendment’s scope
authorized civil rights enforcement legislation that punished private as well as
state infringements of citizens’ rights. He reasoned that,
as it would be unseemly for Congress to interfere with state enactments, and
as it cannot compel the actions of state officials, the only appropriate legislation it can make is that which will operate directly on offenders and offences
and protect the rights which the Amendment secures.
Justice Bradley’s explanation of why Congress could directly punish private
offenders despite the Fourteenth Amendment’s language assumed the nationalist
tradition of constitutional interpretation that holds that a right that is recognized
or secured by the Constitution of the United States confers upon Congress the
authority to protect it. He therefore concluded that “[t]he extent to which Congress
shall exercise this power must depend on its discretion in view of the circumstances
of each case.” He relied upon this legal tradition in suggesting to Judge Woods a
defense against anticipated objections to this national interference with the local
administration of criminal justice. He stated emphatically: “it must be remembered
that it is for the purpose of protecting federal rights; and these must be protected
whether it interferes with domestic laws or domestic administration of laws.”24
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Reassured by the approving comments and legal analysis of Justice Bradley,
Judge Woods rejected the demurrer. He upheld the constitutionality of the
Enforcement Act of 1870 and the criminal indictments brought under it against
private individuals for infringing the victims’ First Amendment rights to freedom
of speech and assembly. His opinion closely followed the reasoning of Justice
Bradley. Indeed, portions of it were verbatim copies of Justice Bradley’s letter.25
However, Judge Woods made explicit certain conclusions and theories concerning federal citizenship that Justice Bradley had only implied or assumed. For
example, Judge Woods stated that the Fourteenth Amendment revolutionized
citizenship by making United States citizenship “independent of citizenship in a
state, and citizenship in a state is [now] a result of citizenship in the United
States.” Judge Woods underscored this expression of the primacy of national
over state citizenship by asserting that American citizens are, “without reference
to state constitutions or laws, entitled to all the privileges and immunities
secured by the Constitution of the United States to citizens thereof.” As Justice
Swayne had concluded in his examination of the Thirteenth Amendment, Judge
Woods forecast that the status and rights of citizens would henceforth be fixed
by national law.26
Judge Woods also employed natural rights theory and judicial precedent in
equating the privileges and immunities secured by the Fourteenth Amendment
to the natural rights of free men. “Privileges and immunities” is a legal term of
art whose meaning had been explored by Supreme Court Justice Bushrod
Washington in his 1823 Circuit Court opinion in Corfield v. Coryell. Judge Woods
quoted from Justice Washington’s opinion as authority for his conclusion that
the “privileges and immunities” of American citizens are the natural rights of
freemen. He asserted that these natural rights include Bill of Rights guarantees.
Although these guarantees were regarded as mere limitations upon Congress
before the Civil War, Judge Woods observed, the Fourteenth Amendment “introduced great changes” in American constitutionalism. By virtue of the Fourteenth
Amendment,
the right of freedom of speech, and the other rights enumerated in the first
eight articles of amendment to the Constitution of the United States, are the
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, …they are secured
by the Constitution, …Congress has the power to protect them by appropriate legislation.
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Federal and state appellate judges generally held that the citizenship and privileges and immunities clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated
natural rights, including Bill of Rights guarantees, as nationally enforceable
rights of the newly defined American citizenship; they also held that these rights
were to be recognized and secured throughout the nation under national and
state law. With judges interpreting the nationally enforceable rights of citizenship in such generic terms, the specific rights that were thought to be enforceable under national law were indefinite in scope. The task of specifying these
rights was to be performed by the courts on a case by case basis as the United
States Supreme Court ruled in 1855.27
One of the rights of national citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment
is the right to become a citizen of the state of one’s residence. National and state
citizenship were considered to be two dimensions of the same status. Judges
therefore spoke of national law conferring citizenship, not national as distinguished from state citizenship. The distinction between national and state citizenship that the Supreme Court found so profoundly important in 1873 was
apparently considered insignificant by lower federal court and state appellate
court judges, because they virtually ignored it.28
However, judges did recognize that individuals enjoyed certain rights as citizens of a particular state. But, these state-conferred rights were not among the
natural rights of citizenship; rather, they were regarded as special privileges that
the states might choose to extend to or withhold from their respective citizens.
Because they were not natural rights, citizens could not claim them by virtue of
their humanity or status as freemen or national citizenship. For example, a
United States citizen residing in a particular state could not demand a public
school education if the state did not extend that privilege to its citizens, because
a public education was not considered to be an incidental right of life, liberty,
or property. Conversely, a citizen could demand the right to testify in the courts
precisely because judges considered that right to be essential to life, liberty, and
property. The right to testify was to be enjoyed in every state and territory
because it was a nationally enforceable right of citizenship. Similarly, any other
right deemed to be essential to life, liberty, or property would be an incident of
these natural rights and, therefore, a right of United States citizenship that was
enforceable by Congress and the federal courts throughout the entire nation. It
was because the rights peculiar to state citizenship were privileges rather than
the natural rights inherent in freemen that allowed states the discretion of
extending them to, or withholding them from, their own citizens or citizens
of other states.29
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The rights that judges regarded as state conferred rather than natural rights
of citizenship often related to important areas of social interaction and political
power. In addition to public education, judges asserted that suffrage, office holding,
and marriage were rights or privileges that the states could confer or withhold.
Still, rulings relating to these privileges were not uniform. Although judges generally recognized a distinction between civil rights and political rights, some
judges included political rights among the fundamental rights of citizenship
secured by the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments and the Civil Rights Act
of 1866. Interracial marriage was another controversial legal issue because of
state antimiscegenation laws. Marriage could be viewed as a contract secured by
the first section of the Civil Rights Act and the Fourteenth Amendment as a natural right of citizenship; or, it could be regarded as a domestic institution that
was completely within the authority of the states’ police power. Most judges
accepted the second interpretation of marriage and allowed the states the freedom to prohibit interracial marriage. Courts were virtually unanimous over the
status of public education as a state-conferred privilege.30
Even though judges identified certain rights as state conferred, they conceded
to the national government certain powers to enforce them. A citizen could not
demand that his state extend to him rights that were not essential to life, liberty,
or property. But, if the state did extend such rights to its citizens, then all citizens
of the state could demand that the state secure those rights in a racially impartial manner. The right to racially impartial state law and administration of state
law was recognized as a right of United States citizenship under the Fourteenth
Amendment. The constitutional authority of the national government to secure
an equality in state-conferred rights stemmed from the nature of the newly
defined federal citizenship. Since citizenship in the United States also conferred
citizenship in the state of one’s residence, then national citizenship also conferred a right to the rights encompassed within state citizenship. However, the
reader should remember that equal rights in the nineteenth century permitted
segregation. This concept of equal rights still allowed the states to maintain
schools on a segregated basis so long as they provided schools for blacks. If they
did not, however, courts held that black children must be admitted to schools
established for white children. Similarly, antimiscegenation laws were upheld so
long as they applied equally to both races. The right to an equality in stateconferred rights was understood within the context of separate but equal.31
Despite its language, state action limitations were not attributed to the
Fourteenth Amendment’s scope in securing rights of national citizenship.
Judges implied or explicitly employed the natural rights and nationalist legal tra-
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ditions in interpreting the negative prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment
as positive guarantees of fundamental rights as they did in interpreting the negatively worded Thirteenth Amendment as a positive guarantee of personal liberty.
Indeed, these traditions were applied by judges in interpreting all three Civil War
Amendments as delegations of legislative authority to protect the rights of freedom, citizenship, and political participation. The legal reasoning that transformed these negative prohibitions into positive guarantees of rights and
corresponding delegations of legislative authority was succinctly expressed by
the United States district judge for Delaware, Edward Bradford, in an 1873 case
involving the infringement of black voting rights by local registrars of election.
He said that
it is difficult to conceive of the constitutional prohibition on the states and
general government, from denying or abridging a constitutional right, without at the same time conceding the grant of the right; for such prohibition or
denial appears to be an absurdity if the grant be not admitted, for otherwise
there would be no subject matter for the denial or prohibition to work upon.
In a separate opinion in the same case, Supreme Court Justice William
Strong, as Circuit Justice, agreed that “[t]he prohibition is itself an acknowledgement of the right,” and he added that the Civil War Amendments were
“manifestly intended to secure the rights guaranteed by them…. Not only were
the rights given…but power was expressly conferred upon Congress to enforce the
articles conferring the right.” These amendments therefore contained a double
authorization of legislative power: the recognition of the rights which, under the
broad nationalist legal tradition, conferred legislative authority upon Congress
to secure the rights, and a separate enforcement section that expressly conferred
that authority upon Congress.32
Federal and state appellate court decisions prior to 1873 generally acknowledged that a revolution in federal citizenship had been wrought by the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments and the statutes enacted to enforce
them. These decisions held that the Reconstruction Amendments conferred
upon the national government primary authority over the enforcement and protection of citizens’ civil rights. They defined the nationally enforceable rights of
American citizens as the natural rights of freemen that included Bill of Rights
guarantees. Because these rights were understood in such generic terms, the specific rights of United States citizenship were indefinite in scope. Nevertheless, the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments were interpreted by judges as confer-
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ring upon Congress the necessary authority to secure the rights to life, liberty,
and property and the rights incidental thereto because these rights were recognized
and secured by the Constitution of the United States to American citizens.
Judges understood Congress’s legislative authority to secure citizens’ rights as
virtually limitless, and they held that the civil rights laws Congress enacted to
punish infringements of these rights were constitutionally authorized. Indeed, it
was the virtual limitlessness of congressional authority that confronted federal
judges with troublesome questions of jurisdiction as they struggled to define
national judicial criminal jurisdiction without displacing state jurisdiction over
ordinary crimes. This doctrinal problem of jurisdiction will be discussed in
Chapter 6. Nonetheless, it is no small irony that jurisdictional problems that
troubled federal judges in their efforts to secure and protect civil rights stemmed
from an abundance, rather than a paucity, of national civil rights enforcement
authority under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. Elaborating the
theory of national civil rights enforcement authority sufficient to secure civil
rights was relatively easy. The actual judicial administration of justice proved
more difficult.

2

T

The Freedmen’s Bureau and
Civil Rights Enforcement,
1866–1868

he first systematic effort of the United States government to secure the
civil rights of American citizens was entrusted to the United States Army
and the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands, otherwise
known as the Freedmen’s Bureau. Established in 1865, the Bureau was the first
federal social welfare agency. As Southern whites’ resistance to black freedom
and equality took increasingly violent and criminal forms, and as the administration of justice, criminal as well as civil, was withheld from blacks by the
Southern states, the Bureau’s responsibilities increased. First by Bureau circulars
and general orders, and then by direct congressional legislation, Bureau agents
and army personnel were authorized to secure the personal safety and civil liberty
of blacks.
Historians have concluded that the efforts of Bureau agents to protect and
enforce freedmen’s rights were insufficient and ineffective. Explanations of this
ineffectiveness have emphasized various inadequacies and weaknesses within the
administration of the Bureau and the practical context in which it functioned. The
analysis that follows parallels and is partially based upon these earlier studies.1
This analysis, however, sharply differs from others in at least one important
respect. It concludes that Bureau agents possessed and exercised sufficient civil
legal authority to secure the civil rights and personal safety of the freedmen of
the South. Bureau ineffectiveness, therefore, was not attributable to the insufficiency of national civil rights law. Rather, that inadequacy was due primarily
to the virtually insurmountable practical obstacles to civil rights enforcement
that confronted Bureau agents. Bureau failure, then, was due to an insufficiency of political power and failure of will, not to an insufficiency of civil legal
authority.
The political and institutional context of Bureau activities reveals the hopeless conditions that impeded, if not precluded, effective civil rights enforcement.
A discussion of this context is a prerequisite to an underriding of the ways in
which Bureau officers understood the scope of their legal authority to enforce

22

The Politics of Judicial Interpretation

civil rights, because it largely explains why they failed to secure civil rights even
though they possessed sufficient legal authority to do so.
Bureau agents operated as law enforcers within a milieu that was generally
characterized by a disregard for law and order. When combined with deepseated hatred toward blacks and their white Unionist allies, this lawlessness
erupted into violent assaults upon both groups. Bands of terrorists freely
roamed the Southern countryside preying upon blacks and their white defenders. These “regulators” presaged the Ku Klux Klan by committing their outrages
in disguises and at night, which made identification difficult, if not impossible.
The bulk of these crimes were committed in the most remote areas of the
Southern states, where Bureau and military authorities were unable to reach
them. When crimes were within geographic reach and suspects were identified,
arrests were attempted under the greatest personal danger to the arresting officers. The outlaws frequently outnumbered them and violently resisted. Arrests
often required the assistance of the United States Army. Military forces, however,
were numerically insufficient to render adequate assistance. The ineffectiveness
of federal agencies in maintaining law and order increased disrespect for federal
authority and encouraged additional lawlessness. Even the black and white
Unionist victims of terrorism sometimes withheld their support from federal
authorities out of fear and hopelessness. It is not surprising, therefore, that the
freedmen reported so few of the crimes committed against them.2
Community attitudes toward the Bureau and national authority further
hampered agents’ efforts to protect civil rights. Law enforcement depends upon
the cooperation and support of the community, and when that support is lacking, law enforcement is impossible, except through authoritarian methods. Not
only did the Bureau lack community support and cooperation, but it was also
faced with the defiant resistance and active opposition of the white-dominated
communities in which it operated. The actions of local authorities often reflected
the lawless and defiant spirit of their communities. Local peace officers usually
failed to bring terrorists to justice, either because of fear for their personal safety
or because of their support for the terrorists. Sheriffs refused to arrest suspects,
judges refused to try defendants, and juries refused to convict them.3
Local judges subverted justice and assisted the lawless in other ways. They
refused to admit the testimony of black witnesses that was essential to indictments and convictions. They declared the Civil Rights Act unconstitutional, or
they simply ignored it. Prosecutions were sometimes brought against terrorists
in the local courts to prevent federal prosecutions. However, the terrorists were
not charged with the felonies they had allegedly committed. Rather, they were
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charged with misdemeanors carrying nominal penalties. Their cases were called
for trial without adequate notice to the victims, who were prevented thereby
from giving testimony and presenting witnesses against their attackers. Federal
authorities effectively were prevented from bringing subsequent prosecutions
against the defendants because of the legal difficulties presented by the Fifth
Amendment’s guarantee against double jeopardy. They were also handicapped
by the political considerations of appearing arbitrary and vengeful in “persecuting” people who had already been given “justice” in the local courts. Moreover,
local authorities sometimes used state law directly against federal officers by
bringing charges and supporting civil suits against officers who attempted to
make arrests. Arresting officers found themselves charged with false arrest,
assault, assault with intent to kill, and other crimes because of the force they
were sometimes required to use in making arrests. Local authorities virtually
legitimated lawlessness by participating in it and insulating it from punishment
in federal tribunals.4
State legislatures also contributed to the defiance of federal authority. They
appropriated funds to pay the legal expenses of local judges who were prosecuted
in federal courts for violations of the Civil Rights Act. Most of the prosecutions
were brought against these judges for refusing to admit the testimony of blacks
in cases involving whites. However, judges were also prosecuted for imposing
unequal punishments upon black defendants. Lawmakers sometimes legislated
to impede local judges who were conscientious in securing the rights of blacks.
The Maryland legislature, for example, went so far as to curtail the power of the
Baltimore Criminal Court because Judge Hugh Lennox Bond effectively protected the civil rights of black apprentices from their former masters.5
With the freedmen and white Unionists forced to seek refuge under national
authority, civil rights violators found refuge under state authority. In this clash
of national authority and civil rights protection with states’ rights and white
supremacy, the latter held every advantage. The obstacles to effective civil rights
enforcement appeared to be so insurmountable that some Bureau agents
despaired of achieving even the semblance of civil rights protection. General W.
P. Carlin, Bureau commander in Tennessee, expressed the view of many other
agents when he informed General O. O. Howard, commissioner of the Freedmen’s
Bureau, that only the exercise of “arbitrary power” could protect the freedmen.
Knowing that such power was not forthcoming, many agents bowed to what
they believed was inevitable and tried to minimize or eliminate confrontations
with local authorities and their communities by acceding to the wishes of the
dominant white conservatives and landholders at the expense of the freedmen.
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Indeed, Bureau agents were often recruited from local magistrates who shared
interests and prejudices in common with the white supremacists. Political, economic, and social self-interests, in addition to other practical obstacles to civil
rights protection, reinforced racism and prompted many Bureau agents to cater
to locally dominant white racists rather than to serve the needs of blacks.6
Administration politics presented additional obstacles to effective civil rights
enforcement. The military character of the Bureau’s legal authority and institutional structure helps to explain how the president impeded its effectiveness. The
Freedmen’s Bureau and the United States Army derived their authority to secure
civil rights primarily from the war powers and the Freedmen’s Bureau Act of July
1866. They were also ordered to enforce the Civil Rights Act of 1866, but under
military authority. To implement these provisions, agents were instructed to
arrest persons who were charged with offenses against citizens “in cases where
the civil authorities have failed, neglected, or are unable to arrest and bring such
parties to trial, . . .” and to hold them for trial. Bureau agents were to refer cases
involving blacks either to Bureau courts, military tribunals, or federal civil
courts, depending upon the seriousness of the crime, when blacks were unable
to receive justice in the local courts of the state. When agents were confident that
the local courts were willing to dispense impartial justice, they were to return the
administration of justice to them. In this event, agents were to continue to protect the interests of the freedmen in the local courts by representing them as
counsel.7
Bureau agents functioned without the support of their president, Andrew
Johnson. Indeed, President Johnson undermined the jurisdiction and authority
of the military tribunals and Bureau courts with his peace proclamations of
1866. Since these courts functioned under the war powers, the president rendered doubtful the constitutionality of military and Bureau jurisdiction over
civilian criminal and civil cases when he proclaimed that peace was established,
the rebellion was ended, and the rebellious states were restored to the Union.
Furthermore, President Johnson stridently expressed his opposition to the trial
of civilians by military tribunals and ordered Bureau officers to return the
administration of justice to local authorities as quickly as possible.8
The Supreme Court of the United States added to the confusion about
Bureau legal authority in November 1866 when it announced its decision in the
Milligan case. This decision prohibited the trial of civilians by military tribunals
in areas where civil government was functioning. Although General Howard
believed that the Supreme Court justices did not intend this ruling to apply to
the operations of Bureau courts in the South, President Johnson used the ruling

The Freedmen’s Bureau and Civil Rights Enforcement, 1866–1868

25

as justification for ordering the cessation of agents’ efforts to secure equal justice
in those tribunals even when local courts failed to do so. General Howard sought
to bring a test case before the Supreme Court to settle the issue of Bureau court
jurisdiction, but President Johnson deterred him by ordering military personnel
to stop trying civilians and to free prisoners. Because the use of military institutions to dispose of civilian cases was antithetical to American civil liberties sensibilities and, apparently, to a ruling of the Supreme Court, the president’s
opposition to civil rights enforcement took on an air of legitimacy. Federal officers who sought to use the military and Bureau courts to enforce civil rights
were vulnerable to charges of despotic militarism as well as to presidential censure. With the president openly opposed to and actively impeding the Bureau’s
and the military’s efforts to protect the rights of the freedmen, the effectiveness
of these agencies to protect blacks’ civil rights was never fully realized.9
State legislatures added to the pressures to restore local civil government.
Legislatures, with varying alacrity, repealed many of the racially discriminatory
statutes. These statutes had provided the best legal and political evidence that
blacks could not receive equal justice in state courts and that the active participation of Bureau tribunals in the administration of justice was required to protect blacks. The repeal of these statutes created the appearance that Southern
statutes were providing equal justice in form, while the states continued to deny
equal justice in substance. The enactment of impartial statutes gave the harried
and unsympathetic Bureau and military officials a justification for returning
jurisdiction to local civil authorities. At the same time, the statutes compounded
the difficulties confronting conscientious federal officials who sought to go
beyond form and secure the substance of justice for the freedmen. Although the
mere existence of impartial laws did not guarantee impartial justice, so long as
they did exist, Bureau agents were hard put to prove injustice in a court of law
and in the court of public opinion, especially when such efforts were opposed by
President Johnson. With the legal authority of Bureau courts and military tribunals over civilians in serious doubt because of their military character, with
the federal courts practicably inaccessible, with administration pressures pushing toward a full restoration of local civil authority, Bureau agents were compelled to use local courts to secure justice for the freedmen however imperfect
that justice proved to be.10
The repeal of discriminatory statutes also created a false optimism among
Bureau agents regarding the evolution of racial harmony in the South. Burdened
by a self-defeating and undesirable mission, some officers seized upon the enactment of impartial laws as evidence of a growing disposition of Southern whites
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to recognize and respect the rights of blacks. Finding other signs of greater racial
harmony that enabled them to equate impartial laws with impartial justice, they
began to make optimistic reports about relations between blacks and whites in
the South. Some officials reported that the higher state courts and courts located
in larger cities and near military posts were already dispensing impartial justice.
They also observed that the quality of justice varied within states according to
the proclivities of individual magistrates. In their opinion, the disposition of individual judges more than the content of the law determined the quality of justice
dispensed to blacks. In light of the evidence they saw of the increasing legal and
judicial recognition of freedmen’s rights, many Bureau agents concluded that,
because of their efforts, Southerners were beginning to accept and respect the
rights and safety of the freedmen.11
However, just as the quality of local justice meted out to blacks varied, Bureau
agents’ efforts to secure justice to blacks were uneven. Confusion in the
Freedmen’s Bureau’s policies also caused inconsistency in the efforts of agents to
secure equal justice. The president and the commissioner disagreed over the
substance of these policies. General Howard wanted Bureau agents and tribunals
to continue to exercise unsparingly federal authority to enforce freedmen’s civil
rights. However, President Johnson opposed Howard’s policy objectives and
insisted that Bureau tribunals lacked authority over civilians. The president also
considered the Bureau’s civil rights activities to be unnecessary and demanded
the expeditious restoration of local government. General Howard capitulated to
his commander-in-chief, and he reluctantly encouraged his assistant commissioners to restore local civil authority even though this policy left the freedmen
unable to protect their rights. Pressured by the president, General Howard
instructed agents to avoid actions that might unnecessarily arouse opposition to
the national government and the Bureau and to disband Bureau courts if state
agencies indicated they would recognize freedmen’s rights. General Howard
specified that local government was to be restored when state legislatures
replaced racially discriminatory statutes with impartial ones. The repeal of the
black codes, the legislative recognition of freedmen’s rights, and the enforcement
of equal rights in some of the state courts gave many agents an irresistible rationalization and justification for the restoration of local civil authority.12
However, General Howard’s instructions also gave each agent the discretion
of assessing the quality of justice available to the freedmen in the local courts.
Field officers, therefore, possessed the authority to restore local government or
to continue using federal military and, where United States district courts were
available, federal civil tribunals to try cases involving the freedmen. Some officers
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followed the letter of Bureau policy and restored civil authority as soon as state
legislatures enacted impartial laws. Others followed the spirit of Bureau policy
and continued to exercise military authority because citizens could not receive
justice in local courts despite the impartial laws. For the same reason, others
reasserted military jurisdiction after they had restored local civil authority.
These circumstances suggest that agents who refused to restore local government despite these inducements to do so were either unusually vindictive or
unusually committed to securing freedmen’s rights.13
The ability of federal officers to remove cases to the federal courts was severely
hindered by administration policy and political pressures to restore local authority and end federal interference in local affairs rather than by inadequate legal
authority. General Howard identified the difficulty when he complained that federal courts could not assert their jurisdiction under the Civil Rights Act over state
prosecutions unless the state court denied some right secured by the act. He
observed that “[i]t is difficult to prove actual ‘deprivation’ of justice in such manner as to ‘remove the cause’ to the U.S. District or Circuit Court.” Even federal
judges who wanted to secure justice for the freedmen, he continued, “can do
nothing under the Civil Rights Act until the local Courts shall have been tested.”14
General Howard’s lament appears to support scholars who argue that the act’s
restricted application to discriminatory state action hampered federal efforts to
secure civil rights under the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Further investigation and
analysis suggests that such a conclusion is not supported. First, the cases to
which General Howard refers were initiated by local authorities. They necessarily
involved state actions brought against private citizens in the state courts. Section
3 of the Civil Rights Act authorizes the removal of a state court trial to a federal
court if the state court failed to enforce, or if it infringed, the rights of one of the
parties. Given the hostile political climate, it is understandable that a federal
judge would require a petitioner to show that he could not enforce his rights in
the state court before he would authorize the defendant to remove his case to the
federal court. But this is a problem of judicial administration rather than one of
jurisdiction. Moreover, the scope of the entire Civil Rights Act of 1866 should not
be measured by this section of the act that authorizes the removal of state trials
to the federal courts. Federal jurisdiction over these cases is distinct from federal
jurisdiction over cases initiated by federal authorities in the federal courts under
federal law.15
A search of General Howard’s correspondence failed to yield any letters from
judges who felt legally compelled to force citizens to exhaust state remedies
before federal courts could assume jurisdiction under the removal section of the
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Civil Rights Act of 1866. Certainly, General Howard had no statutory basis for his
comment concerning the need to test the state courts before the federal courts
could act. The Civil Rights Act imposes no such limitation. In fact, the statute
was interpreted as authorizing the interruption of a state trial on the motion of the
defendant who claimed that he could not enforce his rights in the state court.
The judge advocate general of the army, Joseph Holt, informed General Howard
of this interpretation in an official opinion in which Holt declared that a state
judge who refused to allow such a case to be removed to a federal court was subject to federal prosecution. Clearly, a defendant was not required to exhaust state
remedies or to test the other state courts before his case could be removed to a
federal court. Significantly, Holt’s interpretation of the Civil Rights Act was in
reference to a case involving a white person who claimed that he could not
receive a fair trial in the state court because of political prejudice.16
Federal prosecutions could also be initiated without first testing the local
courts. General Jeff Davis, for example, reached an agreement with the United
States district judge for Kentucky, Bland Ballard, under which Davis was to arrest
all persons who mistreated or committed outrages against blacks in Kentucky
and to turn them over to the federal court for prosecution. Judge Ballard and
General Davis anticipated that state authorities would fail to enforce state law to
punish crimes committed against blacks and that the state courts would refuse
to admit the testimony of blacks. Out of this arrangement emerged the first
reported federal case to uphold the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act and
of the federal prosecutions of white citizens for crimes against black citizens.
Throughout the Southern states federal authorities who attempted to enforce
the Civil Rights Act typically did not wait for the state courts to act, nor did they
exhaust the state courts before bringing cases into the federal courts and other
federal tribunals. On the contrary, they took immediate action. Not only were
the local courts not tested, they were not even tried.17
The only letters that tended to support General Howard’s complaint concerning the difficulty of removing state cases to the federal courts were dated
after he made his complaint to Secretary Stanton. These letters are noteworthy
because they are unique. Major William L. Vanderlip reported from Maryland in
March 1867 that the Civil Rights Act failed to protect blacks from assaults and
other outrages “by [not] providing for the punishment of the White man who
commits outrages.” Nor did the act protect freedmen from white employers who
refused to pay them, he complained. The major did observe that the act “applied
a remedy in such cases,” but he added that the remedy “seems to be beyond the
reach of the freedman.” A suit in the state court was always decided against the
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freedman, but he could not bring his case into the federal court “without such
expense as he is unable to meet.” In civil cases, then, the expense of litigation
rather than the inadequacy of legal authority prevented blacks from securing
remedies offered under the Civil Rights Act.18
Major Vanderlip also suggested that criminal cases could be better handled “if
the Civil Rights Act conferred on the District Courts concurrent jurisdiction with
the State Courts over persons accused of outraging free people.” Freedmen then
could bring their cases into the federal court “in the first instance.” He evidently
was not aware of Bureau activities in Kentucky, nor did he seem to understand
the statute. The Civil Rights Act did confer expressly at least concurrent jurisdiction, as Justice Swayne ruled in United States v. Rhodes, especially in a state
such as Maryland where state statutes excluded the testimony of blacks in state
courts. Even when the state legislature repealed the discriminatory statutes, local
ordinances continued to discriminate. Consequently, the Civil Rights Act would
have authorized the federal courts to assume primary jurisdiction in these cases
even under a state action interpretation of the act that limited its application to
states that retained discriminatory state statutes.19
Colonel James V. Bamford also protested that he lacked adequate authority to
enforce civil rights in North Carolina. He reported that the military could not
make arrests “until the entire routine of civil remedies have been exhausted in
vain.” (Emphasis added.) Because the federal courts were not established in North
Carolina until June 1867, some three months after his letter was written, his
remark was directed at his inability to exercise military jurisdiction in those
cases, not to the inadequacy of federal civil authority. The Freedmen’s Bureau
courts and military tribunals had assumed jurisdiction over cases where blacks
failed to receive justice in the local courts, even after discriminatory statutes were
repealed by the North Carolina legislature in July 1866. Colonel Bamford’s problem was created by President Johnson’s proclamation ordering the restoration of
civil authority when discriminatory state statutes were replaced by nondiscriminatory laws. Consequently, the colonel’s comments did not relate to federal civil
authority to protect civil rights; rather, they referred to inadequate military jurisdiction under the president’s policy of reconstruction.20
General Howard did receive one letter that might have prompted the complaint he made to Secretary Stanton. However, the letter related to military prosecutions of Memphis police officers growing out of the Memphis Riots of 1866.
In this letter, General Clinton B. Fisk vaguely referred to opinions of federal law
enforcement officers that the Civil Rights Act was of no use in this situation. The
general indicated, however, that federal prosecutions were not brought against
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the rioters because of political considerations rather than inadequacies in the
provisions of the Civil Rights Act. Federal prosecutions against public officials,
as well as private citizens, were authorized by Tennessee Bureau officers in 1867.
Further, the assistant commissioner for Tennessee in 1867, General W. P. Carlin,
authorized the removal of cases to federal courts when the local courts failed to
dispense impartial justice. Both of these facts support the conclusion that political considerations and practical difficulties were the primary reasons that federal prosecutions were not brought against the Memphis rioters in 1866.21
Evidence from other states also supports the conclusion that political considerations rather than the inadequacy of legal authority prevented more effective
civil rights enforcement by the Freedmen’s Bureau and the military. General
Charles Griffin reported from Texas that the state’s statutes were discriminatory,
oppressive, and tyrannical in their effect and in their enforcement, but they did
not discriminate on their face. Therefore, he concluded: “I have not felt at liberty
to disregard them.” That the general’s remark was directed to constraints of policy rather than to limitations of legal authority is evidenced by the actions of
Bureau agents in Texas who continued to assume jurisdiction in cases where
individuals were unable to receive justice in the local courts. Furthermore, the
United States attorney in Texas did not find racially impartial state statutes to be
an obstacle to enforcing civil rights under the Civil Rights Act in the federal
courts. General Griffin’s comment more likely expressed his reluctance to clash
with local authorities. Because of the administration’s demand for the restoration of, and cooperation with, local authorities, Bureau agents acted circumspectly even when state laws, such as the black codes, discriminated on their face.
Both President Johnson’s insistence upon the rapid restoration of local government and the Bureau’s consequent policy of cooperation with local authorities
in looking after freedmen’s interests within local institutions help to explain why
more civil rights cases were not brought into federal military tribunals and
district courts.22
Agents’ decisions to prosecute actions under the Civil Rights Act do not appear
to have been based on the presence or absence of discriminatory state action.
Federal officers failed to prosecute when discriminatory state action was present;
they brought prosecutions when discriminatory state action was not present.
This evidence suggests the need for an alternative explanation of General
Howard’s lament. If General Howard’s complaint was not an expression of the
constitutional and legal inadequacy of the removal power under the Civil Rights
Act of 1866, it was probably directed at the political and practical difficulties
encountered by federal legal officers in transferring the jurisdiction and the
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functions of the state courts to the federal courts. The political upheaval must
have been great at both the local and national levels. Both a dislike of the racial
and political interests served by federal courts and a desire to preserve local
autonomy aroused local opposition to federal involvement in the administration
of justice. Moreover, federal efforts to secure civil rights undermined cooperative relationships Bureau agents had been directed to establish with local authorities. At the national level, the federal enforcement of civil rights contravened the
policies and political interests of the Johnson administration. These circumstances explain why federal judges who might have wanted to secure justice for
the freedmen were constrained to wait until the local courts were tested before
asserting their jurisdiction even if they felt no legal or constitutional restrictions
on their authority to do so.
Although they often felt impeded by Bureau policy, Bureau agents interpreted
their legal authority under the Civil Rights Act as sufficient to secure freedmen’s
rights. One of the primary objectives of the Bureau was to achieve a uniform and
impartial administration of justice in the state courts. Impartial laws were essential to this objective, but more important was the impartial administration of the
laws by local officials. To achieve this goal, Bureau officers arrested and prosecuted judges and her state officers who refused or neglected “to perform any
official act required by law, whereby due and rightful protection to person and
property shall have been denied.” State judges were prosecuted for declaring the
Civil Rights Act unconstitutional, for enforcing discriminatory state laws, for
imposing unequal punishments upon blacks, and for refusing to admit the testimony of blacks in their courts whether their refusal was authorized by, or was
in violation of, state law. Other state officials were prosecuted for failing to make
arrests on complaints filed by blacks and unpopular whites, for infringing the
rights of blacks to carry firearms and to be protected against unreasonable
searches and seizures, for participating in outrages committed against blacks, and
for prosecuting white Unionists on trumped-up charges for political reasons.
Local officials were prosecuted under the Civil Rights Act for generally victimizing blacks and white Unionists and for failing to provide them with the equal
protection of the law and equal justice under law. Since Bureau agents understood the Civil Rights Act as primarily intended to secure the civil rights of citizens, they brought charges against local officers who infringed such rights of
citizenship as the rights to bear arms, to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures, to testify in the courts, and to the full and equal benefit of the laws for
the protection of person and property. And, agents brought charges against local
officials whether the victim was black or white.23
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Bureau agents did not stop at prosecuting state officials who violated civil
rights in their official capacities. They also prosecuted private individuals. Where
the state law enforcement machinery failed to mete out justice, Bureau agents
and tribunals assumed primary jurisdiction and law enforcement functions such
as investigating alleged crime, making arrests, trying and, upon conviction, sentencing criminals. Crimes that were prosecuted by Bureau agents ranged from
murder, manslaughter, and assault to theft and involuntary servitude. Federal
authorities also assumed primary jurisdiction in civil cases under similar circumstances. Cases were tried in Bureau courts or military tribunals, or, when
they were available, cases were turned over to United States commissioners and
the United States district courts. Where federal courts were unavailable and
Bureau officers felt that Bureau courts and military tribunals were unauthorized
to try civilians, they held the prisoners until a local court was prepared to try
them. Bureau officers felt that they were authorized to take these actions whether
the laws of the state discriminated or were impartial. Their criterion was the
necessity for federal action created by the failure of the local authorities to bring
offenders to justice. When the impartial administration of justice could not be
achieved under local law, federal officers supplanted the local authorities and
performed this governmental function.24
Federal officers also assumed jurisdiction in state prosecutions of blacks and
whites who could not receive a fair trial in the local courts. In these cases, the exercise of federal jurisdiction was more difficult because the state judge might refuse
to allow the case to be removed to a federal court. Furthermore, to justify the
removal of a state prosecution to a federal court that would then sit as the criminal court of primary jurisdiction, the defendant had to show that he could not
enforce some right or receive impartial justice in the state court. Or, if the trial had
been completed and the defendant had been convicted, he had to show that he had
not received a fair trial. Such a showing was very difficult in the absence of some
obvious evidence, such as a discriminatory law or a determination of the jury that
was grossly contrary to the evidence presented in the trial. Here again, the personal
proclivities of Bureau agents were important. Some of them asserted federal jurisdiction when merely aware of local prejudice and its impediment to a fair trial.
Others were loathe to interfere with the local courts and were content to settle for
as fair a trial as was possible, even if they believed the trial was unfair.25
Although Bureau officers were hampered by the inadequacy of military jurisdiction over civilian crimes and by the form and rules of judicial procedure, they
rarely complained of inadequate constitutional authority under the Civil Rights
Act. A few cases will illustrate this point and the confluence of political, policy,
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and legal factors in hampering the power of the federal government to enforce
civil rights.
Early in 1867, President Johnson reported to Congress three violations of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866. He made this report pursuant to a unanimously
adopted Senate resolution that requested that the president report to the Senate
all violations of the Civil Rights Act that came to his knowledge. He was also
instructed to report the actions he had taken to enforce the law and to punish
the offenders. This unusual act of bipartisan cooperation suggests that both
Democrats and Republicans believed that their political self-interests could be
furthered thereby.26
Not surprisingly, only Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton, the sole member of
President Johnson’s cabinet who supported civil rights enforcement, reported
violations of the Civil Rights Act despite the fact that Attorney General Henry
Stanbery was well aware of others. According to the Secretary of the Navy, Gideon
Welles, Generals Grant and Howard submitted to Secretary Stanton a report listing 440 violations. The conservative Welles considered these reported violations
“an omnigatherum of newspaper gossip, rumors of negro murders, neighborhood
strifes and troubles…vague, indefinite party scandal which General Howard and
his agents had picked up….” He recorded that some cabinet members were surprised by the report, but they rejected it as irrelevant. Secretary of the Interior,
Orville Browning, identified the partisan potential of the report when he accused
General Howard and his agents, whom he called “radical partizans,” of compiling
exaggerations as “a mean, malicious” attempt to force the president
to send out to the country, endorsed by him as facts, these prejudiced and in
many instances false, and in almost all exaggerated statements, or place
himself, by refusing to send them to Congress, in a position where they
could falsifly [sic] but plausibly charge him with the suppression of facts.
His own partisan sensitivities prompted the president to pare down the number of violations to three. The message President Johnson wished to convey in
reporting so few civil rights violations was that local authorities in the South
were adequately securing freedmen’s rights and that the federal presence there
was unnecessary.27
All three cases reported by the president represented attempts by federal officers to enforce the personal rights of United States citizens. Two of the three
cases involved federal review of state courts, and the other involved the intervention of federal authority into the state’s pretrial law enforcement process.
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They are useful, therefore, as case studies showing the manner in which federal
officers interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1866 shortly after it was enacted.
The first case involved the vagrancy conviction in Georgia of William
Fincher, a freedman who was then serving as vice president of the Pike County
Equal Rights Association. The United States attorney at Savannah, Henry S.
Fitch, reported to Attorney General Stanbery that Fincher had been unjustly
convicted by a biased jury, presumably because of his political activism in furthering the rights of blacks and because of his suspected adultery. However,
Fitch could find no remedy under state law because Fincher’s attorney,
Freedmen’s Bureau agent W. T. C. Brannon, had failed to file a bill of exceptions
within the prescribed time limit of thirty days. Fitch could not remove Fincher’s
case to a federal court under the Civil Rights Act of 1866 because he could not
show that Fincher had not received impartial justice in the local court. He
reported that “there is nothing in Fincher’s case, according to the present laws of
Georgia, rendering it an exception either in the mode of procedure or the punishment inflicted.” If the evidence demonstrated that Fincher was guilty as
charged and the punishment imposed was prescribed by law, how could Fitch
argue that Fincher was denied any rights or that he suffered prejudicial treatment in the state court, particularly since his trial lawyer had not alleged any
violations of Fincher’s rights during the trial?28
Fitch proposed an alternative legal strategy to get Fincher’s case into the federal court. He suggested challenging the constitutionality of the Georgia
vagrancy statute as a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment and the Civil
Rights Act of 1866. This strategy was first recommended to Fitch by United States
District Judge John Erskine who described the vagrancy law as “barbarous,”
“cruel and illegal, and a palpable renewal of human slavery in its most revolting
and degrading form.” Although Fitch expressed a willingness to challenge the
Georgia statute, he declined to do so without specific instructions from the
president or the attorney general. Those instructions were never sent.29
Fincher’s case shows the unwillingness of the federal attorney to use federal
law to remedy the injustice a freedman apparently had suffered. Politics seem to
explain Fitch’s reluctance to use federal law to correct a state injustice, since this
action would have furthered the interests of the Republican Party. Fitch was a
conservative supporter of President Johnson who actually used the powers of his
office to prosecute local Radical Republican officeholders for political reasons.
He had also embarrassed General Howard by informing the administration of
the general’s desire to get a test case before the United States Supreme Court to
legitimate the powers of Bureau courts in the South contrary to the president’s
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policy. Fitch was one of the very few federal legal officers who discouraged
Bureau agents from using the Civil Rights Act to punish crimes against blacks
because, he said, the act would not sustain such legal action. This could explain
why Fincher’s defense counsel failed to remove the case to a federal court for trial
on the grounds that Fincher could not receive impartial justice in the Pike
County Court. Given Fitch’s politics, his refusal to try cases in the federal courts
appears to be the result of political machinations more than the inadequacy of
the Civil Rights Act.30
In contrast to the Fincher case, the Freedmen’s Bureau and military in Texas
found no impediments to assuming jurisdiction in the case of Dick Perkins.
Perkins was a former slave living near Courtney, Grimes County, Texas. He had
been shot by his former master in a fight over whether he was to return to his
master’s employ. Perkins, who also had a gun, shot at his attacker in self-defense
after he had been wounded. The local sheriff subsequently arrested Perkins
without a warrant and confined him in irons in the Anderson, Grimes County
jail for six weeks without medical attention. Perkins eventually escaped with the
help of a United States soldier who also had been confined in the jail, and he was
taken to the Freedmen’s Bureau hospital in Houston. While Perkins was recuperating in the hospital, the city marshal arrested him with the intention of
placing him in the custody of his former master, the man who had shot him.
However, the subassistant commissioner, Colonel J. C. DeGress, removed
Perkins from the custody of the city marshal and held him for trial.
Colonel DeGress believed he had authority to hold Perkins and to remove his
case for trial in the United States District Court under the Civil Rights Act. The
colonel believed that the defendant would not receive impartial justice or the
protection of the laws in the county court. The fact that the local authorities had
imprisoned Perkins without medical attention and had intended to return him
to the custody of his assailant supported this conclusion. Colonel DeGress did
not doubt that the federal court had jurisdiction in this case, and the United
States attorney agreed.31
The third reported violation of the Civil Rights Act concerned the murder of
a freedman, one William Medley, by a prominent white physician of Rockbridge
County, Virginia, Dr. James L. Watson. Dr. Watson apparently acted because he
believed that Medley had insulted his wife and daughter. Confessing that he had
shot Medley, Dr. Watson turned himself over to the local authorities. However,
the Lexington Examining Court, by a 3 to 2 margin, refused to indict him.
According to General J. M. Schofield, the assistant commissioner of the
Freedmen’s Bureau in Virginia, the evidence presented to the examining court
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was sufficient for an indictment for murder, and the general believed that Dr.
Watson should have been held over for trial. He also believed that the failure to
try Dr. Watson for murder would encourage whites to feel immune from prosecution, which would gravely threaten the personal safety of blacks in the state.
The danger and injustice to which blacks in Virginia were already subjected,
General Schofield reported, were “not so much on account of any inequality in
the laws, nor yet from undue severity of the courts, but from individual violence
and wrong.” The Medley murder, therefore, was an assault upon the rights and
personal security of all blacks living in Virginia. Consequently, General Schofield
ordered the arrest of Dr. Watson for trial by a military commission. He claimed
authority to try a civilian for murder under section 14 of the Freedmen’s Bureau
Act of 1866 and General Order No. 44, which was issued to enforce the Civil
Rights Act of 1866.32
Dr. Watson was arrested on December 4, 1866, and was brought to Richmond
to stand trial for the murder of William Medley. General Schofield chose to try
Dr. Watson by military commission instead of in the federal district court
because he wanted to test the authority of military commissions to try crimes
involving blacks when local authorities failed to bring the defendants to justice.
The general felt a test case was needed because of the confusion caused by the
president’s peace proclamations issued earlier that year. General Howard was
delighted with this opportunity to clarify the scope of military authority in the
area of civil rights enforcement. However, President Johnson intervened and dissolved the military tribunal. He justified his action by citing the opinion of
Attorney General Stanbery that the Supreme Court’s Milligan decision prevented the trial of civilians by military tribunals where the civil government was
functioning. Dr. Watson was released, and the case to test the authority of military tribunals to try civilians in the South dissolved. The American repugnance
toward trying civilians in military tribunals conveniently provided the president
with a plausible, if not wholly justifiable, excuse for impeding civil rights
enforcement by undermining military authority.33
Far from complaining of inadequate constitutional authority under the Civil
Rights Act, Bureau officers expressed the belief that blacks would enjoy full security in their civil rights if the act were enforced as it was intended. Indeed, federal officers reported that, where the Civil Rights Act was enforced, blacks were
treated much more equitably in the local courts and by private citizens. General
Howard himself suggested that constitutional authority was adequate to secure
civil rights if only it could be used. The ineffectiveness of the Freedmen’s Bureau
and the military in protecting civil rights was not the result of inadequate civil
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legal authority to enforce civil rights. Rather, it was the result of a number of factors including: the confusion over military authority and policy caused by conflicting orders issued by the president and the commissioner of the Freedmen’s
Bureau; political pressures to restore local authority as soon as possible; the
insufficient numbers of federal legal officers, troops, and courts; the immense
distances that had to be covered; the enormous number of crimes that had to be
prosecuted; the inefficiency of the case method of dispensing justice; the personal opposition of many of the Bureau agents to protecting civil rights; the
ubiquitous resistance of Southern whites to federal law; and the deeply felt
Southern defiance of, and hatred for, federal authority.34
The efforts of the military and the Freedmen’s Bureau to secure civil rights
were as short lived as they were circumscribed. The use of Freedmen’s Bureau
tribunals rapidly declined through 1867, and they ceased to function by the end
of 1868 when statutory authority for most Bureau activities expired. The process
of restoring the former Confederate states to the Union was completed in most of
those states by 1868, and in all of them by 1870. With the restoration of civil government, civil and criminal judicial process became the sole means of redressing
civil rights violations.

3

G

The Politics of Civil Rights
Enforcement in the Federal
Courts, 1866–1873

iven the expansive definitions of federal power they had formulated,
the federal courts were relatively inactive in enforcing the Civil Rights
Act of 1866 during the last years of the 1860s. Since the conditions for
which the Civil Rights Act was enacted existed in many parts of the former
Confederacy, opportunities abounded in the South for the federal courts to
enforce civil rights. In some places, statutes that discriminated against blacks
were enforced by local judges in defiance of the Civil Rights Act. In other areas,
statutes were impartial on their face, but local judges and juries acted in such a
prejudicial manner that blacks and unpopular whites could not receive justice.
Although the freedmen and white Unionists could not expect to receive justice
or judicial enforcement of their civil rights in state courts, relatively little was
done to bring their cases into the federal courts1
Several reasons explain the relative inactivity of the federal judiciary in protecting civil rights in the years immediately following the Civil War. Perhaps the
most important reason was the Johnson administration’s opposition to federal
enforcement of civil rights. Racism, although important, was not the sole factor
in the administration’s aversion to the federal government’s involvement in the
protection of civil rights. The administration’s political philosophy and political
affiliations were equally decisive. Its commitment to states’ rights and a
Democratic Conservative political coalition rendered the federal enforcement of
the civil rights of Southern blacks and Republicans at the expense of the local
authority of Southern Democrats antithetical to its political interests and political values. These values and interests reinforced racial antagonisms.2
The Johnson administration’s opposition to federal enforcement of civil
rights must have discouraged even those federal officers who took seriously their
responsibility for executing the congressional mandate to secure civil rights.
The posture taken by the attorney general in his correspondence with United
States attorneys and United States marshals inhibited their active involvement
in civil rights issues. Cautious legal officers who requested instructions from
the attorney general concerning civil rights enforcement policy received no
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clarification. The attorney general consistently refused to instruct subordinate
legal officers as to their responsibilities under the Civil Rights Act or to answer
their questions concerning the meaning and scope of federal civil rights enforcement authority, “believing that to be entirely a judicial question.” Federal officers
were left to act on their own, but, in light of the president’s known opposition to
civil rights enforcement, politics and self-interest were powerful inducements
toward inaction.3
The administration’s opposition to the exercise of national power and the
enforcement of national laws extended beyond the Civil Rights Act. The
attorney general refused to give instructions and interpretations of federal laws
generally. He withheld his encouragement and support, as well as his cooperation, from federal legal officers. The president’s opposition to federal law
enforcement was more than passive. He appointed legal officers who shared his
opposition to national authority and nullified the efforts of conscientious legal
officers by pardoning prisoners who had been convicted of violating federal
laws. The United States district judge for Kentucky, Bland Ballard, expressed the
frustration produced by such policies when he complained that under President
Johnson many
[r]evenue officers were either corrupt or had no sympathy with the
Government, and the veriest criminals had only to ask pardon to obtain it. I
sometimes feel that all my labors were vain, that it was no use to hold court
at all. I was often engaged a week or more in the trial of some swindler who
was pardoned in less than a week from the conviction and sentence.4
The judicial business of the federal courts mushroomed after the Civil War.
This uncontrolled increase in federal case loads added to the pressures to curtail
national law enforcement. Legal and judicial officers complained that the business of the attorney general’s office and the federal courts had expanded
beyond the capacities of these agencies. They attributed increases in the federal
legal and judicial work load to the accretion of powers, jurisdiction, and functions of the national government during the Civil War era. United States District
Judge Robert A. Hill of Mississippi, for example, observed that “the consequences of the War have greatly increased the business in the U.S. docket.”
Further, he complained that the disorganization of the state courts induced all
litigants who could to transfer their cases into the federal courts. Inadequate
staffing forced the attorney general to hire special counsel to assist United States
attorneys in the federal courts. The creation of the Department of Justice in 1870
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was an attempt to meet the workload crisis and to eliminate the need to hire
special counsel. However, appropriations to finance the operations of legal officers and the courts did not match the expanding workload. The creation of the
Department of Justice in 1870 and the United States circuit courts in 1869 suggests that congressional Republicans were aware of the need to improve the
administration of federal law enforcement. But inadequate financing of these
operations shows that Republicans in Congress were reluctant nationalizers of
the federal courts and were unwilling to dispense completely with traditional
arrangements to achieve a fuller implementation of their policies. The attorney
general thus struggled with penurious Congresses to increase appropriations to
enable the federal courts to exercise the expanded authority Congress conferred
on them while he exerted pressure upon legal and judicial officers to curtail
expenses.5
Other kinds of practical difficulties impeded the enforcement of civil rights.
Judge Hill reported that he was aware of many violations of the Civil Rights Act,
but only a very few cases had been brought before the United States grand jury.
He explained that the violations occurred in areas of the state that were too
remote from the places in which he held court to bring witnesses to testify. The
physical remoteness of federal courts meant that parties had to travel long distances requiring extended absences from home and work. The expense and
inconvenience were prohibitive, especially to indigent blacks. Furthermore, federal courts were slowly reestablished after the Civil War in many areas, or, if
established, they were severely handicapped by the absence of judges, United
States attorneys, marshals, and deputy marshals. Where the courts were functioning, they met infrequently and for intervals that were too brief to provide the
kind of continual availability required of courts of primary jurisdiction.6
The implementation of federal law has been difficult throughout our history.
During the 1960s, for example, Democratic administrations were committed to
civil rights enforcement; they enjoyed substantial budgets and relatively abundant federal law enforcement officers. Yet they were unable to achieve more than
a mediocre record of civil rights enforcement. Federal officers in the 1860s
enjoyed none of these advantages. Moreover, local resistance to federal enforcement of civil rights was even more virulent in the 1860s than in the 1960s. Local
opposition complemented the policies and political interests of Andrew
Johnson’s administration. Considerations of personal safety and political selfinterest precluded federal legal officers from seizing the initiative to enforce the
Civil Rights Act specifically and prompted them to be less than energetic in
asserting federal authority generally. It was safer to do nothing than to risk
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disapproval from an administration that was hostile to the exercise of national
power to secure the civil rights of blacks at the expense of state prerogatives and
white supremacy. The posture of the president, combined with the practical
obstacles encountered in civil rights enforcement, prevented even well-intentioned
federal judicial officers from offering effective protection. At the same time,
these factors created an aura of legitimacy around the attitudes and inactivity of
federal officials who were unsympathetic or opposed to civil rights enforcement.
It is not surprising that so little effort was exerted by federal legal officers to
enforce civil rights during the 1860s.7
The efforts of federal legal officers in Kentucky are striking exceptions to the
lethargic civil rights enforcement under the Johnson administration. The Civil
Rights Act was enforced more vigorously there than in any other state. The reason lies largely in the moral and political commitments of the federal legal officers in the state. The United States attorney was Benjamin H. Bristow, a native
Kentuckian who opposed secession and strongly supported the Union cause
during the Civil War. He had been appointed to his position by an old family
friend, James Speed, Lincoln’s attorney general. After he resigned as attorney
general, Speed returned to his native state and assisted Bristow in civil rights
cases in the federal courts and served as legal advisor and legal counsel for the
Freedmen’s Bureau in Kentucky. Bristow’s political circle included the federal
district judge, Bland Ballard, and the federal legal officers in Kentucky who, as
Republicans, were committed to the enforcement of the civil rights of blacks.8
But, even here, the debilitating influence of the Johnson administration was
evident. The enforcement of civil rights was cautious, halting, and inadequate
under Attorney General Stanbery. When the Civil Rights Act was enacted by
Congress, United States Attorney Bristow instructed federal officers to assume primary criminal jurisdiction only after blacks were denied justice in the state courts.
When the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act was challenged in the courts,
Bristow halted prosecutions and refused to accept additional ones. However,
when the law’s constitutionality was upheld by the United States Circuit Court
for Kentucky in 1867, Bristow’s enforcement policy changed. He instructed
Freedmen’s Bureau officers to transfer all cases involving blacks to the federal
courts whenever the blacks’ personal and pecuniary interest would be served
thereby. Still, civil rights enforcement in Kentucky continued to be cautious until
Ulysses S. Grant was elected to the presidency. During the Grant administration
the effectiveness of civil rights enforcement improved, apparently because of the
cooperation that local federal legal officers received from Grant’s attorney general,
E. Rockwood Hoar.9
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Even with a sympathetic presidential administration, civil rights enforcement
in Kentucky continued to be hampered by limited human and financial
resources. Bristow estimated that the workload of his office and of the federal
courts in Kentucky increased threefold after 1866 because of revenue and civil
rights cases. Bristow’s successor as United States attorney, G. C. Wharton, also
complained of the burdensome workload, which he attributed primarily to these
kinds of cases. This prompted Wharton, along with Judge Ballard, to express the
hope in 1870 that they would soon be relieved of the onerous job of trying criminal cases involving blacks. Their earlier commitment to civil rights enforcement
had waned, since they were prepared to return such criminal cases to the state
courts as soon as the legislature extended to blacks the right to testify in cases
involving whites. They apparently were satisfied that the recognition of this right
would result in impartial justice. Their specious conclusion that statutory recognition of the right to testify ensured impartial justice for blacks is a measure of
how oppressive civil rights enforcement had become.10
As national civil rights enforcement under the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was
winding down in Kentucky, federal courts in other areas of the South were
becoming preoccupied with civil rights protection under the Enforcement Acts
of 1870 and 1871. The catalyst to this change in judicial enforcement of civil rights
was the increasingly virulent Southern resistance to Reconstruction as
Republicans captured control of Southern state governments after 1867. White
supremacist groups such as the Ku Klux Klan emerged as terrorist wings of the
Democratic Conservative parties of the South. Their political purpose was to
unseat Republican officeholders and to disenfranchise Southern blacks. The
paramilitary structure of the Ku Klux Klan and other terrorist groups made their
intimidation of black and white Republicans more systematic and effective.
The federal effort to destroy terrorism triggered the most extensive involvement of the national government in the administration of criminal justice up to
that time. Congress enacted the Enforcement Acts of 1870 and 1871 to supplement the Civil Rights Act of 1866 by defining as federal crimes certain offenses
against the persons and property of citizens. The Enforcement Acts represented
a more elaborate and explicit expansion of the federal criminal code than the
Civil Rights Act of 1866. They consequently required greater participation of the
federal government in the administration of justice than did the Civil Rights Act
of 1866. The assumption of this function by the national government produced
such a fundamental and profound reordering of the constitutional structure of
the federal Union that it eventually spawned a judicial reaction that virtually
eliminated the national protection of civil rights for almost a century.
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The reign of terror inaugurated by the Ku Klux Klan and other terrorist
groups has been well documented. The story need not be repeated here except
as it affected criminal law enforcement. Terrorism became a concern of the federal government because local law enforcement agencies and officers were
utterly unable or unwilling to deal with it. Whole sections of Southern states
experienced breakdowns in law and order. Their populations were subjected to
the mercy of organized bands of criminals who attacked them with impunity.
While whipping was the most common form of violence, shooting, beating,
murder, rape, and various forms of torture were not infrequent. Further, these
criminals destroyed property and stole weapons. Economic intimidation and
social ostracism were also included in the arsenal of the Ku Klux Klan.11
The brutality and savagery of these crimes made them distinctive. United
States circuit judge Hugh L. Bond was appalled when he learned that a North
Carolina woman was dragged from her cabin, beaten, and then “her hair
burned off her privates.” Aghast at other crimes that came before him in his
court, Judge Bond was moved by the facts of one case to declare: “I never saw a
worse, more outrageous and unprovoked assault with intent to kill a man who
was absolutely unknown to most of his would be murderers than this.” Fearful
of being too explicit in a letter, he wrote his wife Anna from South Carolina in
the fall of 1871:
I never believed such a state of things existed in the U.S. I will tell you all
when I come home what I am afraid to pour out on paper—I do not believe
that any province in China has less to do with Christian civilization than
many parts of this state.
He made the impossible resolve of never returning. Attorney General Amos T.
Akerman, himself a Southerner from Georgia, sadly wrote that the Ku Klux Klan
has revealed a perversion of moral sentiment among the Southern whites
which bodes ill to that part of the country for this generation. Without a
thorough moral renovation, society there for many years will be—I can
hardly bring myself to say savage, but certainly very far from Christian.
In his opinion, the Klan was “the most atrocious organization that the civilized part of the world has ever known.”12
Southern terrorism was distinctive for a far more important reason than its
savagery. With membership rolls numbering into the hundreds in some counties,
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the Klan effectively paralyzed local government agencies and officers. Many public officers were members of the Klan and participated in their crimes.
Consequently, though hundreds of crimes were committed, local officers moved
against very few. Even when they wanted to bring the criminals to justice, local
officers were too frightened and/or unable to do so. In York County, South
Carolina, for example, some 1,500 to 2,000 suspects were said to have fled military arrest while hundreds of others were actually arrested by federal authorities. Local officials and agencies were overwhelmed by the magnitude of such
criminality.13
Equally significant was the Ku Klux Klan’s militaristic organization. Federal
officials emphasized that it was organized, armed, uniformed, and drilled, and
they came to regard the Klan as a paramilitary operation fighting a rear-guard
action in continuation of the Civil War. The United States attorney for Alabama,
John A. Minnis, explicitly attributed Klan activities to “the old disunion secession doctrine that led the South into her troubles.” Attorney General Akerman
concluded from his experience in Georgia and reports from the field that “these
combinations amount to war, and cannot be crushed on any other theory.” Judge
Bond reached the same conclusion and more explicitly asserted that martial law
was the only effective way to combat the Klan.14
Even Southern sympathizers perceived the South as engaged in war with the
national government, but they placed the onus on the national government. The
Charleston Daily Courier, for example, said in an editorial that the Civil War was
being perpetuated by the continuing federal military presence in the South, by
the suspension of civil law, and by the imposition of martial law. The editor
viewed blacks as members of the federal war machine against which Southerners
were forced to defend themselves. Aimed at overthrowing Republican-controlled
state governments in the South and preventing the realization of equal rights for
blacks, the Klan and similar organizations essentially were in armed rebellion
against the United States.15
In light of these assertions by Southerners, it is curious that Northern
Republicans did not perceive Klan terrorism as a revival of the South’s rebellion
against the United States. Indeed, they were not even sure that reports of Klan
violence were anything more than Southern Republican political propaganda.
Northerners apparently longed too much for an end to the political and racial
problems of Reconstruction to admit that the preservation of the North’s Civil
War victory would require their continued determination to use military
authority against recalcitrant Southerners. The lack of official authorization and
support of state governments for the Klan’s guerrilla-type violence distinguished
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it from the Confederate war effort and contributed to Northern Republican
blindness to its paramilitary and insurrectionary nature.
Southern conservative newspapers also played a role in blunting the
Northern awareness of the nature of Southern violence. They denied the very
existence of the Klan and Klan terrorism and attributed reports of violence to
scheming Republicans out for political advantage. Undeniable instances of violence were attributed to the victims or explained away as isolated incidents. It
was easy for the increasingly disinterested Republicans of the North to discount
reports of Southern violence and turn their attention to other interests.
Furthermore, Democratic Conservatives attributed Southern disorders to federal interference in local affairs, providing Northern Republicans with a rationalization to justify an end to Reconstruction. They could facilely persuade
themselves that the elimination of federal intrusions into Southern affairs would
bring about the peace they desired.
Congress attempted to put down this armed insurrection in the South
through the federal judicial process. The nearest it came to providing the kind of
martial response called for by federal officials, however, was a statutory provision authorizing the president to suspend the writ of habeas corpus in areas
where armed bands overthrew local government or where local officials were
unable or unwilling to maintain law and order because of terrorist activities. As
a result, Congress was confronted by a problem that had arisen during its consideration of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and had troubled federal judicial officers trying to enforce the act. Legislation aimed at Klan activity inescapably
thrust the federal courts into the administration of criminal justice on a massive
scale. Congress somehow had to authorize the federal courts to punish offenses
against personal rights without at the same time supplanting local criminal
jurisdiction over ordinary crimes. Congress resolved this dilemma by defining as
federal crimes offenses that were peculiar to the Klan and similar organizations.
Thus, offenses that were committed for the purpose of depriving citizens of their
political or civil rights or because of racism or political prejudice or because of
the victim’s previous condition of servitude were made crimes against the
United States. Offenses that were committed by armed combinations of men, or
in disguise and at night, or conspiracies to deprive citizens of their rights for the
motives just mentioned were also made crimes against the United States.
However, Congress continued to give state criminal codes an important role in
federal law enforcement. Punishments were not specified for these crimes.
Rather, they were to be commensurate to the penalties prescribed by state laws
for the actions committed. Congress thus sought to authorize the federal courts
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to punish crimes, such as murder, by broadly defining them as violations of federally enforceable civil rights in order to avoid the accusation that the federal
courts were unconstitutionally supplanting state courts in punishing offenses
against the criminal laws of the states.16
The legal reasoning expressed in the congressional debates leading to the
adoption of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 paralleled the judicial understanding
of the authority of the federal government to enforce civil rights up to that time.
Congressional proponents of the Klan Act argued that the natural rights of citizenship, including the Bill of Rights guarantees, were federally enforceable rights
of United States citizens. They invoked the broad nationalist legal tradition of
constitutional interpretation and insisted that Congress possessed the authority
to protect these rights in whatever manner it deemed appropriate. On the other
hand, opponents of the Klan Act applied the narrower states’ rights legal tradition and denied that Congress could protect personal rights, because that
authority was among the exclusive powers of the states. Opponents perceived
civil rights proponents as legislating to secure Bill of Rights guarantees, because
they relied on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Barron v. Baltimore to insist that the
Bill of Rights was not a delegation of legislative authority but a prohibition
against congressional authority.17
Although Congress exercised far-reaching powers to put down the Ku Klux
Klan, federal legal officers who bore the responsibility of enforcing the civil
rights laws of 1870 and 1871 soon discovered that dealing with armed insurrection through ordinary criminal process was far more difficult than anyone realized. Some of the difficulties were the same as those experienced by federal
officials connected with the Freedmen’s Bureau. These obstacles became more
acute in the 1870s, and new ones were added.
The first problem with which federal attorneys, marshals, and commissioners
were confronted was securing complaints and evidence for the purpose of
indicting suspects. Victims were “often ignorant, poor and timid,” and possessed
“neither the knowledge, the means, nor the courage to bring the case to the
notice of the proper officers.” The vast size of judicial districts and the enormous
numbers of individuals implicated in the crimes overwhelmed the sparse number of legal officers. Forced to travel hundreds of miles to the scene of a crime
and to spend weeks to work up a case, they had to neglect other official business
to conclude their investigations. Although federal courts convened more regularly in the 1870s than immediately after the Civil War, they still met infrequently
for short periods and at few locations. It was difficult to get witnesses to leave
their homes to travel the great distances to the federal court. Even willing witnesses
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and victims could ill afford the journey or the time away from their work. To try
the tremendous number of crimes and cases would have required months before
continual sitting judges instead of the days available before the sporadic terms of
the federal courts. Both time and space, therefore, were impediments to civil rights
protection and invitations to civil rights violations.18
Further complicating the investigations was the lack of cooperation within
the communities in which the crimes occurred. Indeed, members of the communities did what they could to impede federal officers. Alerted to the approach
of arresting officers, suspects were able to organize a forceful resistance or to flee.
Some suspects left their homes permanently and resettled in distant places.
Those who remained and resisted arrest usually outnumbered the federal
authorities, who were forced to rely on the military to make arrests. When arresting officers responded to violent resistance with force, they were indicted in local
courts for crimes that ranged from assault to murder. In making their arrests,
federal authorities first had to find their suspects and then avoid being assaulted
and even murdered, and, if they survived the arrest, they had to avoid being
arrested and jailed by local authorities. Complainants and witnesses were subjected to the same intimidation. Violent retaliations usually met those who
brought complaints to federal authorities or who supported complaints with
evidence. The violent confrontation between the forces of nationalism and states’
rights was thus expanded into the local and federal courts. The danger these
local prosecutions posed to the successful federal enforcement of civil rights
alarmed federal legal officers. United States attorney for Virginia, H. H. Wells,
declared that “if such a practice is continued or becomes general, the criminal
laws of the United States cannot be enforced.” The attorney general instructed
him to challenge the constitutionality of these local prosecutions all the way up
to the United States Supreme Court if necessary.19
As a community rallied to assist suspects in avoiding arrest, it helped defendants who were brought to trial. Mention has already been made of the actions
state legislatures took to defend state officers in federal prosecutions of civil
rights violations. In various Southern states, collections were taken up for the
defense of private individuals in the federal courts. The moneys were spent to
hire the best attorneys to defend “‘our boys’ that have been kidnapped by the
Yankees….” “Money seems like water for ‘our boys,’” wrote a United States marshal from Mississippi, and he added that Mississippians “will go to any extreme
to get them clear.” These fund-raising campaigns were led by some of the South’s
leading citizens. For example, Wade Hampton headed one such campaign that
raised $10,000 to employ former Attorney General Henry Stanbery and Senator
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Reverdy Johnson to defend Klansmen in the federal court at Columbia, South
Carolina, and to challenge the constitutionality of the Enforcement Acts up to
the Supreme Court of the United States. The amount raised was larger than the
annual salary of the federal judges before whom the cases were argued and many
times the salary of the United States attorney. Furthermore, leading members of
the bar frequently donated their services. Since many Southern lawyers opposed
federal civil rights enforcement, defendants were usually represented by the best
legal talent in their states.20
Often times defendants themselves were leading citizens of an area who
enjoyed the advantages of wealth, political influence, and social prominence.
They were able to use their influence against federal prosecuting attorneys who
were, after all, political appointees removable at the discretion of the president.
Prosecutions in North Carolina, for example, were reportedly postponed at the
instigation of the governor, and, when the trials finally resulted in convictions,
additional pressures were put on the court to give suspended sentences. The
district judge and the United States attorney, however, were able to resist such
pressures because the attorney general supported their efforts to punish Ku Klux
terrorists.21
While the defense enjoyed a surfeit of talent, the United States attorneys
suffered from inadequate assistance and exhaustion. They often worked seven
days and nights per week to prepare Enforcement Acts cases. Days were spent
examining witnesses while nights were used in recording the days’ testimony.
By day they appeared before grand juries to present cases for indictment, and
their evenings were spent preparing evidence and formulating strategy for the
trials themselves. While defense counsel were relatively free to plan their
cases, United States attorneys were “harassed and annoyed” by demands to
draw bills and complaints in other areas of federal law. During prosecutions
at one term of court, United States attorneys had to be preparing cases for
trial at the next term. Because of the technical complexities posed by the language of the Enforcement Acts, United States attorneys were sometimes
required to assist federal commissioners frame arrest warrants and conduct
preliminary hearings.22
The nature of the offenses defined by the acts further handicapped United
States attorneys. Committed late at night under the cover of disguises, these
crimes were the work of men who were sworn to secrecy and refused to implicate their coconspirators. Consequently, the evidence in these cases required
“laborious arrangement and preparation,” United States Attorney E. P. Jacobsen
informed Attorney General Akerman, because “[i]t is almost wholly circumstantial
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and of such a nice character that if it does not receive the closest attention, the
Government cannot expect to succeed in the prosecution.” Furthermore, the
need to prove an intent to deprive the victims of these crimes of some constitutional right, Jacobsen noted, required “the examination of many witnesses,
which will have to be repeated in most of the cases.” He concluded that the
“preparation of these cases will require great and attentive care, and, in view of
the wealth and influence opposed to the Government, they are in themselves
more than one counsel can attend to.”23
The expansion of the workload in the federal courts continued unabated
into the 1870s and added to the judicial strain. Attorney General James Speed
complained in 1866 that recent “legislation superinduced by the altered conditions and new relation of the nation has developed into such massive proportion…,” that it would be difficult to conduct the business and interests confided
to his office “without sinking under them.” Speed’s complaint was echoed by
Attorney General Akerman in 1871 when he confided to a friend: “I am on the
rack from morning till night, and frequently far into the night, and yet, with all
that, I can hardly keep down this pile of business.” Akerman explained that the
state courts “are not as trusted [by all litigants] as formerly,” and litigants who
could used the federal courts. He also noted that new legislation had greatly
expanded the number of criminal cases the federal courts heard. The
Enforcement Acts and the revenue laws accounted for most of this accretion in
the criminal docket.24
By 1871, the situation in some districts was desperate. Jacobson, the United
States attorney for the Southern District of Mississippi, traveled to the Northern
District to assist the United States attorney there, G. Wiley Wells, because
Enforcement Acts cases threatened to overwhelm Wells. Jacobson volunteered
his services. A few months later Jacobson was in danger of being overwhelmed
himself, and he informed the attorney general that he simply could not “physically perform the necessary labor.” Conditions in Tennessee were no less dismal,
for the United States attorney at Nashville, R. McPhail Smith, informed United
States Circuit Judge Halmer H. Emmons:
I fear that it will not be in my power to get up for you anything like the preparation you will desire. I have no means of assembling my witnesses & conferring with them prior to the trial of cases. We have usually relied, in criminal
cases at least, upon eliciting from witnesses, whose testimony obtained the
indictment before the grand jury, the details of the case for the first time
when upon the stand.

50

The Politics of Judicial Interpretation

He did not even have an assistant who could take notes during the grand jury
hearing. Instead, “the prosecuting officer ‘goes in’ pell mell & takes the chances.”
It is not surprising that other federal officials sought his removal for “inefficiency, want of zeal, or…the unsatisfactory results here….” However, Judge
Emmons defended him to the attorney general and attributed Smith’s unsatisfactory performance to the conditions under which he labored:
I am only surprised at the progress he has made in securing testimony, scattered as it is over the district, in so many of the hundreds of cases under his
charge. As a matter of course, he cannot unaided prepare as they should be
any considerable number of them upon the facts, and have one moment left
for legal examination.
Other United States attorneys were equally harried.25
The plight of legal officers engaged in civil rights prosecutions during
Reconstruction was somewhat analogous to that of the present legal staff of the
Federal Trade Commission, which has been trying to bring antitrust suits against
some of the large oil conglomerates. Although the legal issues in civil rights cases
were not as complex, nor the legal procedure as vexatiously consuming as the
antitrust cases, nineteenth-century legal officers were similarly opposed by betterpaid and better-staffed lawyers who were able to raise fine points of law that
challenged the skills and exhausted the time and energy of government counsel.
Like present-day government attorneys, they were at a decided disadvantage to
opposition counsel, and this disadvantage adversely affected their performance.26
The situation was no better for federal judges. They, like federal attorneys,
lacked adequate assistance. Not only did they struggle with insufficient clerical
help, but also they sometimes did not have a legal library or copies of federal
statutes. Under such conditions backlogs developed that, over time, became
exceedingly burdensome. When he assumed his judicial duties in Memphis,
Tennessee, in November 1871, Judge Emmons found some three to four hundred
cases on the docket, some of which were described as “long standing and … of the
highest national as well as local importance.” The equity docket for the district had
not been called for five years, “and such has been the pressure upon the District
Judge that the administration of Federal law has been practically suspended.”“It is
no proper designation of this condition of things to say it is unfortunate,” the
judge concluded, “it is simply disgraceful.” The condition of the federal courts in
Tennessee may have been extreme, but federal judges generally were burdened by
a lack of resources, expanding workloads, and backlogged dockets.27
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The racial and class character of the Enforcement Acts prosecutions not only
presented difficulties to the government, but it also called into question the very
legitimacy of the federal courts in the South. Defendants were always white and
frequently men of wealth and influence; victims were usually black. Racism and
class bias worked against the credibility of government witnesses. Even when
juries were willing to convict, federal attorneys were hard pressed to persuade
juries to accept the testimony of persons regarded as inferior against that of
highly respected leaders of the community.28
The legitimacy and credibility of these prosecutions were severely undermined by their unavoidably partisan nature. The Ku Klux Klan was an instrument of the Democratic Party that was dedicated to the destruction of the
Republican Party in the South. Consequently, defendants in these trials were
invariably Democrats while the government’s witnesses were almost always
Republicans. Without these prosecutions, federal officers observed, the
Republican Party could not survive, and individual Republicans could not enjoy
such fundamental rights as freedom of speech and assembly, the right to vote for
the candidates of their choice, of life itself. United States District Judge Richard
Busteed went so far as to boast, albeit with apparent exaggeration, that without
his judicial assistance the Republican Party would have disappeared from
Alabama. When the federal courts implemented the Enforcement Acts they
almost always acted against Democratic Conservatives and in the interest of
Republicans. The federal judiciary quickly assumed the appearance, if not the
reality, of being an instrument of the Republican Party.29
For Republicans, the survival of their fundamental liberties depended upon the
success of Enforcement Acts prosecutions. For Democrats, local self-determination
and white supremacy required their cessation. The national government’s
administration of criminal justice represented to Democratic Conservatives and
white supremacists an intrusion into local democratic government tantamount
to a revolution in the federal structure of the Union that ensured the destruction of individual liberty. The national government’s intervention with military
force and suspension of habeas corpus gave credence to the Democratic
Conservatives’ charges of military despotism and executive imperialism. They
demanded a return to the traditional system of local law enforcement not only
because of their states’ rights philosophy, but also because of their belief that
local law enforcement was the only salvation of civil liberty in the United States,
as they defined civil liberty. The impact of federal law enforcement on race relations reinforced these attitudes. Southern Democratic Conservatives believed
that the maintenance of white domination over blacks was essential to their
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personal liberty. Senator Reverdy Johnson expressed this connection among
politics, political philosophy, and racism in an impassioned plea to the United
States Circuit Court at Columbia, South Carolina: “in the name of justice and
humanity, in the name of those rights for which our fathers fought, you cannot
subject the white man to the absolute and unconditional dominion of an armed
force of a colored race.”30
The composition of juries added to the vulnerability of the federal courts to
charges of partisanship. Restricting jury lists to members of the dominant political party was a common practice in many nineteenth-century courts. In the
Enforcement Acts cases, however, the composition of the juries had important
political consequences. Democratic Conservatives uniformly refused to indict
Klansmen when they sat on grand juries or to convict them when they sat on
petit juries. To ensure “impartial” jury determinations, venires had to be assembled in ways that excluded Democratic Conservatives. This meant that juries
were comprised essentially of Republicans. This also meant that blacks not only
served on juries, but also that they often comprised majorities. Southern white
racists, who were incensed that black witnesses were even allowed to testify
against them, regarded blacks sitting in judgment of them as an intolerable
affront to their dignity. Democratic Conservatives viewed the racial and political composition of federal juries as evidence of the government’s partisan
motives in Enforcement Acts prosecutions and its determination to win convictions regardless of the guilt or innocence of the accused. What was common
practice in other places constituted proof of judicial persecution and injustice in
the minds of Democratic Conservatives. Federal authorities were thus caught in
an unresolvable dilemma. To open venires to Democratic Conservatives and
Klan sympathizers effectively precluded the possibility of securing indictments
and convictions of the guilty. But, limiting juries to “honest and impartial” men
who supported the enforcement of federal laws was interpreted as court packing,
which undermined the legitimacy of the federal courts among many of the most
influential people in the South.31
Because the Enforcement Acts trials were so inherently political, even the resolution of seemingly apolitical legal questions carried political implications. For
example, the federal rules of evidence prohibited husbands and wives from testifying in behalf of each other in federal cases. This rule was challenged in
Enforcement Acts cases in Mississippi. Defense counsel claimed that this rule did
not apply in Mississippi because an 1862 federal statute provided that the procedural rules of the forum state should be used in federal cases at common law,
equity, and admiralty law. Mississippi permitted spouses to testify in each other’s
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behalf. This issue was raised because defense witnesses who were closely related
to defendants frequently perjured themselves to provide defendants with alibis.
The prosecution was at a loss to counter such perjured testimony because crimes
were usually committed at night “and under the additional protection of disguised and disciplined caution, and direct testimony…” was difficult to procure. Judge Hill ruled in favor of the defense and allowed wives to testify in
behalf of their husbands. “The advantage therefore gained by the defendants
under this ruling,” wrote United States Attorney E. P. Jacobson, “is exceedingly
serious.” In itself, this issue was apolitical. However, in the context of these cases,
it carried serious political implications because it so substantially affected their
outcome.32
The judicial process throughout the United States generally was held in low
esteem at this time. Jurors were thought to be incompetent, even in the federal
courts. Federal judges complained that the most intelligent members of the
community evaded jury duty because they regarded it as burdensome and
inconvenient. The courts ended up with the least qualified members of the community who could often not comprehend the law, the arguments of opposing
counsel, or the nuances of commercial disputes. Judges repeatedly petitioned
Congress to enact legislation requiring a literacy test as a basic qualification for
federal jurors.33
Not only in the South were attorneys and judges regarded as venal, partisan,
self-interested, and corrupt. The New York Times reported that the city courts of
New York were demoralized because of the “chicanery, favoritism and corruption” of the lawyers and judges who used the courts to advance their personal
interests. Former Supreme Court Justice John Archibald Campbell blamed the
public for the debased condition of the judiciary because of its tolerating “corruption maladministration, partiality in courts—worthlessness in juries, &
[regarding] government only as a means of exploitation….”34
Participants in Klan trials were sometimes accused of acting for selfaggrandizement. Judge Bond claimed that Senator Reverdy Johnson exploited
the South Carolina Klan trials as a springboard into the White House. The fact
that Senator Johnson’s son was the United States marshal responsible for federal
law enforcement in these cases gives a dissonant sound to the senator’s charges
of despotic disregard for civil liberty on the part of federal officers. However,
whether he was attempting to advance himself to the White House is another
matter all together. More credible are Judge Bond’s intimations concerning his
judicial brother, District Judge George S. Bryan. South Carolina Democrats purportedly offered Judge Bryan the governorship if he would support their position
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on legal questions raised in the trials. Whether Bryan was induced by their lure
is uncertain. But, Judge Bond was convinced that the “democrats have hold of
him… & persuade him to be a stick between our legs at every step.” When
defense counsel began to enter motions to quash the indictments, Bond wrote to
his wife:
This will be the beginning of my troubles with old Bryan. I went to him the
other day & frightened him half to death. I stormed at him & told him, if he
wanted his salary increased (you know he is always talking about that) he
had just better [not] keep the court sitting doing nothing but posing about
the smallest matter in the world day after day. He caved right in…I am sick
of him & altogether disgusted & he is with me.
Bryan did disagree with Bond on the scope of constitutional authority to
enforce civil rights and forced the cases to the Supreme Court.35
The participation of legal officers in partisan political activities intensified
the politicization of the judicial process. Attorney General Akerman continued
his active involvement in the Georgia Republican Party, and he traveled around
the country in support of Republican candidates for office. When he was offered
the chairmanship of the Georgia State Republican Committee, he declined
because he was too distant to be effective and because “such an appointment
might expose the committee to the reproach of being a mere executive agency.”
Nonetheless, he apparently did not feel that the office of attorney general would
in any way be compromised.36
United States marshals and attorneys also openly participated in politics.
They saw no impropriety in actively campaigning for Republican candidates for
federal, state, and local offices. In fact, one’s political connections were an essential condition for appointment to, and retention of, these offices. Department of
Justice officers continually reassured the attorney general of their political loyalty. Nor were they above using the federal courts for political advantage. United
States Marshal Stephen B. Packard, for example, found the District Court at New
Orleans an effective instrument in aiding his custom house gang’s struggle to
win the governorship in 1873 for William P. Kellogg against Henry C. Warmoth.
Benjamin H. Bristow was so disgusted with the politics of his office as United
States attorney at Louisville that he wanted to resign in 1869.37
The incident involving District Judge Bryan shows that federal judges were
not immune to politics either. While Judge Bryan’s behavior represented blatant
self-interest, judges were political in other ways. Political campaigning within
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their districts was a common practice. They evidently felt no need to hide their
political affiliations. The United States district judge for Virginia, John
Underwood, was notoriously partisan. He even went so far as to use his courtroom as a meeting place for the Republican organization in his area. Of course,
not all judges shared this rather loose conception of judicial propriety. Circuit
Judge Emmons eschewed politics and bent over backwards to avoid the taint of
partisanship in his courtroom. However, he still found no impropriety in the
selection of judicial officers and jurors on the basis of party affiliation. District
Judge Hill avoided party politics in Mississippi, but because he felt “that a faithful and impartial administration of the Constitution and laws, as the only judge
in the State was as much as could reasonably be required of one man.”38
The very manner in which federal judges perceived the function of their
courts politicized them. Judges assumed that their essential role was to enforce
the statutes enacted by Congress in the ways in which Congress intended them
to be implemented, so long as the laws did not obviously conflict with the
Constitution. Judges therefore functioned as instruments of congressional will.
However, the Enforcement Acts and the Reconstruction Amendments had been
adopted along purely partisan lines. Republican congressional majorities
enacted them over the vehement opposition of Democratic minorities. They
were enacted for the purpose of protecting citizens’ civil and political rights. But,
the citizens who were to be protected were primarily Republicans in the South,
and the persons from whom they needed protection were Democrats. In implementing the Enforcement Acts, therefore, judges, intentionally or not, functioned as instruments of a Republican-controlled Congress. This partisan quality
of the judicial enforcement of civil rights was so evident to contemporaries that
attorneys, judges, and the public referred to the legal reasoning supporting the
constitutionality or unconstitutionality of these laws as the Republican or the
Democratic interpretation. Related legal questions were commonly discussed
and resolved in the courts and in the public forum not only on the basis of
commitment to racial equality and legal and political philosophy, but also on the
basis of party affiliation.39
Political scientists have for some time studied the influence of sociopolitical
factors on a judge’s behavior on the bench. These studies have demonstrated that
a judge’s background and familiarity with the community he serves affect his
behavior on the bench. They suggest that the longer and the more involved the
connection between the judge and the community the more likely and the more
strongly will he conform to and reflect local values, attitudes, interests, and
objectives in his decisions. Pressures to conform to local interests and perspectives
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increase when a judge is native to his district and has participated in local and
state politics before his judicial appointment.40
These studies provide insights into the political context of the federal judges’
actions during Reconstruction. Of the eleven district judges who were involved
in Enforcement Acts cases, only one, Richard Busteed, was a recent immigrant to
his district. Eight were native to their districts while two, Busteed and John
Erskine, were born in Ireland. One judge, John Underwood, was born in New
York state although he had moved to Virginia in 1832. Judge Erskine had moved
to Florida in 1832 before settling in Georgia in 1855. At least nine of these judges
had been involved in politics before their appointment to the bench. Only Judge
Underwood had been an abolitionist before the Civil War and a known Radical
Republican after the War. Judge Ballard of Kentucky was noted for his dedication
to federal law and, until 1872 at least, the civil rights of blacks.
None of these judges had been appointed by President Grant. Four judges,
George W. Brooks of North Carolina (1865), George S. Bryan of South Carolina
(1866), John Erskine of Georgia (1866), and Robert A. Hill of Mississippi (1866)
were appointed by President Andrew Johnson. Five judges, Bland Ballard of
Kentucky (1861), Richard Busteed of Alabama (1863), John Jackson, Jr., of West
Virginia (1861), Connally F. Trigg of Tennessee (1862), and John Underwood of
Virginia (1863) were appointed by President Abraham Lincoln. Two judges, John
Cadwalader of Pennsylvania and Humphrey Howe Leavitt of Ohio, were
appointed before the Civil War. Judge Cadwalader was appointed by President
James Buchanan in 1858, and Judge Leavitt was appointed by President Andrew
Jackson in 1834. All of these district judges, then, had been appointed to the federal court long before the Enforcement Acts were enacted, and most if not all of
them had been appointed by presidents who were, or probably would have been,
opposed to the acts’ implementation.41
All of the judges except Busteed and Underwood were well accepted and
respected by local elites in their districts. Judge Underwood was unpopular
because of his blatant Radical republicanism. Judge Busteed, disliked by both
Southern Democratic Conservatives and Republicans, was resented because of
his political charlatanism and frequent and extended absences from his district. With three exceptions, these district judges favored states’ rights over federal authority, and they were either opposed to the policies of the Grant
administration or were Democrats or both. Only Judges Ballard, Hill, and
Underwood were committed to the goals of congressional Reconstruction.
One can understand the caution with which United States attorneys brought
Enforcement Acts cases before district judges. Nor is it difficult to understand
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why they felt that district judges were less reliable than the circuit judges in
these cases.
Only three federal circuit judges were involved in Enforcement Acts prosecutions in the early 1870s. Their actions illustrate the influence of sociopolitical
factors on judicial behavior. Since Congress established the circuit courts in
1869, the circuit judges were all appointed by President Grant. Hugh Lennox
Bond, born in Baltimore, was raised and educated in New York City. He returned
to Baltimore after college and settled and married there. A member of the
American Party in the 1850s, he, together with Henry Winter Davis, became one
of the founders of the Republican Party in Maryland. Not only was he against
slavery, but he also favored equal rights. As a judge of the Baltimore Criminal
Court he assisted Freedmen’s Bureau attorneys in litigation challenging the
legality of discriminatory indenture contracts. He consistently supported black
education and voting rights. Having demonstrated his Radical Republican credentials, he was appointed to the Fourth Circuit in 1869 by President Grant. One
historian has suggested that the president appointed Bond because he felt that
Bond was particularly well suited to try Ku Klux Klan cases.42
Not much is known about the other two circuit judges, Halmer H. Emmons
and William B. Woods. Judge Emmons seems not to have been involved in politics before his appointment. A native of Michigan, he was appointed to a circuit
that comprised two border states, Kentucky and Tennessee, and two Northern
states, Indiana and his home state. Because he resided outside the South, he
maintained a Northern identity, which enabled him to avoid many of the
Southern Conservative pressures to which other federal judges were exposed.
Judge Woods was also a Northerner by birth and background. His home state
was Ohio. He distinguished himself in the Union army during the Civil War
despite the fact that he was a prominent Ohio Democrat who had opposed
President Lincoln. However, he became an ardent Republican after the Civil War
in his adopted state of Alabama. Before his appointment to the federal bench,
Woods engaged in cotton planting, various business ventures, and the practice
of law in addition to playing a leading role in the Alabama Republican Party. His
appointment to the Fifth Circuit was crucial to Enforcement Acts prosecutions,
because the Fifth Circuit encompassed the states of the Deep South in which
many of the cases arose.43
Circuit judges were more committed to the vigorous enforcement of federal
laws than were the district judges. They had been Republicans before coming on
the federal bench. They had been appointed by a Republican president and given
a mandate to enforce federal laws. They were relatively insulated from local
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pressures, and they were more disposed by circumstance and inclination to apply
federal authority even in the face of local opposition than were district judges.
Little wonder that United States attorneys preferred to bring their cases before
circuit judges. But the federal judicial business depended more on district judges
than circuit judges. Circuit judges had to travel over several states and divide their
time among many more courts than did the district judges. Moreover, district
judges held court more often and for longer periods than did circuit judges. United
States Attorney D. T. Corbin of South Carolina, for example, determined that the
circuit judge of the Fourth Circuit could not possibly hold court in each district of
his circuit every year. Consequently, from their perspective, United States attorneys
were forced to bring their cases before the least reliable federal judges.44
Legal historian Kermit L. Hall demonstrated that these courts accommodated
both federal law and local interests. That federal judges were expected to be sensitive to local, regional, and sectional interests gave their courts a democratic flavor. The participation of judicial appointees in local politics before their
elevation to the bench reinforced this democratic quality. Hall asserts that party
organization “acted as a link between the priorities of a national administration
and the needs of local constituencies serviced by the lower federal courts.”
However, the infusion of partisanship and localism into the federal courts that
provided such a link before the Civil War subjected them to severe strains during Reconstruction. The priorities of the Grant administration were in direct
and irreconcilable conflict with local Southern Conservative interests. After the
Civil War, party affiliation became a scalpel severing national policy and dominant local interests. Federal district judges were in the untenable position of
having to please two irreconcilable constituencies.45
These opposing pressures already have been discussed with respect to Judge
Bryan in South Carolina. Bryan’s reluctance vigorously to enforce federal law
against the Ku Klux Klan in 1871 was consistent with his posture generally on the
bench. Secretary of the Treasury Hugh McCulloch complained to Attorney
General William Evarts in 1868 that Judge Bryan was too lenient in Revenue Act
cases. According to Louis F. Post, law clerk to United States Attorney Corbin,
Judge Bryan was as undesirable personally as he was as a judge. “It may be disrespectful to criticize the behavior of a Judge, and bad taste to speak harshly of
an old man,” he wrote as a correspondent of the New York Tribune during the
Ku Klux Klan trials at Columbia, South Carolina,
but if there are exceptional cases, he certainly is one. Judge Bryan, on the
Bench, is weak, vacillating, ignorant, and old-womanish; and it may not be
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amiss to add that he is far from being always courteous to his presiding
brother, and his whole bearing as associate Justice is marked by bad taste in
the highest degree.
United States Attorney Corbin tried to avoid bringing Enforcement Acts cases
before Judge Bryan, he explained to Senator George F. Edmunds, chairman of
the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1872, because “[a]ll the causes heretofore
attempted to be brought before the Court, have failed.” Judge Bond also found
that “all the negro population abjuring Judge Bryan look to me for protection as
well as do the poorer class of whites.”46
Judge Connally F. Trigg of Tennessee represented an even more serious threat to
federal law enforcement. Federal legal officers complained that he was a states’ rights
sympathizer who had little loyalty to the United States government. He was accused
of failing to enforce the federal revenue laws in good faith, of going to great lengths
to dismiss cases in favor of defendants, of releasing prisoners, of refusing to hear
Enforcement Acts cases, and of failing to hold court regularly. The United States
attorney at Nashville, R. McPhail Smith, complained to Attorney General Akerman
in 1871 that “the Federal Courts in his hands in this State amount to very little.” The
United States marshal, L. B. Eaton, told Circuit Judge Emmons in even more
emphatic terms that “[t]he simple truth is that the enforcement of the 14th and 15th
Amendments and of the revenue laws in this state rests solely upon your presence,
firmness and courage.” United States Attorney Smith so desperately wanted to avoid
Judge Trigg that he offered to pay the expenses if another judge could be brought
from another district to sit on the federal court at Nashville.47
The political posture of Judge Richard Busteed of Alabama was more elusive
and more variable. He was a political chameleon who not only changed political
affiliations between the Democratic and Republican Parties over time, but also
his publicly stated opinions contradicted his private views. Despite the abundant
evidence of Ku Klux Klan terrorism presented in his court, he publicly disclaimed any knowledge of the Klan’s existence in Alabama or of any threats to
personal rights in that state. However, in private conversations with federal legal
officers he not only conceded the Klan’s existence and terrorism, but he also recommended that additional federal legislation be enacted to make all violations
of personal rights crimes against the United States and punishable in the federal
courts. Judge Busteed was obviously playing on both sides of the Klan issue; he
could thus appease local power wielders and federal legal officers.48
Federal legal officers sometimes encountered difficulties in enforcing civil
rights even when the district judge supported federal authority and the
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Enforcement Acts. No one disputed the commitment of Judge Hill of Mississippi
to protect personal rights and to advance Republican policies. Yet, legal officers
complained of his leniency in Enforcement Acts cases. The problem, according
to Deputy Marshal Allen P. Huggins, was Judge Hill’s “known weakness.”
“Sometimes the Ku Klux in the people will break out,” Huggins informed
Attorney General Akerman in 1871, “and the Court is so completely overawed
that I do not see much chance for justice to be meted out to these fiends in
human shape.” As a Mississippian who was active in local politics before his
appointment to the federal bench by President Johnson, Judge Hill’s leniency
and weakness in Ku Klux cases is not surprising. Moreover, he suffered from an
exaggerated need to be accepted by the legal community of his district. On the
other hand, much can be said in support of Judge Hill’s desire to avoid alienating local elites. He commented to Solicitor General Bristow, “I know that unless
these laws are enforced in such a manner as to bring to their support the moral
influence of the sober right thinking men of the State it will be a failure….”
Herein lay the essential problem the federal courts confronted in the South: the
impossibility of accommodating national law and local interests when these two
were in opposition to one another. Not surprisingly, Attorney General Akerman
informed United States Attorney E. P. Jacobson that his was “not the only district
where the judiciary succumbs to the pressure of a local sentiment.”49
Despite the seemingly overwhelming adverse pressures and conditions in
which they operated, the federal courts generally upheld the authority of the
federal government under the Enforcement Acts of 1870 and 1871. All Southern
district judges upheld their constitutionality, even if reluctantly. Some opposed
using them in Ku Klux Klan prosecutions. That even unsympathetic Southern
federal judges opposed to the national enforcement of civil rights upheld the
constitutionality of congressional civil rights legislation demonstrates how
strongly held was their view that the judicial function was to implement
Congress’s will unless it was obviously unconstitutional. That these unsympathetic judges accepted or attributed such broad power to Congress under the
Reconstruction Amendments is revealing evidence of contemporaries’ understanding of the expansive scope of legislative intent and the authority of the
national government under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. This
analysis suggests that the failures of the national government to enforce civil
rights were due not to insufficient constitutional or legal authority but to institutional and political obstacles.
Terrorist groups such as the Ku Klux Klan and local law enforcement authorities
spearheaded the continuing rebellion against federal authority. Congress attempted
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to put down this rebellion primarily through the judicial implementation of the
Enforcement Acts. Judicial process was invoked against violent insurrection.
However, by upholding and applying national authority to secure civil rights, the
federal courts ensured their condemnation by local political elites. Southern
spokesmen not only criticized the federal courts for venal partisanship, but they
also discredited the very legitimacy of federal judicial process under national
civil rights legislation. Southern Democratic Conservatives characterized the
Enforcement Acts as unconstitutional invitations to executive and judicial
despotism enacted by a partisan Congress for the purpose of destroying representative government and civil liberty in the South. Republicans, on the other
hand, could not expect to receive justice in the local courts, which sometimes
were used against them to retaliate for federal enforcement of civil rights. The
federal courts thus became the new battleground of the Civil War, and their success depended greatly on the support they received from government officials in
Washington. We therefore turn now to an analysis of the Department of Justice
and its impact upon judicial behavior.50

4

C

The Department of Justice
and Civil Rights
Enforcement, 1870–1871

ongress created the Department of Justice approximately one month
after the enactment of the Enforcement Act of May 31, 1870. This administrative reform enlarged the attorney general’s office and centralized
the legal business of the national government within it. By creating a permanent
staff of attorneys, Congress expected the new executive department to handle
the nation’s legal affairs more efficiently and effectively and to eliminate the need
to hire outside counsel. These changes reportedly represented a savings of
$1,000,000 per year. A massive problem of criminal law enforcement in certain
Southern states soon confronted the enlarged and reorganized attorney general’s
office. The largest and most consuming area that engaged the new department
was the protection of civil rights. Overcoming the almost insurmountable obstacles described in the previous chapter, federal legal officers successfully enforced
the civil rights acts of 1870 and 1871 against Ku Klux Klan terrorism. Despite their
success, or perhaps because of it, the attorney general largely abandoned civil
rights enforcement in 1873 in an effort to reduce mounting departmental expenses.
The history of the Justice Department’s response to the challenge presented by the
Ku Klux Klan has not been fully explored. Yet, the extent to which department
officers and federal judges attempted to enforce civil rights reveals much about
the commitment of federal legal officers to civil rights enforcement during
Reconstruction.1
The Department of Justice was inaugurated with a new attorney general.
President Grant’s first attorney general, E. Rockwood Hoar, resigned his office
just days before Congress passed the bill creating the department. In addition to
the respect he enjoyed for his legal abilities, Hoar was noted for his integrity and
nonpartisanship in conducting the legal affairs of the government. His successor,
Amos T. Akerman, also was esteemed for his legal abilities, but he was more controversial. Born in New Hampshire and educated at Dartmouth College,
Akerman moved to Georgia where he studied law under John McPherson
Berrian, a former United States senator and attorney general under President
Andrew Jackson. Akerman strongly opposed secession at the outbreak of the
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Civil War, but he later served in the Confederate government for eighteen
months. At the conclusion of the war, he helped to organize the Republican
Party in Georgia, although Congress did not remove the disabilities he incurred
as a Confederate governmental officer until 1869. As a Republican, Akerman suffered proscription and social ostracism because of his switch in political loyalties.
His ardent republicanism was also the reason for his appointment as United
States attorney for Georgia just months before President Grant elevated him to
the position of attorney general in June 1870.2
The man appointed as the solicitor general was another ardent Republican
with Southern ties, Benjamin H. Bristow of Kentucky. Relatively unknown outside of his home state, Bristow came to President Grant’s attention because of his
role in party politics and his efforts in behalf of the civil rights of blacks as
United States attorney at Louisville. Grant initially offered him the position of
assistant attorney general, but Bristow declined the appointment because the
salary of $5,000 was too low. The position of solicitor general carried an extra
$2,500 per year, still an income lower than that of a successful attorney, but
apparently high enough to persuade Bristow to join the Grant administration.3
Thus, the two highest legal officers of the United States were personally and
politically committed to the goals of congressional Reconstruction. Bristow had
already demonstrated his commitment to civil rights as United States attorney
for Kentucky; Akerman was about to demonstrate his commitment as attorney
general. Allen Trelease has suggested that the reason for Akerman’s unswerving
desire to destroy the Ku Klux Klan and his efforts to punish its criminal members was because he personally had been endangered by this organization in
Georgia. That, together with his firsthand experience of Georgia politics, helps
to explain the firm stand he took against the Ku Klux Klan. He knew that federal
authorities had to take vigorous action if lawlessness was to be stopped and if the
Republican Party was to survive in the South.4
Nevertheless, Akerman preferred to leave the administration of criminal justice
to the states, because local authorities had traditionally performed this function.
Akerman’s attitude was typical of nineteenth-century federal legal officers even
in regard to federal criminal law. Prior to the Civil War, United States attorneys
general gave only passing attention to the enforcement of federal criminal laws.
United States attorneys were allowed to enforce federal law as they saw fit. This
prosecutorial discretion was attractive when it came to Klan crimes because they
were unlike violations of any previous federal laws. The protection of persons and
property from violence was a radically new function Congress thrust upon federal
legal officers for which they were ill prepared institutionally and professionally.
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“The difficulty,” Attorney General Akerman informed Alabama United States
Attorney John A. Minnis in February 1871,
is that the United States government is not so constituted as to be able to
reach outrages of this character with due efficiency. The State governments
are designed to be the regular and usual protectors of person and property,
and when they fail in this, through the indisposition of officials, or private
citizens, it is hard to accomplish the result in any other way.5
Yet, when the new Department of Justice was organized, the Klan’s criminality
was so pervasive that local law enforcement authorities in several Southern states
were unable to provide even the semblance of criminal law enforcement.
Military action and the imposition of martial law were probably the most effective means of bringing Klansmen to account. But, state legislatures refused to
invoke martial law, and state governors were reluctant to call out militia to combat the Ku Klux Klan. Instead, state officials looked to the federal government for
protection. Congress responded in 1870 and 1871 with civil rights legislation
aimed specifically at the Klan. The enforcement of this legislation required a
significant departure from the attorney general’s traditional inaction in federal
criminal law enforcement.
Attorney General Akerman nevertheless quickly prompted federal legal officers to enforce civil rights. One month after he took office, Akerman issued a
circular to all United States attorneys, marshals, deputy marshals, and commissioners with instructions to implement the Enforcement Act of May 31, 1870. He
informed them that the statute
makes it your special duty to initiate proceedings against all violators of the
act. You will, therefore, whenever you receive from any source credible information that this law has been violated, take prompt measures for the arrest
and effectual prosecution of the guilty party.
Akerman repeated these instructions to legal officers individually and complimented them when they energetically enforced the law. He even urged the
federal marshal in San Francisco to prosecute vigorously all persons who discriminated against the Chinese there in violation of the Enforcement Act.6
Despite the attorney general’s promptings, the act was not vigorously
enforced in 1870. Only forty-three cases were prosecuted under the Enforcement
Act that year. Of these, however, thirty-two resulted in convictions. Five cases
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resulted in acquittals, and six were nolle prosequi. Generally, the number of
Enforcement Act cases were few, but, compared to the average for all federal
criminal cases in the United States, they resulted in substantially higher conviction
rates (74% as against 53%) and lower nolle prosequi rates (14% as against 8%).
The acquittal rate, however, was also slightly higher for Enforcement Act cases
than for all criminal cases (12% and 8%, respectively).7
The Enforcement Act was relatively unenforced in 1870 because the disincentives far outweighed the incentives. As has already been discussed, federal legal
officers often were reluctant or unwilling to enforce federal criminal laws.
Moreover, state legal officers traditionally exercised jurisdiction over crimes
against personal rights. To make these areas of law enforcement high priorities,
federal legal officers had to assume a different attitude toward the functions and
duties of their offices. In addition, as the previous chapter noted, merely establishing that crimes had been committed, or that crimes had been committed by
members of the Ku Klux Klan, was difficult. Victims frequently were unwilling
to bring charges or to testify against their assailants. Even when they were willing,
victims were usually poor black country people who had been terrorized by
white gangs that were often led by leading citizens. Legal officers were reluctant
to involve themselves in such situations, particularly when the very existence of
the Klan and its crimes was so vehemently denied by the Southern press and
politicians. Legal officers who shared the political views and racial prejudices of
Southern Democratic Conservatives used these denials to justify prudent
inaction. The political context and practical difficulties of civil rights enforcement would have discouraged even sincerely committed legal officers. Under
these circumstances, the attorney general had to do more than merely
announce a policy of civil rights enforcement to get legal officers in the field
to protect civil rights.8
Still, 271 prosecutions were pending in the federal courts at the end of 1870.
Many of these cases were brought in Northern states. However, the bulk of these
cases, some 190 (70%), were instituted in one state, Tennessee. The federal
district courts disposed of four other cases in this state in 1870, two by convictions and two by nolle prosequi. The low rate of disposal (2%) in these
Enforcement Act cases was consistent with the disposal rate of criminal cases
generally in Tennessee. Only 17% of the total criminal docket was cleared in 1870,
leaving 83% for 1871. This was considerably lower than the average disposal rate
for all federal judicial districts in the United States. On the average, 41% of the
criminal docket of the federal courts was disposed of in 1870, and 59% was carried over into 1871. These statistics tend to confirm the criticism of federal legal
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officers in Tennessee about District Judge Connally F. Trigg’s antipathy towards
enforcing federal law.9
Federal inaction bred greater local violence. As Klan violence increased in the
spring and summer of 1871, so did the urgings of the attorney general to bring
violators of federal criminal law to justice. Akerman again admonished United
States attorneys to institute prosecutions “whenever you find that the
Enforcement Act, or the Civil Rights Act, has been broken….” He stated that
these laws were to be vigorously enforced “against all parties who may be guilty.”
The attorney general was attempting to fill the void created in criminal law
enforcement by the collapse of local authorities with a federal administration of
criminal justice. His policy went beyond the goals of stopping further Klan violence and destroying the Ku Klux Klan. Akerman’s objective was to bring to justice
all persons involved in Ku Klux crimes.10
The attorney general believed that peace could be restored only by directing
the full force of federal power against criminals:
It [is] my individual opinion that nothing is more idle than to attempt to
conciliate by kindness that portion of the southern people who are still malcontent. They take all kindness on the part of the Government as evidence
of timidity, and hence are emboldened to lawlessness by it. It appears impossible for the Government to win their affection. But it can command their
respect by the exercise of its powers. It is the business of a judge to terrify evil
doers, not to coax them.
Experience in Georgia and North Carolina supported this draconian
approach to law enforcement, for federal officers’ appeasement of the Klan in
these states merely led to greater lawlessness. Relying on this experience,
Akerman concluded: “The policy of coaxing those of our people who are
unfriendly to the Government has utterly failed hitherto.”11
Men of high position and stature who committed crimes were not to be spared
the embarrassment and inconvenience of defending themselves in a federal court
of law. On the contrary, federal legal officers were to “make special efforts to subject them to the vengeance of the law.” Expressing the belief that the conviction
of a few leading citizens would most effectively end lawlessness, Akerman and
Bristow urged subordinates to make examples of them. “The higher the social
standing and character of the convicted party,” Solicitor General Bristow
instructed the United States attorney in North Carolina, “the more important is
a vigorous prosecution and prompt execution of judgment.”12
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However, the enormity of prosecuting all offenders of the federal civil rights
laws was simply beyond the capacity of the Justice Department’s legal force in
the South. When Enforcement Acts cases were added to the persistently accreting
workload of the federal courts, federal legal officers pleaded for help. Requests
poured into the attorney general’s office for special assistant counsel, investigators, clerks, and stenographers to aid in the preparation and adjudication of
cases. So did calls for military assistance to make arrests, to hold prisoners for
trial, and to protect government witnesses and officers while the federal courts
tried defendants.13
At first, the attorney general rejected requests for special assistance even
when they came from cabinet officers such as Secretary of War William Belknap
and Secretary of the Treasury George Boutwell. The reason was twofold. One of
the reforms intended by the creation of the Department of Justice was the elimination of special assistant counsel. Consequently, the statute establishing the
department prohibited the employment of such assistance unless the legal issues
were of such a highly specialized nature that ordinary legal officers were unable
to handle them. The second reason for this policy was the lack of money to
employ such assistance. “It will be difficult,” Attorney General Akerman
explained in rejecting a request for aid from District Judge Hill in July 1871, “if
not impossible in view of the general increase of the business of the country to
sustain the Courts through the current fiscal year upon the present appropriations. Hence, the strictest economy is a necessity.” As legal officers became
enmeshed in bringing Klansmen to justice, their repeated failure to secure
requested assistance caused some to feel abandoned. A United States deputy
marshal in Mississippi, Allen P. Huggins, lamented: “Attorney General it is too
bad to let us fight this thing against all the public opinion as single handed as we
are. We need more force enough to inspire respect and command order….”14
The attorney general was not impervious to the difficulties that confronted
his legal officers in the South. He urged Congress to enact a special appropriation for the purpose of hiring detectives to investigate civil rights violations and
to assist in bringing prosecutions in the South. The Department of Justice thus
would take the initiative in instituting civil rights prosecutions. He explained
that such investigators were needed because the victims of Ku Klux crimes “are
for the most part, poor and ignorant men, who do not know how to put the law
in motion, or who have some well-grounded apprehension of danger to themselves from the attempt to enforce it.” Congress appropriated $20,000 for these
purposes in June 1871, and the attorney general quickly asked H. C. Whitley,
chief of the Secret Service, to employ “capable and trusting persons” who would
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willingly go to the South and assist in the investigation of civil rights crimes.
However, President Grant diverted substantial amounts of the appropriation to
New York City to preclude election frauds by Democrats. The funds available for
federal officers in the South were exhausted within five months.15
Congress appropriated other funds to employ lawyers to assist in the preparation and trial of civil rights cases. Whereas the attorney general previously
had declined requests for legal assistance, by November 1871 he not only
approved such requests, but he also made unsolicited offers of such aid to United
States attorneys engaged in Enforcement Acts prosecutions. Apparently the
increase in Ku Klux crime stimulated a greater determination in the Grant
administration and Congress to bring the criminals to justice.16
The willingness to employ special legal assistance nevertheless was limited by
financial considerations. Funds were simply insufficient to meet the needs of
federal attorneys. For example, United States Attorney John A. Minnis required
$10,000 for additional attorneys in Ku Klux Klan trials in Alabama. Akerman
responded that the requested amount was simply too great for a budget of
$2,000,000 that had to be distributed among all the federal judicial districts of
the nation. To use $10,000 in one class of cases in one portion of one state was
simply impossible. However, the attorney general did authorize one half of the
requested amount, and Congress subsequently appropriated an additional
$1,000,000 for judicial expenses.17
Political considerations were almost as great a problem as the lack of funds.
Democratic Conservatives in the North and South denied that the Ku Klux
Klan existed, and they insisted that reports of Klan terrorism were presidential
and Republican exaggerations and falsehoods. Thus, while legal officers in
many areas of the South desperately struggled to put down armed insurrection, administration officials and their Republican supporters struggled to
convince the public, particularly in the North, that the Klan did exist and that
the prosecutions of its lawless members were not despotic persecutions of
Southern political opponents. This helps to explain why Attorney General
Akerman urged the United States attorneys to prosecute civil rights violators
for the purpose of exposing their crimes, even when there was no hope of
securing convictions. Judge Robert A. Hill reported some success in persuading Mississippians of the Klan’s existence in that state. “Our investigations,” he
informed Solicitor General Bristow in July 1871, “have shown the public that
there does exist in certain portions of the State an organization dangerous to
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, a fact before not generally
believed.”18
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Public disbelief in the necessity of these prosecutions, combined with the
extraordinary expenditures they required, exposed the Grant administration to
charges of boondoggling. Legal officers were paid fees based upon the number
of cases they tried. Witnesses were given per diem and travel expenses. The more
cases that were brought before the federal courts, the more money legal officers
earned. The more witnesses the government used in its prosecutions, the greater
its potential patronage. Democratic Conservatives charged that federal legal officers were using the pretext of civil rights violations for political and economic
self-interest. Sensitive to these charges, Attorney General Akerman cautioned
federal attorneys to remember “that the execution of the Enforcement Laws
must be, and must appear to the country to be, entirely free from any plausible
suspicion that they are used for the purpose of advancing any private pecuniary
interest.”19
Political considerations complicated the selection of special assistants. Some
legal officers sought to deflect partisan criticism from themselves and the courts
by appointing leading Democrats to assist in Ku Klux Klan prosecutions. United
States District Attorney Jacobson, for example, recommended the appointment
of local attorneys in Mississippi who were opposed to the Grant administration
and the Enforcement Acts, for
their connection with the cases will go far to repress from the prosecution
the complexion of political design with which the Administration is generally charged by a large class of this people, and which may prejudice the
government before the jury.
He added that these lawyers “will probably carry the jury on which ever side
retained.” Other legal officers disagreed with this strategy. United States Attorney
Minnis of Alabama counseled Attorney General Akerman that “[t]he lawyers
generally have taken strong ground against these laws, and I cannot afford to be
encumbered with a lawyer who will not cordially enter into the Spirit of the law.”
The danger in hiring sympathetic attorneys was that they most likely would be
Republicans, which would highlight the partisan appearance of the trial.20
The attorney general opted for assistant counsel who were committed to
federal law enforcement at the risk of appearing partisan. Therefore, he recommended the appointment of local attorneys who were sympathetic to the
Enforcement Acts, because Republicans were “more likely to have their hearts in
their work.” At the same time, he cautioned against using the courts for purely
partisan purposes or even giving the appearance of judicial partisanship.21
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Detectives and assistant attorneys were not the only extraordinary aid
required for Ku Klux Klan prosecutions. Because of the important constitutional
questions raised, stenographers were needed to record the voluminous depositions and pretrial testimony, as well as the proceedings of the trials themselves.
Accurate transcripts were also needed to demonstrate the very necessity of the
trials in the face of Democratic Conservative criticism. Additional deputy marshals and federal troops often were required not only to restore peace, but also
to arrest defendants, to protect witnesses, to execute judicial orders, and, in some
areas, to enable the federal courts to function at all. When added to the “ordinary” costs of prosecutions, these extraordinary expenses raised the costs of
prosecuting violators of the Enforcement Acts to staggering amounts. Judge
Bond estimated the “fearful” expenses of the month-long South Carolina Ku
Klux Klan prosecutions in 1871 at $200 per hour. Although over four hundred
defendants were scheduled for trial, the court was able to try only five.22
With the attorney general instructing legal officers to prosecute violators of
the Enforcement Acts and providing additional financial, legal, and military
resources for this purpose, prosecutions under these laws increased markedly in
1871. The total number of Enforcement Acts cases handled by the federal courts
rose by a dramatic 630% (from 43 cases to 271 cases). Although convictions
increased, acquittals and nolle prosequi cases rose by even greater percentages.
Therefore, the conviction rate for Enforcement Acts cases dropped over 30%
from the previous year (from 74% to 41%), and this rate was 10% lower than the
51% conviction rate for other criminal cases in 1871. The acquittal rate remained
about the same (12% in 1870 and 15% in 1871), and this rate was comparable to
the acquittal rate for all crimes (18%) in 1871. However, the nolle prosequi cases
rose by 30% (from 14% to 44%) over the previous year, and the 1871 nolle prosequi rate was 13% higher than the nolle prosequi rate for other crimes (which was
31%). Furthermore, the courts disposed of 63% of other federal criminal cases in
1871, but they completed only a fourth of the Enforcement Acts cases in that year.
The lower conviction rate, the higher nolle prosequi rate, and the lower case
completion rate for Enforcement Acts cases reflect the extraordinary difficulties
these cases presented to federal judges, attorneys, and marshals. Federal legal
officers may have directed much greater effort to Enforcement Acts prosecutions
in 1871, but they were far less effective here than they were in other areas of federal criminal law enforcement.
These aggregates, however, are misleading. Most Enforcement Acts cases were
instituted in 1871 in Alabama, Mississippi, North and South Carolina, and Tennessee.
Eighty-two percent of the 1,193 Enforcement Acts cases brought in 1871 were begun
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in these states. North and South Carolina heard most of these cases (20% and
36%, respectively). United States Attorney D. H. Starbuck in North Carolina was
extraordinarily successful in federal criminal prosecutions that year. He won
convictions in 75% of the cases that were disposed of in his district. Little wonder that, with all of the difficulties involved in these prosecutions, he felt entitled
“to the gratitude and thanks of the law abiding people everywhere and especially
of the Republican or Union Party of the nation which it was the purpose of this
daring conspiracy to destroy.” Starbuck was equally successful in increasing convictions and reducing acquittals and nolle prosequi cases in other criminal prosecutions, even though the number of criminal cases that were tried in his district
increased 243%. At the same time, the proportion of cases that were carried over
into 1872 also was reduced, although the actual number of cases pending
increased slightly. This extraordinary record is explained in large part by the
combined determination of United States Attorney Starbuck and United States
Circuit Judge Hugh L. Bond to enforce the federal criminal laws.23
The performance of United States Attorney Daniel T. Corbin of South
Carolina in criminal prosecutions was significantly poorer than Starbuck’s.
Judicial information for 1870 is unavailable for South Carolina, so a comparison
of 1871 with that year cannot be made. In 1871, however, Corbin succeeded in
winning convictions in only 5 trial cases, though 49 other convictions resulted
from confessions. These 54 convictions represent a conviction rate of 48%,
slightly above the average for all Enforcement Acts cases. However, the acquittal
rate in South Carolina of 34% was significantly higher than the acquittal rate of
15% for all Enforcement Acts cases. If these ratios are applied only to tried cases,
Corbin’s conviction rate drops to 12% (5 divided by 43) and his acquittal rate
skyrockets to 88%.24
The poor record in South Carolina was due to a number of factors.
Democratic Conservatives decided to concentrate their legal opposition to the
Enforcement Acts in the South Carolina federal courts. Corbin’s opposing counsel, therefore, were two of the most outstanding constitutional lawyers of the
day, Senator Reverdy Johnson and former Attorney General Henry Stanbery.
Moreover, Ku Klux violence was more virulent and widespread in South
Carolina than in any other state in that year. Only in South Carolina did the
president suspend the writ of habeas corpus under the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871.
The Klan controlled several counties in the northwestern portion of the state.
Intimidation of witnesses was great, and the sheer volume of potential cases was
staggering. Consequently, the difficulties that confronted federal legal officers in
the pretrial investigation and preparation of these cases as well as in the courtroom
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proceedings were greater in South Carolina than in any other state. Yet, more
cases were instituted there than anywhere else (390), and more cases were completed in this state than in any other (112). At the same time, Corbin nolle prosequi relatively few of these cases (20). Corbin’s handling of other federal criminal
cases reflected the strain of these Enforcement Acts prosecutions. His conviction
rate in these cases was a poor 33%, his acquittal rate a somewhat high 26%, and
his nolle prosequi rate of 41% was 10% higher than average. By the end of 1871,
the burden of the month-long trial of those 5 convicted defendants was reflected
in the 278 cases involving some 420 persons that had to be carried over into 1872.
Apart from the difficulties confronting Corbin, his attitude toward the trials to a
significant degree accounted for his poor performance. Unfavorable to the policy
reflected in the Enforcement Acts, he was careful to separate himself from that policy in court. The bungling manner in which he presented these cases before the
court reflected this attitude. Corbin’s abilities as an attorney are seriously challenged
by his performance in these trials.25
Most Ku Klux Klan cases remained untried at the end of 1871 in the states in
which most Enforcement Acts cases were instituted. Seventy-six percent were carried over into 1872. Not one such case was settled in Alabama or Mississippi. In
these two states, trials were delayed by constitutional challenges to the Enforcement
Acts and the inability of legal officers to prepare cases for trial. United States attorneys in all five states generally failed to dispose of as many criminal cases as their
counterparts in other states. Sixty-six percent of the criminal cases in these states
were carried over into 1872, whereas the average for all judicial districts was only
41%. Similarly, these states had poorer rates of conviction and higher rates of cases
that were nolle prosequi. However, the legal officers in these states reduced the
acquittal rate 4% below the average of 18%. Aggregates for these states show that,
while federal legal officers there were generally less successful in bringing cases to
trial, in convicting defendants and in clearing judicial criminal dockets, they actually performed better in Enforcement Acts cases than they did in other criminal
cases. However, the aggregates do not reflect the high degree of success with which
United States Attorney Starbuck performed in North Carolina and the comparatively poor showing of United States attorneys in South Carolina and Tennessee.26
By the end of 1871 Akerman realized that the judicial process was incapable of
reaching every offense and every offender. In his annual report for that year, he
referred to the South Carolina cases and declared:
With the caution and deliberation which the law wisely observed in criminal proceedings, it is obvious that the attempt to bring to justice, through the
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forms of law, even a small portion of the guilty in that State must fail, or the
judicial machinery of the United States must be increased. If it takes a court
over one month to try five offenders, how long will it take to try four hundred, already indicted, and many hundreds more who deserve to be
indicted?
To a lesser extent, these observations were applicable to other states as well.27
As the inability of the federal judiciary in South Carolina to prosecute every
offender of the Enforcement Acts became evident at the end of 1871, the attorney
general was forced to change his objectives and purposes there. Attorney
General Akerman’s original policy of assuming the administration of justice in
Ku Klux Klan cases gave way to a more modest policy of selective prosecutions.
Ringleaders and those who “contributed intelligence and social influence to
these conspiracies,” along with persons who had committed “acts of deep criminality,” were to be prosecuted as soon as possible. Individuals “whose criminality is inferior to that of the first class,” but still great enough “to require some
visitation from the law” were to be released on bail and tried later. Finally, those
persons who had been unwilling participants in these conspiracies and did not
participate in violent crimes were to be spared punishment if they demonstrated
“penitence for their offenses, and a determination to abstain from such crimes
in the future.” A confession of their crimes was an adequate demonstration of
their penitence, but their confessions were to be kept on file just in case they did
not “bear themselves as good citizens henceforth.”28
The original goal of administering criminal justice in Ku Klux Klan cases
remained in effect in other states. But, in South Carolina federal legal officers
were content merely to try to stop the violence and break up the Ku Klux Klan.
The overwhelming number of cases there forced a shift in policy from punishing past crimes to preventing future ones. Furthermore, this more modest policy of civil rights enforcement better complemented United States Attorney
Corbin’s unsympathetic attitude toward the Enforcement Acts.
Akerman feared that the selective Ku Klux prosecutions in South Carolina
held potential dangers. He worried that prosecuting only a few of the criminals might be interpreted by the Klan as a weakening of the government’s will
to enforce law and order, or, worse, as a capitulation to terrorism. In either
case he believed that the Klan might be encouraged to continue and even
increase its criminality. He cautioned United States Deputy Marshal Charles
Prossner: “As long as these bad men believe you are unable to protect yourselves, they will cherish the purpose of injurying you as soon as the hand of
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the Government shall be withdrawn.” He urged United States Attorney
Corbin to do nothing that might appear to be faltering. Nor did he fail to see
the same implications in other states where the courts were utterly unable to
try all cases. The ability to bring to trial only a portion of civil rights violations rendered convictions all the more imperative. Thus, he confided the
hope that “our friends will be cautious in prosecuting under these laws, and
make sure that the facts bring the case under them before proceeding. A prosecution which fails is apt to react unfavorably.” Consequently, if legal officers
could not try all cases, they were to strive to prosecute the best as well as the
most important cases.29
The enormous difficulties that confronted them discouraged even the most
committed federal legal officers. For example, while he was in Raleigh, North
Carolina, trying Ku Klux Klan cases in June 1871, Judge Bond wrote his wife that
“I am going to stay here and fight Ku Klux if it takes all Summer.” By September,
however, he began to hope that some policy could be devised that would merely
put an end to Klan atrocities. “I am only anxious to devise a method to do so,”
he wrote again from Raleigh, “for all I want is an acknowledgement of its existence & of its nefarious character—that it is suppressed.” He expressed impatience at the snail’s pace of the litigation. He wrote three months later from
Columbia, South Carolina during the trial of Ku Klux there that “if we go on this
way it will take till the next Presidential election to clean them out.” Though his
sights were lowered, Judge Bond nevertheless was determined to punish as many
defendants as he could. “If all the defense try here is my want of patience,” he
told his wife, “I shall see that it don’t avail.” With a dramatic flair, he concluded:
“I shall stay them out if it costs me my life.” Even with judges who were as determined as Judge Bond, legal officers concluded that the federal courts “are utterly
inadequate” to secure person and property. This caused Attorney General
Akerman to wonder,
whether, if in 1867, I had foreseen the strength of the prejudices to be encountered, I should have had the courage to enter the field on this side, which I
believed both expedient and right, I cannot say, but, having entered, I was not
disposed to recede, though hard pressed by many adversaries, and sometimes
sorely tried by those whom the necessities of the case made my comrades.
He was forced to grudgingly admit in November of 1871 that the Ku Klux
Klan was “too much even for the United States to undertake to inflict adequate
penalties through the courts.”30
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Growing difficulties in the North amplified the problems in the South.
Northern interest in civil rights enforcement in the South was flagging by
November 1871. The attorney general urged legal officers to expose Klan atrocities “and the rebellious utterances of some of the prominent leaders” in the
hopes of demonstrating the gravity of Ku Klux crimes and reviving the declining
interest of Northerners in the problems of the South. “If the people of the North
really understood it,” he told General Alfred Terry, “there would be an outbreak
of indignation unparalleled since April 1861.” He expressed the belief that if the
country knew only half the truth about the Klan, it would “sustain what has been
done there, and [would] insist that Congress shall furnish, and that the Executive
shall apply, remedies still more energetic.” Exposure of Ku Klux Klan terror thus
became an important goal of civil rights enforcement. Akerman identified several sources of the growing Northern disinterest. “The feeling here,” he wrote to
a political confidant, “is very strong that the Southern republicans must cease to
look for special support to congressional action.” The federal protection of civil
rights appeared to be too partisan to be considered an appropriate governmental
function. At a time when political scandal occupied so much of the public’s
attention, it smacked too much of political corruption. It was easy to view civil
rights enforcement in the South as another aspect of administration corruption
since Democrats so vehemently insisted that it was. Furthermore, the North simply was turning its attention to other issues. As 1871 drew to an end, the attorney
general complained that “[t]he Northern mind being active and full of what is
called progress, runs away from the past. My apprehension is that they are not
aware that the Southern people are still untaught in the elements of the
Republican creed.” Under these circumstances, Akerman ruefully concluded
“that Congress will be indisposed to make any changes in the national courts
that would secure their efficiency in suppressing this conspiracy.”31
Shortly after expressing these views, Attorney General Akerman resigned his
office. The circumstances surrounding his resignation are as mysterious as the
resignation was sudden. He undoubtedly was asked to resign, or was forced to
that decision, because he felt that he could not explain the reasons for this action
“without saying what perhaps ought not be said.” Some observers have suggested
that his resignation was triggered by the Grant administration’s unwillingness to
pursue a more energetic civil rights enforcement policy. There is some reason to
consider this a possibility. Akerman was probably more dedicated to a strict
enforcement of civil rights laws in the South than other members of the administration, including the president, who had made the curtailment of government expenses and the reduction of the public debt high priorities. Grant’s

76

The Politics of Judicial Interpretation

administration was also under fire for corruption, venal partisanship, extravagance, waste, military despotism, and tyranny, and prosecutions under the
Enforcement Acts fed the fires of that criticism. The desire for peace and normality
by granting amnesty to Southerners and restoring home rule to the South was
gaining support among members and leaders of the president’s party in 1871. The
attorney general’s policy was in conflict with this growing Northern demand to
terminate the federal enforcement of civil rights and interference in Southern
affairs. Some contemporaries thus believed that Akerman’s resignation presaged a
curtailment in civil rights enforcement. This surmise was given additional credence by the simultaneous resignation of the solicitor general, another known civil
rights exponent, and by the appointment of Akerman’s successor, George H.
Williams, who was hardly noted for his interest in the cause of civil rights.32
Still, Akerman’s resignation appears to have been unrelated to differences
over civil rights enforcement. Politics may very well have accounted for his leaving office, but the politics of economics and finance were probably more influential than the politics of civil rights. The attorney general had long been
unpopular with many congressional Republicans because of decisions he made
concerning interest payments due the government from the Union Pacific
Railroad. At any rate, civil rights enforcement policy almost surely was not the
issue that forced Akerman from office. In the last days as attorney general, he
confided that the “President, I am sure, is resolute in his determination to
protect the friends of the Government at the South.” He also believed that his
successor would continue the policy of vigorous Klan prosecutions that he had
inaugurated. His confidence was not betrayed, for civil rights prosecutions were
not curtailed after he left office. In fact, the number of prosecutions actually
increased the following year.33
Although they were burdened with the onus of Klan prosecutions, federal
legal officers were gratified by the effect they were having on the Ku Klux Klan.
At the beginning of 1872, federal officers felt that they were on the verge of
destroying the Klan. They also were heartened by the sharp curtailment of violence that had resulted from their efforts. The fear of prosecution not only
restored peace, but it also motivated Klansmen to confess their crimes in the
hopes of gaining leniency. “They all plead guilty…,” Judge Bond found, “[i]f you
only won’t hang them….” The United States attorney’s ambivalence notwithstanding, federal prosecutions in South Carolina had so demoralized members of
the Ku Klux Klan there that its leaders issued orders to stop all Klan activity.34
The federal authorities were winning the war against the Klan, despite their
inability to prosecute every criminal offender. A few prosecutions with a high
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probability of convictions seemed to have had a more beneficial effect than
bringing many cases indiscriminately. United States Attorney Minnis, for example,
prosecuted only six cases in Alabama, but he won convictions in five. Thus, he
happily reported that the federal court was “demoralizing and carrying terror to
these lawless K. K. Klans.” The essential factor in breaking up the Klan seems to
have been the federal government’s resolve to “declare war” upon it. It was the
perceived determination of the government to punish wrongdoers as much as
the actual success of selective federal prosecutions that struck terror in the hearts
of Klansmen. United States Attorney Corbin reported at the end of 1872 that
although 1,000 indictments were pending in the United States Circuit Court for
South Carolina, only the prosecution of the leaders was necessary to restore peace
and order to the state. Judge Bond shared this view, which he expressed to his
wife: “We have broken up Ku Klux in North Carolina. Everybody now wants to
confess & we are picking out the top puppies only for trial.” Significantly, the successes of the Justice Department were earned within Attorney General Akerman’s
more modest policy of determined but selective civil rights enforcement.35
Although the Ku Klux Klan was on the verge of collapse, terrorism and
violence were not completely eradicated. Federal legal officers expressed the
belief that the continued vigorous enforcement of federal civil rights laws was
absolutely essential to maintain the peace and prevent future violence.
According to United States Attorney G. Wiley Wells, the Klan in Northern
Mississippi was merely biding its time until the federal government let up in
its prosecutions so that it could resume its wave of terror. Any leniency in
enforcing the law, he felt, would revive the Klan and violence. Corbin similarly predicted that an orgy of terror would ensue in South Carolina unless
the government continued to demonstrate its determination to mete out justice. Minnis feared that the mere failure of the Republican Party to renominate
the president in 1872 would be interpreted by Alabama Klansmen as evidence
of faltering in the North that “would revive their hopes and encourage new
outrages….” Judge Bond observed that if federal enforcement power was curtailed in South Carolina, he “would not live in this State 24 hours if I were
a republican….” The restoration of peace on a permanent basis, legal officers
believed, depended on continued energetic prosecutions under the
Enforcement Acts.36
The optimism engendered by federal prosecutions of the Klan thus rested on
a tenuous basis at best. The prosecutions had not eliminated violence and intimidation as instruments of political action, to say nothing of the racism and
parochial prejudice from which these political tools were fashioned. United
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States Attorney Wharton added another insight into the problem when he
observed that in Kentucky “and in all the Southern States there exists a public
sentiment which justifies the taking of human life upon very small pretext,”
whether the life was that of a black or a white person. While a general tradition
of lawlessness undoubtedly accounts in part for the Ku Klux Klan, a Texas federal marshal identified a more fundamental and distinguishing characteristic of
the Klan when he reported that “[i]n their hearts the rebellion has never been
‘crushed out.’”37
Although the criminality of the Ku Klux Klan was exposed in federal trials
during 1871, Southern apologists persisted in their support of it in 1872. They
continued to oppose and impede federal legal officers who were struggling to
enforce federal laws. Rather than conceding the criminality of Ku Klux violence, Southern Democratic Conservatives viewed Klansmen as defenders of
Southern nationalism and excoriated federal officials for martyring them in
their judicial “persecutions.” They insisted that the Klan was not the cause of
Southern violence, but that the organization was reacting defensively to the violence that was actually caused by federal interference in Southern communities.
In their opinion, peace would be restored only when the federal authorities
restored law enforcement to the people of the South. Even Southerners who
condemned Ku Klux violence believed that the Enforcement Acts instigated
lawlessness, and that peace, law, and order would be restored only when the federal government ceased its unwarranted and unconstitutional intrusion into
Southern life.38
The vituperation of the Southern conservative press and mind intimidated
federal witnesses and jurors. It also generated continued assaults upon them and
legal officers. Though violence was reduced to minimal levels during 1872, federal legal officers still performed their duties in danger. The threat of violence
was still great enough in some areas of Alabama and Mississippi to require
military protection and assistance for the operation of federal officers and the
judicial process.39
With the need for civil rights enforcement as great as ever, some question was
raised as to whether vigorous civil rights enforcement would be sustained in
light of growing Northern opposition. Furthermore, the president faced reelection in 1872, and his policies and actions were usually calculated to curry votes.
Southern Democratic Conservatives, and particularly Ku Klux victims of
Akerman’s radicalism who so strongly desired a more conciliatory administration, largely interpreted Akerman’s resignation as a harbinger of a more congenial
presidential posture toward the South during the election year of 1872. However,
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Justice Department officers believed that continued vigorous civil rights
enforcement was essential to the peace and security of Southern Republicans
even though they seem to have succeeded in destroying the Klan. The Grant
administration’s civil rights enforcement policy was, therefore, a critical factor in
shaping the political life of the South.40

5

The Department of Justice
and the Retreat from Civil
Rights Enforcement,
1872–1873

B

efore his appointment as attorney general, George H. Williams represented the frontier state of Oregon in the House of Representatives. As a
congressman, he earned a reputation for crass partisanship rather than
for judiciousness and commitment to principle one might expect of the chief
legal officer of the United States. His appointment as attorney general in late
1871 thus fueled speculation that President Grant was gearing up for the forthcoming presidential election. Indeed, Grant’s biographer concluded that the
change in attorneys general was a political maneuver intended to satisfy a Pacific
Coast demand for cabinet representation. Further, this change encouraged
Southern Democratic Conservatives who sought to bargain politically with the
president for leniency toward the South.1
The new attorney general left no doubt, however, that he fully supported his
predecessor’s policy of civil rights enforcement and that he intended to continue
it. He informed federal legal officers that
[t]he Department has no intention of abandoning proceedings against any
persons who may have rendered themselves answerable to the laws of the
United States….Wherever parties have been charged with crimes it is the
wish of the Department that the District Attorney…vigorously prosecute
them to a conviction. It is my intention as far as it may be in my power to see
that the laws of the United States are faithfully carried out and the parties
offending against them properly punished.
Williams expressed to District Judge Busteed his belief that vigorous federal
civil rights enforcement would restore peace, law, and order in the South.
Consequently, he prodded the foot-dragging United States attorney in Atlanta,
Georgia, John D. Pope: “I am sure it is only necessary to apprise you of such
criminal acts to cause them to be inquired into and prosecuted with diligence
and earnestness.” He even authorized United States Attorney Minnis to assume
the prosecution of certain cases in which Alabama state authorities already had
begun to bring defendants to justice.2
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Like Akerman, Williams soon learned that an all-out effort to enforce federal
laws was unrealistic because of budgetary limitations. The original appropriations of $2,000,000 for fiscal 1872 was increased by another $1,200,000 just
before the fiscal year ended, and these amounts still fell some $300,000 short of
expenses incurred that fiscal year. Some dedicated legal officers even subsidized
court expenses out of their own private funds, sometimes without expectation
of repayment. When repayment was made, delays of a year or more were not
uncommon. Still, Attorney General Williams recognized the need to employ
additional legal counsel in Ku Klux cases. He authorized the United States
attorneys in North and South Carolina to hire assistant attorneys in the spring
of 1872, even though the department’s court funds had been completely
depleted.3
The attorney general authorized expenditures beyond the congressionally
approved budget in the expectation of an additional deficiency appropriation.
Congress, however, was not as accommodating as Williams expected; it failed to
authorize additional funds through the rest of calendar 1872. Confronted in the
summer of 1872 with escalating judicial expenses and an uncooperative
Congress, he began to issue directives to curtail expenses with increasing
urgency and firmness. He also began to accuse federal legal officers of excess and
waste. Although Williams recognized that the hundreds of Ku Klux prosecutions
in states such as South Carolina necessitated increased court costs, he nevertheless insisted that “the exercise of rigid economy” by legal officers could substantially reduce their expenses. He could not understand, therefore, how judicial
expenses could legitimately have increased “so enormously” in the Southern
states, and he concluded that such increases represented “the most unwarrantable extravagance.” Williams’s directives to curtail judicial expenses thus
took on increasingly menacing tones.4
Williams also believed that “a very large portion” of these costs was due to
corruption and abuse. Federal commissioners and marshals were beyond the
attorney general’s control, and they determined the number of cases heard and
the expenses incurred by the federal courts. They and the United States attorneys earned only nominal salaries; most of their income was derived from fees.
They therefore had an interest in multiplying the number of prosecutions
instituted in the federal courts. The attorney general believed that the government was paying unnecessarily for “frivolous and vexatious prosecutions” that
were brought by these legal officers to increase their incomes. In addition, witnesses were paid a per diem of $2 to $3, and Williams believed that large numbers of witnesses were often brought long distances unnecessarily. Many of these
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persons either did not testify at all, or, if they did testify, their testimony contributed nothing of importance. Although he admitted he had little or no evidence to support these claims, he implicitly attributed these abuses primarily
to Enforcement Acts cases.5
The accuracy of the attorney general’s charges is very difficult to prove or
disprove. His annual reports did not include judicial expenses for the respective
judicial districts until 1872. Exact comparisons with previous years is therefore
impossible. However, total judicial expenses for fiscal 1872 were only $40,387
greater than those for fiscal 1871. This represented a 1% increase. Unless judicial
districts in Northern states had sharply reduced their expenses, judicial costs in
the South could not have increased very significantly. Furthermore, in those
states having the highest number of Ku Klux cases, the number of cases the
courts handled rose by 119% (315) in 1871 over the previous year and again by
77% (446) in 1872. South Carolina reported almost twice as many cases handled
by the courts (105) in 1872 than the previous year. North Carolina reported 68
fewer cases disposed of in 1872 than in 1871. This difference was due primarily to
the removal of Enforcement Acts cases to the newly created Western District and
the decision of the United States attorney to await the return of Circuit Court
Judge Bond to try these cases. The federal courts in Mississippi disposed of five
and one-half times more cases in 1872 (488) than they did in 1871 (74). The rate
of increase in prosecutions in these states was substantially greater than the overall rate of increase in judicial expenses. This would tend to contradict the
attorney general’s charge that prosecutions were being brought in these states
extravagantly. On the other hand, judicial districts in states other than these five
experienced a 9% decline in the number of cases handled by the courts (474).
While this evidence is insufficient definitively to support any conclusions, it does
suggest that judicial districts with the highest incidence of Enforcement Acts cases
were not extravagant or corrupt unless one assumes that these prosecutions were
brought frivolously and unnecessarily.6
Statistics for 1873 show that these judicial districts continued to function economically. In fiscal 1873, total judicial costs for all districts declined below fiscal
1871 levels. This represented a 1.5% ($45,464) decrease in judicial expenses.
Judicial districts having the largest number of Ku Klux cases experienced a 26%
($191,959) reduction in expenditures while the number of cases they handled
continued to rise by 13% (135). This increase was due essentially to prosecutions
in North Carolina. However, other judicial districts reduced the number of cases
handled by 47% (2,132), but their expenditures for court expenses dropped only
6% ($146,495). The reduction of court costs, however, was even greater for the
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five states of greatest Enforcement Acts prosecutions. In North Carolina, expenditures dropped 25% ($45,585), while cases handled by the courts rose 202%
(370). Although North Carolina’s performance was not typical of the other judicial districts with high incidents of Enforcement Acts prosecutions, these statistics support the conclusion that these prosecutions were not primarily
responsible for waste, extravagance, and mounting judicial expenses. In fact, the
courts in these states appear to have been more economical and more effective
than average.
The effectiveness of Enforcement Acts prosecutions is more obvious when
they are compared to other federal criminal prosecutions. For 1872, the number
of cases handled by all federal courts (5,593) remained about the same as in 1871
(5,621). However, in those states with the largest number of Enforcement Acts
prosecutions, the number of cases handled rose 77% (from 579 to 1,025). In other
states that number declined 9% (from 5,042 to 4,568). Enforcement Acts cases
accounted for most of the increase in cases handled in Enforcement Acts states.
Enforcement Acts prosecutions rose 217% (339) while the increase in other criminal cases was 25% (107).
In Enforcement Acts states, convictions in Enforcement Acts cases rose 300%
(336), in other criminal cases 7% (20), or 82% (356) in all. In other states, all convictions dropped 3%. The conviction rate for Enforcement Acts cases in
Enforcement Acts states rose from 48% (112) in 1871 to 56% (448) in 1872, which
was about average for all criminal cases in all federal judicial districts. However,
the acquittal rate in Enforcement Acts cases dropped sharply in Enforcement
Acts states from 19% (44) in 1871 to only 6% (47) in 1872, which was substantially
below the average acquittal rate of 15% for all criminal cases in all states. The
conviction rate of 33% (340) and acquittal rate of 19% (190) in other criminal
cases in Enforcement Acts states were much poorer. United States attorneys in
Enforcement Acts states thus markedly increased the number of cases handled
by the federal courts, the number of Enforcement Acts convictions, and
decreased the number of acquittals. By doing so, however, they sacrificed their
effectiveness in other criminal cases.
The number of Enforcement Acts cases that were nolle prosequi in these states
also rose sharply by 299% (233) in 1872. Still, this represented only a 5 percentagepoint increase (from 33% in 1871 to 38% in 1872) in the proportion of nolle prosequi cases to all cases handled. However, the proportion of Enforcement Acts
cases that were nolle prosequi was 10% lower than the proportion of other criminal cases that were nolle prosequi. Federal authorities in Enforcement Acts states
had a greater tendency to nolle prosequi cases than their counterparts in other
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states. This tendency, however, was not another cost of effectiveness in
Enforcement Acts prosecutions. Those states in which courts handled the greatest
number of prosecutions had the lowest rates of nolle prosequi cases. The states of
Alabama and Tennessee primarily accounted for the high rate of nolle prosequi
cases: only 18% (36) and 17% (233) of the cases were handled by the courts. The
federal district judges in both of these states were notorious for their absenteeism
and unwillingness to hold court and to enforce federal law generally. It is not
surprising that these states had large numbers of nolle prosequi cases.
Mississippi and South Carolina were extraordinarily successful in
Enforcement Acts prosecutions during 1872. Mississippi accounted for 73% (356)
of all Enforcement Acts convictions and South Carolina accounted for 19% (86).
Legal authorities in Mississippi achieved a 73% conviction rate while those in
South Carolina won an astounding 90% of their cases by conviction. South
Carolina’s success probably was due to United States Attorney Corbin’s instructions to prosecute only the best cases. Authorities in Mississippi maintained their
high conviction rate while disposing of most of their criminal cases; 56% (490)
of the Enforcement Acts cases were heard by the courts, while 44% (385) were
carried over into 1873.
The disposal rate was quite the reverse in South Carolina. While most of the
cases resulted in convictions, the court handled only 7% (96) of the cases and
93% (1,207) were carried over. This low disposal rate is explained partially by the
stiff opposition Corbin encountered in pretrial preparation and in court. He also
undoubtedly tried to avoid bringing these cases before Judge George S. Bryan
who sat in Judge Bond’s absence. This may also explain why Corbin devoted relatively more time to the prosecution of other criminal cases. The desire to have
Judge Bond on the bench in Enforcement Acts prosecutions also explains United
States Attorney Starbuck’s unwillingness to try Enforcement Acts cases in North
Carolina solely before Judge George W. Brooks or Judge Robert P. Dick of the
newly created Western District.7
The number of Enforcement Acts cases handled by the federal courts continued to rise in 1873, though more modestly than in 1871 and 1872. The total
increase in Enforcement Acts cases handled by all federal courts in 1873 was 6%
(from 505 to 537). However, this relatively modest increase becomes more significant when one considers that the total number of other criminal prosecutions
heard by all federal courts declined by 40% (from 5,088 to 3,059).
The increase in Enforcement Acts cases that were tried occurred almost completely in Enforcement Acts states. These states also accounted for a 20%
increase (from 530 to 636) in other criminal cases handled by the courts.
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In Enforcement Acts states the number of convictions in Enforcement Acts
cases increased 3% (from 448 to 461), but acquittals increased 34% (from 47 to
63). Convictions in other criminal cases increased 36% (from 340 to 462) while
acquittals declined 8% (from 190 to 174) in these states. In other states, the total
number of convictions dropped 53% (from 3,610 to 1,702), acquittals decreased
23% (from 958 to 734), and the total number of cases tried declined 47% (from
4,568 to 2,436). In Enforcement Acts states, the total number of convictions rose
17% (from 788 to 923), acquittals remained unchanged (at 237), and the total
number of cases heard by the courts increased 13% (from 1,025 to 1,160).
However, in all states, the conviction rate in Enforcement Acts cases dropped
sharply from 53% (456) in 1872 to 36% (469) in 1873. This decline was comparable to the general drop in the conviction rate in other criminal cases from 54%
(3,942) to 40% (2,156) for all judicial districts.
The sharp decline in the conviction rate in Enforcement Acts cases was due
to the significant increase in the number and rate of nolle prosequi cases, not to
fewer convictions. Whereas nolle prosequi Enforcement Acts cases in 1872 represented 41% (351) of the cases disposed, in 1873 they represented 59% (767) while
the number of convictions and acquittals rose by similar amounts (13 and 19,
respectively). Consequently, if nolle prosequi cases are excluded, 90% (456 of 505
cases) of Enforcement Acts cases heard by all the courts resulted in convictions
in 1872, while 87% (469 of 537 cases) resulted in convictions in 1873. The same
explanation holds for the decline in the conviction rate in other criminal cases.
The increase in nolle prosequi cases also accounts for the rise in the proportion
of Enforcement Acts cases that were disposed (31% [856] in 1872 to 40% [1,304]
in 1873). Overall, then, Enforcement Acts states were more effective in criminal
law enforcement than were other states. Although legal officers in Enforcement
Acts states overall tended to be as effective in the courtroom, their effectiveness
in Enforcement Acts prosecutions began to decline because of an increased tendency to nolle prosequi cases. This rise in the number and rate of nolle prosequi
cases was due to instructions from Attorney General Williams.
Mississippi was once again responsible for much of the effectiveness in
Enforcement Acts prosecutions. Over one-third of Enforcement Acts convictions were won in this state. However, North Carolina resumed its prosecutions
of the Ku Klux Klan and won most of the convictions under the Enforcement
Acts in 1873. Fifty-six percent (263) of all Enforcement Acts convictions were
won in North Carolina. Mississippi and North Carolina combined to account
for 95% (447) of all Enforcement Acts convictions that year. Federal attorneys in
Mississippi almost doubled their overall conviction rate by winning 69% (184 of
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234) of all cases they tried. Federal attorneys in North Carolina won a phenomenal
98% (263 of 269). However, success in the courtroom was offset somewhat by
proportionately fewer Enforcement Acts cases being tried. In Mississippi, 53%
(307) were carried over to 1874 and in North Carolina 74% (862) were pending
at the end of 1873. Although federal attorneys in Mississippi won 184 convictions,
that number was still 48% lower than the 356 they had won the previous year.
The 263 convictions in North Carolina cannot be compared to 1872 because circumstances precluded the trial of Enforcement Acts cases in that year.
The resumption of Enforcement Acts prosecutions in North Carolina, therefore, mainly accounts for the overall increase in the number of cases tried in
Enforcement Acts states in 1873. With the exception of Alabama, the other
Enforcement Acts states experienced a decline in the number of Enforcement
Acts cases and other criminal cases heard by the courts from 842 cases to 607
cases or 28%.
The reduced effectiveness of federal legal officers reflected Attorney General
Williams’s insistence on reduced judicial expenditures and clemency in
Enforcement Acts cases. Because of the vast number of Ku Klux crimes and the
stringent limitations on human and financial resources, the federal courts could
prosecute only a small proportion of Enforcement Acts violations. The prosecutions that were instituted, however, usually ended in convictions.
Although the federal courts had been given an almost impossible task to perform in redressing civil rights violations, they accomplished their job exceedingly well. The decline in their effectiveness and in the number of Enforcement
Acts prosecutions was due to the attorney general’s decision to reduce judicial
expenditures, not to changing judicial theories or the inabilities of federal legal
officers. Judicial expenditures admittedly had to be closely supervised to keep
them within available appropriations. But, given the relative efficiency of the
federal courts in those states in which most of the Enforcement Acts prosecutions were brought, the attorney general’s criticism of those prosecutions as
excessively costly suggests that he used financial exigency as an excuse for curtailing civil rights enforcement. At the very least, one must wonder about the
sincerity of his commitment to enforcing civil rights. The declining effectiveness
in Enforcement Acts prosecutions apparently was due more to changes in the
Grant administration’s policy of civil rights enforcement than to faltering efforts
of federal legal officers in Enforcement Acts states.8
Still, judicial expenditures had to be curtailed in light of inadequate appropriations for judicial expenses. If the rate of expenditure in the federal courts
during the early part of the fiscal year 1873 had continued throughout the year,
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judicial expenses would have greatly exceeded judicial appropriations. As early
as July 1872, Williams warned that funds would soon be exhausted unless spending
was reduced. In December of that year, he informed Congressman James A.
Garfield that judicial appropriations had been exceeded and that judicial
expenses were being paid out of unexpended funds of the previous year. In
response, Williams issued a circular to all United States marshals exhorting them
to use the “strictest economy” in the expenditure of public funds and to use
every possible means to trim judicial expenses.9
The shortage of funds placed the Department of Justice and its field representatives in an untenable situation. Departmental funds were dispensed at an
accelerating rate. Whereas the appropriations for fiscal 1872 had been consumed
by February 1872, appropriations for fiscal 1873 were gone even before the calendar year began. Although this spending trend probably was attributable to a
legitimate increase in judicial business, the attorney general’s solution to escalating costs was to economize. This made it impossible for United States
attorneys effectively to carry out their responsibilities, particularly for those
engaged in Enforcement Acts prosecutions. Given increasing dockets and the
vast number of witnesses required in Enforcement Acts cases, court expenses
could not be curtailed significantly without sacrificing achievement. Yet, the
attorney general insisted upon a vigorous civil rights enforcement policy. This
policy of vigorous prosecutions and judicial economy placed department legal
officers in a dilemma they could not long endure.10
A resolution of the dilemma was signaled in September 1872. Former
Confederate vice president Alexander H. Stephens tried to persuade Attorney
General Williams to extend clemency to convicted violators of the Enforcement
Acts. Hearing of Stephens’s request, Major Lewis Merrill urgently petitioned
Williams to reject all pleas for clemency. Merrill claimed that, because of the
administration’s policy of prosecuting only those individuals who had committed
the most heinous crimes, clemency already had been extended inadvertently
since the government had tried so few of the Ku Klux terrorists. He insisted that
clemency would induce the Klan to go on a rampage of terror.11
Williams did reject Stephens’s request for clemency, but he did so with an
implied promise of future clemency. Admitting that Enforcement Acts prosecutions “impose upon the President an unpleasant duty, and one which he would
if consistent with his official obligations gladly avoid,” the attorney general
announced a conditional change in the administration’s civil rights enforcement
policy: “[w]hen the President is satisfied that the danger from Ku Klux violence
has ceased and that such unlawful associations have been abandoned, he will be
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ready to exercise executive clemency in all cases in the most liberal manner.”
Apparently the Klan accepted Williams’s offer of peace because the election of
1872 was the most violence-free election during the entire period of
Reconstruction.12
Sensing the weakening in the administration’s resolve, United States Attorney
Corbin, in an apparent change of heart, recommended that the administration
reaffirm the enforcement policy Ackerman had adopted a year earlier for South
Carolina. Apparently fearful of the consequences of further erosion of civil
rights enforcement, he argued against dropping prosecutions completely. If notorious murderers were not prosecuted, he cautioned, the Klan would interpret this
inaction as a license to murder. The threat of punishment had effectively
restrained the Ku Klux. Besides, dropping prosecutions just after an election,
Corbin observed, was impolitic. Doing so would give credence to those who
claimed that the prosecutions had been instituted for purely partisan purposes.
Yet, he suggested some reduction in federal enforcement as a way of improving
the relationship between federal legal officers and local authorities so that the
latter willingly might assume the burden of punishing civil rights violators.
This suggestion was curious because Corbin’s experience gave him no grounds
for thinking that local authorities would assume the burden. On the contrary,
experience demonstrated the futility of expecting local authorities in the South
to protect Republicans.13
If Corbin was trying to head off a greater diminution in the Justice
Department’s civil rights enforcement policy, he failed. “My desire,” Attorney
General Williams informed the South Carolina United States attorney near the
end of 1872, “is that the pending prosecutions be punished only as far as may
appear to be necessary to preserve the public peace and prevent future violations of the law.” Williams’s “desire” represented another fundamental change
in the Justice Department’s civil rights enforcement policy. Originally, the
department had tried to administer criminal justice in all Ku Klux cases. At the
end of 1871, Attorney General Akerman recognized the impossibility of achieving this goal. Hence, he attempted to prosecute only the most notorious and
important cases. A year later, Attorney General Williams suggested that of the
relatively few cases that had been selected for prosecution, fewer still should
actually be brought to trial.14
This policy was broadened beyond South Carolina to include all judicial districts. Legal officers were told to shun all Enforcement Acts violations except
those that could not be avoided. Officers who previously had been encouraged
to enforce civil rights vigorously were now exhorted to prosecute only those
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crimes that had to be brought to trial. The administration’s civil rights policy was
changing from one of energetic civil rights enforcement to one of circumscribed
enforcement.
During the spring and summer of 1873 the Justice Department completely
abandoned civil rights enforcement. Instead of actually prosecuting violators of the
Enforcement Acts, the government merely threatened prosecution, hoping that this
would deter the Ku Klux from resuming its terror. This policy was enunciated in
stages that began with an answer to a question raised by United States Attorney
Andrew J. Evans in April 1873. Evans informed the attorney general that several Ku
Klux prosecutions were pending before the federal court at Tyler, Texas. He asked
Williams if he could dismiss the cases in view of the “enormous expense” they
would entail and the probability of acquittal. Williams willingly consented. Further,
he told Evans not to prosecute any cases unless the crime involved was a flagrant
violation of the law and the probability of conviction was strong. He stated:
These prosecutions as a general rule are carried on to enforce an observance
of the law of the United States and protect the rights of citizens; but when
those ends are accomplished, it is not desirable to multiply suits of this
description as they tend to keep up an excited state of feelings, and are a great
expense to the United States.
Clearly, the administration had lost interest in redressing rights violations.
Token cases were to be instituted to maintain the fiction that the national government would protect the rights of its citizens.15
The attorney general selected North and South Carolina to test this new policy of tokenism in April 1873. He instructed legal officers there to suspend all
Enforcement Acts prosecutions for the current term of the federal courts to see
if there was any need to proceed with prosecutions at all. Williams clung to the
fiction that civil rights violations would “be prosecuted as heretofore,” although
he conceded that
[all] that is desired upon this subject is that Ku Klux and other similar combinations of persons, shall be abandoned, and the rights of all persons respected,
and when this is done obviously there will be little need for proceeding any
further with criminal prosecutions under said acts.
The attorney general was attempting to buy off the Klan with a policy of
appeasement.16
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By June, the administration was in full retreat from its original civil rights
enforcement policy. Having selectively suspended prosecutions, Williams now
ordered the cessation of future arrests under the Enforcement Acts unless he
approved them. His intention was “to suspend these prosecutions, except in
some of the worst cases with a hope that the effect will be to produce obedience
to the law, and quiet and peace among the people.”17
The reversal of the administration’s civil rights enforcement policy was completed one month later. A delegation of leading Southern Conservatives paid a
visit to the president at his summer retreat at Long Branch, New Jersey. Carrying
a letter of introduction from United States District Judge George F. Bryan of
South Carolina, they hoped to persuade President Grant to expand his new policy to include clemency for past offenses and pardons for convicted offenders.
They gave the president the assurances of peace that he sought, so he accommodated them. Williams informed the delegation that the administration’s newly
found leniency stemmed from
the belief that the Ku Klux Klan have, through said convictions, been almost
if not altogether broken up, and that those, who were concerned in, or sympathized with, them have come to see the folly, wickedness and danger of
such organizations. You have been pleased to say to me, and similar assurances have been given by others seeking the same object, that executive
clemency at this time, in the Ku Klux cases would tend to remove many
causes of uneasiness and irritation now existing and conduce generally to the
public peace and tranquility, and the proposed action is taken in reference to
such cases with the full expectation that these assurances will be verified.18
Implementation of the new policy of clemency was left to the discretion of
federal legal officers, but this discretion created a political dilemma. The Justice
Department expected that Enforcement Acts prosecutions would be exceptional.
Federal legal officers who instituted even seemingly authorized prosecutions,
however, were vulnerable to criticism and censure. The attorney general’s angry
inquiries into allegedly unauthorized arrests by Justice Department officials
demonstrated Williams’s acute sensitivity to complaints lodged against conscientious legal officers. He assumed that complaints against arresting officers were
valid. Moreover, he made the officers prove that the arrests were consistent with
departmental policy. If they succeeded, he neither commended nor supported
them in their efforts. Consequently, the officers functioned within a hostile
administration reminiscent of the Johnson years. It was safer, easier, and more
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politic to avoid Enforcement Acts prosecutions. Consequently, United States
attorneys recommended the suspension of docketed cases even though they
knew that this probably would lead to future violence and terrorism. After they
had risked the danger and expended the energy, time, and money to fulfill their
responsibilities, the suspension of these cases was a bitter pill for legal officers
to swallow. To be criticized and censured by their superiors for doing their
duty made their jobs intolerable. Some tendered their resignations. Others
abandoned their efforts to enforce civil rights.19
These federal officers had been highly successful in enforcing the civil rights
acts of 1870 and 1871. Their performance is all the more noteworthy given the
exceedingly difficult obstacles that confronted them. Although large numbers of
criminals escaped punishment, a high percentage of cases that were brought to
trial under the Enforcement Acts resulted in convictions. These federal prosecutions were so effective that they virtually destroyed the Ku Klux Klan. However,
they did not completely eliminate political terrorism. Chances of complete success would probably have been greater if Congress and the president had recognized Klan terrorism as rebellion and used the military to quash it. Legal officers
instead were directed to put down insurrection through the judicial process.
Their efforts were frequently heroic and demonstrated their commitment to
enforcing congressional civil rights legislation. Their success also demonstrates
that, within the limitations inherent in the judicial process, the laws themselves
provided legal officers with sufficient authority to protect civil rights, even in the
face of vehement and widespread resistance of Southern whites. When they were
on the threshold of eliminating political terrorism, the attorney general ordered
a halt to Enforcement Acts prosecutions and thus undermined the effectiveness
of the civil rights laws. We will never know if the continued vigorous prosecutions under the Enforcement Acts would have secured civil rights in the South
more permanently.
The Grant administration abandoned civil rights enforcement in the summer of 1873 despite the warnings of its legal officers about the effect leniency
would have on the resumption of crime and violence. The cynicism of this policy is suggested by the attorney general’s awareness of the consequences of eliminating federal efforts to protect civil rights. In the fall of 1873, he declared that
a federal court’s ruling against the constitutionality of the Ku Klux Klan Act of
1871 would encourage crime. Former Solicitor General Bristow agreed. The
administration nevertheless embraced the propaganda of Southern Democratic
Conservatives that law enforcement bred crime and that the absence of law
enforcement produced peace, law, and order. The president and attorney
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general were apparently susceptible to this paradoxical argument because of the
political priorities they had established and the political realities that confronted
them. Beset with crunching financial woes, vulnerable to continuing charges of
despotic, wasteful, corrupt and overly centralized government, and confronted
with increasing Northern opposition to federal interference in Southern affairs,
the fanciful logic of Southern Conservatives proved irresistible. The easiest way
to rebut all of these charges while alleviating problems of finance and shifting
political sentiment in the North was to give up power, curtail government operations, and reduce government spending. The administration would thereby reap
the additional political benefits from contributing toward rapprochement with
the South. Each of these interests was served by ending civil rights enforcement.20

6
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The Judicial Administration
of Civil Rights Enforcement,
1870–1872

he determination of the federal government’s civil rights enforcement
policy, to a large extent, lay with the federal courts. The Justice
Department would have been powerless to protect civil rights if federal
judges simply had held civil rights legislation unconstitutional. At the same time,
the administrative and political problems peculiar to the administration of criminal justice by the federal courts complicated the judicial resolution of these novel
constitutional issues. Judges, too, had to change their understanding of their role as
officers of the federal government. They not only bore the responsibility of deciding whether constitutional law permitted the United States to assume these powers
and functions, but they also carried the additional burden of providing the legal
theories that either justified or precluded the national protection of civil rights.
Judicial interpretations of the authority of the federal government to
enforce civil rights supported the vigorous efforts of Justice Department officers to secure civil rights. The legal theories justifying the exercise of sweeping
authority over civil rights by the national government was analyzed in Chapter
1. That analysis focused on judicial interpretations of national citizenship, the
nationally enforceable rights of American citizens, and the scope of national
authority to enforce the rights of American citizens. Federal judges and most
state appellate judges equated United States citizenship under the Thirteenth
and Fourteenth Amendments with the status of freemen; they equated the
nationally enforceable rights of American citizens under these amendments to
the natural rights of freemen; and they interpreted these amendments as giving Congress the necessary authority to secure these natural rights. The
assumption on which these interpretations were predicated, an assumption
that was sometimes judicially expressed but was often implied, was that the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments revolutionized citizenship in the federal Union by making national citizenship primary and state citizenship
derivative of, and secondary to, national citizenship. Judges understood these
amendments as giving Congress and the federal courts primary authority over
citizens and citizens’ rights.
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Judges understood this authority to be virtually limitless. This understanding
was expressed by Judge Busteed when he proclaimed that the Fourteenth
Amendment gave Congress the authority “to pass police laws to operate within
the political limits of a State to the exclusion of the police regulations of any
State, and to punish the violations of such laws….” He upheld federal jurisdiction
in all prosecutions involving combinations of two or more persons “to injure or
oppress” another individual “in any matter affecting life, liberty or the pursuit of
happiness.” The United States attorney for Alabama, John A. Minnis, however,
thought that, as a matter of policy, only politically or racially motivated crimes
should be punished in the federal courts.1
This seemingly boundless scope of national authority over personal rights
posed troublesome jurisdictional questions for federal judges. These judges
struggled to find a legal theory to uphold what they regarded as constitutionally
and legislatively authorized jurisdiction over these crimes without supplanting
state criminal laws or eliminating the criminal jurisdiction of state courts. The
judges could have declared the civil rights laws unconstitutional. That they
engaged in the jurisdictional struggle at all shows that they accepted the primacy
of federal authority over citizens’ rights.
The perplexity of District Judge Hill illustrates the jurisdictional dilemma
Enforcement Acts prosecutions presented to federal judges. He was confronted
in June 1871 with the problem of delineating national and state jurisdiction over
the murder of Alexander Page of Mississippi. Twenty-eight men were indicted
under sections 6 and 7 of the Enforcement Act of 1870. They were charged with
conspiracy to deprive the deceased of his life and liberty with the intent to deny
him rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States under section 6 of the statute. They were also charged under section 7 with murder as the
means by which they deprived the deceased of his rights to life and liberty. The
defendants petitioned the court for their release under a writ of habeas corpus.
The petition claimed that they were being held illegally since the crimes with
which they were charged did not constitute offenses against the Constitution
and laws of the United States. The basis of their claim was that the rights to life
and liberty were not nationally enforceable rights of United States citizenship.
Hence, the violations of these rights as charged in the indictment were offenses
against the laws of the state of Mississippi that were cognizable only in the courts
of that state.2
Judge Hill was troubled about how to handle the questions presented in the
defendants’ habeas petition. He expressed his anxiety in a letter to Attorney
General Akerman. He described these legal issues as “the most delicate and difficult
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questions that have perhaps ever been presented to the Courts of the Country,
determining the line between the National and State jurisdiction under the
Constitution and these laws passed for the enforcement of the rights of citizens.”3
Nevertheless, Judge Hill rejected the defendants’ habeas petition and upheld
the indictment. His ruling paralleled the reasoning of the federal judges discussed
in Chapter 1. Declaring that natural rights were made nationally enforceable rights
of citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment, he concluded that Congress
had the power to secure these rights through legislation punishing criminal violations of these rights. The Enforcement Act of 1870 was an authorized exercise
of this legislative power. He resolved the jurisdictional conflict by closely adhering to the wording of the act’s sixth section in defining the offenses for which
defendants could be punished in the federal court under the act. To constitute a
federal crime under section 6, Judge Hill ruled,
there must have been a banding together, or conspiracy, between two or more
persons, or two or more persons must have gone, in disguise, upon the public highway, or upon the premises of another, with intent to deprive some
citizen of the United States…some right or privilege secured under the
Constitution or laws of the United States.
Since the indictment defined the offenses according to these specifications, it
was valid under section 6 of the Enforcement Act. The defendants were bound
over for trial along with some two hundred other individuals who were indicted
under the 1870 act during that term of the federal court at Oxford.4
Judge Hill had greater difficulty with section 7 and the charge of murder as
the means by which the conspiracy was implemented. Section 7 provides that,
if in the act of violating section 6 any other “felony, crime, or misdemeanor” is
committed, the violation of section 6 shall be punished according to the penalties prescribed by state law for these other crimes. Judge Hill observed that
murder was an offense under state law alone. The crime of murder therefore
could be tried only in the state courts because the federal government cannot
assume jurisdiction belonging to the states unless concurrent jurisdiction is
conferred by law.
However, Judge Hill upheld section 7 and the charge filed under it. He ruled
that the defendants were not being tried for murder under section 7 even though
the indictment charged them with having murdered the victim as the means by
which they deprived him of his rights to life and liberty in violation of section 6
of the Enforcement Act. He reasoned that section 7 did not create an offense for
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which defendants could be tried. Rather, it provided a method for judicially determining an appropriate sentence for conviction of the crimes defined in section 6,
namely, depriving the citizen of his rights or privileges secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States.
Judge Hill’s opinion on this point represented a serious breach of constitutional law. Before a defendant may be charged with already having committed a
crime in furtherance of another crime for which he is being tried, he first must
have been duly convicted of the original crime. Therefore, a court may not convict a defendant of depriving a victim of life by virtue of his having murdered
the victim unless he was first convicted of the murder. In the case before Judge
Hill, the federal indictment charged the defendants with murder, an action that
was defined as a crime under state statutes. On conviction of the civil rights violation that was the consequence of the murder, the defendants were to be punished according to state statutes as if they had committed the crime of murder.
Since they had not been convicted of murder in a state court, they were being
punished for a crime for which they had not been tried. Alternatively, the federal
court would appear to be trying the defendants for the state-defined crime of
murder. That the jury verdict of guilty would specify the crime as the deprivation of life and liberty rather than as murder may be a distinction without a difference. Under the latter theory, the federal court would be trying the
defendants unconstitutionally for a state offense that was punishable alone in
the state courts. Judge Hill seems to have been aware of the difficulties with his
ruling, for he stated that he had “very serious doubts” that the penalties provided
in section 7 could be imposed if they extended to life or limb. He left that
question unresolved.5
Although he affirmed this decision in another case at Jackson, Mississippi, the
following month, Judge Hill expressed misgivings over its content and over the
novel involvement of the federal courts in the administration of criminal justice
that his ruling prescribed. Uncertain whether his opinion adequately preserved
state criminal jurisdiction, he requested the approval of Solicitor General
Benjamin H. Bristow. Bristow did not answer.6
Even though Hill confessed that he was “unable to perceive the distinction
between this holding, and that of…[Judge Woods’s] Court in Ala….” delivered
weeks earlier, he feared that Circuit Judge William B. Woods would disapprove of
his decision. He may have feared Woods’s disapproval because of the practical
difficulties his ruling presented in Enforcement Acts prosecutions of Ku Klux.
Government attorneys had to carefully word indictments to charge, and to
gather the evidence to prove, that a conspiracy had been entered into, or an act
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had been committed with the intention of depriving the victim of a right of
national citizenship. Proving intent, however, is one of the most difficult jobs of
the prosecuting attorney. Nevertheless, this interpretation of federally punishable crimes against personal rights was not created out of whole cloth. Judge Hill
merely applied the language of the Enforcement Act in a literal fashion.7
The administration of criminal justice thus plagued United States attorneys
with jurisdictional problems as they attempted to draw up indictments under
the Enforcement Acts. For example, E. C. Jacobson, United States attorney at
Jackson, Mississippi, shortly after Judge Hill’s ruling, expressed uncertainty to
Attorney General Akerman over the sufficiency of merely alleging conspiracy
and intent to deprive a citizen of his nationally secured civil rights. The case
before him involved an attempt to deprive the victim of his nationally enforceable right to life. Jacobson’s difficulty was in distinguishing the federal crime of
assault with intent to deprive the victim of his life from the state crime of assault
with intent to murder. His tentative solution was to determine if the crime
stemmed from racial or political prejudice. Since racial prejudice was present in
this case, he “amended the indictment by laying intent to have been to deprive
the injured person of ‘his equality of right to life’ (or liberty, as the case required)
secured to him by the Constitution of the United States.” Skeptical whether this
qualification would obviate the jurisdictional difficulty, he nevertheless added it
because it introduced “a feature in the intent relieving the case from the appearance of an offence purely cognizable in the State Courts,” since state criminal
codes also included crimes of intent.8
Attorney General Akerman’s response was supportive, but not very instructive. The federal administration of criminal justice was simply too new for anyone to have the answers to these questions, he replied, and federal legal officers
would just have to proceed on a trial and error basis. “A few experiments,” he
suggested, “will demonstrate where the dangers are.”9
How to distinguish between ordinary crimes and federally punishable violations of personal rights continued to trouble Judge Hill and United States
Attorney Jacobson. Jacobson explained to the attorney general that his district
was inundated with criminal cases because the public “seemed to take it for
granted, from the popular name of one of the acts at least, that every deed of violence where disguise was used, was specially intended to be reached by the
statute.” Judge Hill apparently was satisfied that the presence of political or racial
motives in committing what would otherwise be felonies under the state criminal
statutes brought the offenses within federal jurisdiction. His problem was to find
some way of distinguishing crimes that came before him in which such motives
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could not be averred. Jacobson still doubted that criminal violations of the rights
to life, liberty, and property could be brought within federal jurisdiction “where
the deed varied from a common-law offence only in that it proceeded from prejudice on account of difference of politics or race.” He was uncertain whether this
difference was sufficient to distinguish federal offenses from ordinary crimes. He
undoubtedly joined Judge Hill in wishing that the Supreme Court would finally
settle these and the other difficult questions arising from federal civil rights
enforcement. It is ironic that the legal difficulties federal officers encountered in
enforcing civil rights stemmed less from having too little authority than from
having been given more authority than they knew how to apply.10
The first case challenging the constitutionality of the Enforcement Act of 1870
to reach the United States Supreme Court, United States v. Avery, originated in
South Carolina. The crime had been committed by a group of Ku Klux who
raided the home of a black person out of racial and political animus, robbed him
of his weapons, and killed him. United States Attorney Corbin felt the need to
consult Attorney General Akerman as he prepared the indictments for the Ku
Klux trials at Columbia, South Carolina, in 1871. Corbin’s question stemmed
from the novelty of “setting up constitutional guarantees in an indictment. The
specific rights involved were the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms
and the Fourth Amendment right to be secure from unreasonable searches and
seizures. However, Corbin expressed no difficulty in charging the defendants with
the murder that was committed in the process of violating the provisions of the
Enforcement Act of 1870.11
Akerman’s response was more definite this time. He questioned whether the
Fourth Amendment guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures
applied to “an irregular and unofficial seizure,” for he thought it referred only to
“those made under color of official authority.” But he was not certain of this and
suggested that Corbin would do well to make the point. “Upon the right to bear
arms,” he added, “I think you are impregnable—and I think that under the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments you will be able to sustain counts for a
violation of the right of free political action.” Corbin also had thought that the
Fourth Amendment guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures
applied only to governmental officials, but, on reflection, he changed his mind
and concluded that “this ought not, and never was intended, to be its full scope.”
While he was still uneasy about charging violations of rights in an indictment,
he thought it was necessary to do so in order to protect the rights.12
Another case originally had been selected to test the constitutionality of the
Enforcement Act of 1870. This case revealed the savage brutality of the Klan.
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A night raid was made on the home of a black Republican by the name of Amzi
Rainey. Klansmen fired upon Rainey and his family while his wife was holding a
young child in her arms. They shot his older daughter in the head after they
attempted to rape her. Rainey was saved from death only by promising that he
would never again vote the Republican ticket.13
The defendants were charged with violating the Enforcement Act of 1870 in
an eleven-count indictment. They were specifically accused of conspiring to
injure, oppress, intimidate, and threaten Rainey with the intent to hinder and
prevent him from freely exercising his constitutionally guaranteed rights to vote,
to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures, to the equal protection
of the law, and to equal privileges and immunities. They were also charged with
assault, breaking and entering, burglary, and robbery committed in the act of
depriving Rainey of his nationally secured civil rights.14
The first count of the indictment was different from the other ten. It merely
alleged the existence of a conspiracy to deprive citizens of their right to vote free
from racial discrimination. It failed to specify the means by which citizens were
so deprived or to identify the victims. United States Attorney Corbin probably
was prompted to include this count by the experiences of United States Attorney
D. H. Starbuck in North Carolina. The first large-scale prosecutions of Ku Klux
had occurred in that state, and they had resulted in fourty-nine convictions
despite the fact that Starbuck also labored under uncertainties concerning
indictments because of the novel nature of Enforcement Act violations. He had
been able to prove to the satisfaction of Circuit Judge Hugh L. Bond, who was
already predisposed to convict the guilty, that the Ku Klux Klan constituted a
widespread conspiracy dedicated to destroying free elections through violence
and intimidation. Starbuck thus was enabled merely to charge the defendants
with being Klan members to make them liable to prosecution. Since Judge Bond
was the circuit judge for South Carolina as well, Corbin may have attempted to
gain the same advantage in South Carolina.15
Starbuck, however, had not been opposed by such expert counsel as Senator
Reverdy Johnson, and former Attorney General Henry Stanbery. White
supremacists in South Carolina established a public fund to retain Johnson and
Stanbery to defend Klansmen and to challenge the constitutionality of the
Enforcement Act of 1870 up to the United States Supreme Court. These eminent
lawyers challenged the indictment in a pretrial motion. Stanbery opened arguments for the defense. His brief made three essential points. He argued, first,
that the Fifteenth Amendment did not constitute a general guarantee of the
right to vote. Rather, it merely protected black Americans in their right to vote

100

The Politics of Judicial Interpretation

in federal elections free from racial discrimination. He insisted that the
amendment offered no protection in local or state elections. Stanbery’s second
point addressed the jurisdictional issue that plagued Judge Hill and United
States Attorney Jacobson in Mississippi. Stanbery argued that the allegations of
robbery and assault were not charged as overt acts of the conspiracy, but as separate and autonomous offenses. If they occurred at all, he insisted, they
occurred for the purpose of robbing and assaulting Rainey, not for the purpose
of preventing him from voting. He concluded, therefore, that these charges
alleged offenses against the laws of the state of South Carolina that were cognizable in her courts alone. In his third point, which carried the greatest implications for the theory of national civil rights enforcement authority, Stanbery
insisted on the narrow, states’ rights legal tradition in interpreting federal
authority. Conceding that natural rights were recognized by the Constitution of
the United States, he maintained that “[t]he well established doctrine is, that
the recognition of these rights in the Constitution is a restriction upon the
Federal authority.” (Emphasis added.) Natural rights were protected not by federal authority, therefore, but by the state governments. Even where the state was
incapable of protecting citizens against strong combinations, he argued, federal
authority may be used only to assist the state in executing state statutes. He concluded that the Constitution prohibited the federal courts from intervening
directly in the process of law enforcement.16
Senator Johnson’s brief is more revealing for what it omitted than for what it
actually contained. He prefaced his argument with the states’ rights view of the
federal Union and emphasized the principle that the national government is a
government of delegated powers, while all residual powers remain in the states.
However, he did not use this theory of American federalism in support of narrow interpretations of the Reconstruction Amendments. Nor did he unambiguously interpret these amendments narrowly. For example, he stated that the
Thirteenth Amendment “does nothing but abolish slavery. It removes from the
limbs of the slave the shackles by which he had formerly been controlled. Every
right, therefore, belonging to a freeman, as a freeman,” he added, “is his—literally
his.” He curiously failed to argue that the amendment did not empower
Congress to secure these rights of freemen. He allowed to stand the implication
of broad civil rights enforcement authority expressed in the latter statement.
Nor did he discuss the authority to enforce civil rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment or the nature of the privileges and immunities it secured. He
merely asserted that the Fourteenth Amendment conferred citizenship and that
the right to vote was not among the rights it secured. Again failing to dispel the
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implication that Congress possessed the authority to protect the rights of citizens,
Senator Johnson based his case on the proposition that suffrage was not such a
right.17
One possible explanation for Senator Johnson’s implied concession of the
broad scope of the Fourteenth Amendment may be found in the views he
expressed in the United States Senate during the civil rights debates of 1866. At
that time, he acknowledged Congress’s power to protect the fundamental rights
of citizenship. His explicit comments to the court about the charge of assault
and battery suggest that he still held this view in 1871. His insistence that the
Enforcement Act did not authorize this charge was based on the statute’s language rather than on the absence of constitutional authority in Congress to punish
such infringements of citizens’ civil rights. Indeed, he declared that if the
Enforcement Act had provided that the crimes alleged in the indictment were
federal crimes when they were committed in the act of violating its provisions,
those crimes would have been punishable in the federal courts. Since the
Enforcement Act did not so specify, those alleged crimes remained offenses
against the laws of the state alone. Senator Johnson’s argument before the court
does not appear to have been a mere legal strategy. He expressed similar views
concerning the scope of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 in a speech delivered before
a gathering of Baltimore Democrats in November 1871.18
The government’s case was opened by South Carolina’s attorney general, D. H.
Chamberlain, who had been retained as assistant counsel. Chamberlain offered
rejoinders to the charges of lack of specificity and other technical weaknesses of
the indictments. On the more substantive issues, he denied that the indictments
alleged offenses against the criminal laws of the state. His reasoning paralleled
that of Judge Hill’s in interpreting section 7 of the 1870 act. Chamberlain argued
that, in specifying crimes such as burglary as the means by which federal rights
were violated, the prosecution was merely trying to provide a method of fixing
the penalty for the federally punishable offense of depriving a citizen of his
rights. The crime for which the defendants were being charged, therefore, was a
conspiracy to deprive a citizen of his rights, not the state, created felony that was
committed to further the conspiracy. He disclaimed any federal jurisdiction over
ordinary offenses against the criminal laws of the state. Chamberlain espoused
the nationalist interpretation of constitutional law to maintain that the rights
infringed by the defendants are nationally enforceable rights. He reasoned that
the recognition of rights by the Constitution conferred upon Congress the
power to secure these rights. Noting that even defense counsel had conceded that
natural rights, such as Bill of Rights guarantees, were constitutionally recognized

102

The Politics of Judicial Interpretation

rights of citizenship, he insisted that Congress was thereby empowered, concurrently with the states, to secure the personal rights of citizens from crimes such
as assault, robbery, and unreasonable searches and seizures. Chamberlain, in
turn, conceded that the wording of the Fifteenth Amendment did not clothe citizens with the right to vote. He nevertheless insisted that the amendment conferred suffrage on black citizens as a practical matter and pointed to the
Enforcement Act of 1870 as evidence of the intent of the amendment’s framers
to do so.19
United States Attorney Corbin concluded the government’s case. He was troubled by the ambiguity in the wording of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments and was peculiarly unwilling to insist on an interpretation of these
amendments favorable to the government’s cause. His remarks, then, were a puzzling blend of the broad nationalist and the narrow states’ rights legal traditions.20
Like Chamberlain, Corbin observed that opposing counsel had conceded that
natural rights such as Bill of Rights guarantees were rights secured to citizens by
the Constitution. In a rather cleverly reasoned argument, he concluded that as
the state governments possessed the power to enforce these rights by virtue of
their bills of rights, so may the national government by virtue of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Nonetheless, Corbin’s more expansive analysis of the amendment revealed the
influence of the narrow legal tradition that viewed national guarantees of personal rights as mere prohibitions against governmental infringements. He argued
that the Bill of Rights had been incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment,
but he assumed that the amendment merely applied the prohibitions of the Bill
of Rights against the national government to the state governments. Conceding
that the only appropriate legislation Congress could enact under the amendment
had to be directed against state officers and institutions, he lamely suggested that
Congress could nevertheless punish private individuals because it was Congress’s
prerogative to determine what constitutes legislation appropriate to the protection of citizens’ rights from state infringements. Possibly embarrassed by the
weakness of his argument, he told the court that he wanted to do no more than
assert the proposition and let the court determine the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Corbin made similar comments about the Fifteenth Amendment.
Though he asserted that the Fifteenth Amendment secured the right to vote, he
nevertheless conceded the possibility that it secured suffrage only against racial
discrimination committed by the states.
Corbin provided a possible explanation for bungling the presentation of the
government’s cause in his comments concerning the Enforcement Act of 1870.
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Characterizing the law as an indirect, inconvenient, and ill-advised method of
securing the rights of citizens, he repeatedly disassociated himself from the policy
it reflected. “I do not like the policy of the Act. I do not like the method. It has
given me an exceedingly great amount of annoyance,” he complained to the
court. And, with an air of grudging acceptance, he declared, “but still it is there,
and I am here to enforce the policy of the law, not ‘my policy.’” Corbin rejected
the opportunity presented to him in these trials to formulate an effective and
persuasive brief for the authority of the national government to enforce civil
rights. He instead completely deferred to the court’s discretion in determining
the meaning and scope of the constitutional provisions upon which civil
rights enforcement policy was based. Although this function ultimately
belonged to the court, in this case, the court was forced to perform it unaided
by the government’s legal officer.21
Arguments were concluded on December 6, 1871, and the decision was
returned by the court the next day. The government was fortunate to have Judge
Bond join District Judge George S. Bryan on the bench, for Bond’s commitment
to civil rights compensated somewhat for Corbin’s clumsy presentation of its
cause. Judge Bond apologized for rendering a hasty decision, but he explained
that the urgency created by the enormous number of defendants and witnesses
who were present for these trials compelled him to decide quickly. He brushed
aside defense arguments to quash the blanket charge of conspiracy to infringe
voting rights that comprised the first count. He found that the charge and the
law upon which it was based were sufficiently definite. Further, he held the
charges to be constitutional under the Fifteenth Amendment, which he interpreted according to the broad nationalist tradition. He acknowledged that the
amendment’s wording declared that the states may not deprive a citizen of the
right to vote on grounds of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. But,
like Justice Bradley and Judge Woods, he maintained that
Congress may have found it difficult to devise a method by which to punish a state which, by law, made such distinction, and may have thought that
legislation most likely to secure the end in view which punished the individual citizen who acted by virtue of a state law or upon his individual
responsibility.
Judge Bond held that Congress’s legislative power to secure the right to vote
by punishing individuals who infringed that right was unlimited. He stated that,
“in the line of its purpose, congress is the sole judge of its appropriateness.” 22
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However, he was unwilling to apply the same broad nationalist reasoning to
congressional power to enforce the Fourth Amendment. Instead, he applied the
narrow legal tradition that depicted the Bill of Rights as mere limitations upon
governmental authority. Consequently, he quashed the count charging a violation of the Fourth Amendment guarantee against unreasonable searches and
seizures. The Fourth Amendment, he declared, “has long been decided to be a
mere restriction upon the United States itself.” In his efforts to reconcile conflicting legal traditions, he placed the guarantee outside the corpus of rights that
are granted and secured by the Constitution. “The right to be secure in one’s
house is not a right derived from the constitution,” he observed, “but it existed
long before the adoption of the constitution, at common law, and cannot be said
to come within the meaning of the words of the act ‘right, privilege, or immunity granted or secured by the constitution of the United States.’” Judge Bond
thus characterized the guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures as a
common law right rather than a natural right of freemen secured by the
Fourteenth Amendment as a right of United States citizenship. He failed even to
mention the Fourteenth Amendment and its impact on congressional power to
enforce the Bill of Rights. The haste with which he rendered his decision may
have prevented him from giving thoughtful consideration to the changes rendered by the Fourteenth Amendment in the national government’s authority to
enforce fundamental rights.23
Judge Bond quashed nine of the eleven counts. Five were thrown out because
they failed to allege that Rainey was qualified to vote or that he was deprived of
that right as secured by the Constitution. The count alleging that Rainey’s
Fourth Amendment rights were infringed was struck down for obvious reasons.
Two counts were quashed because they lacked specificity. The judges divided
over the allegation of burglary, so those counts were withdrawn and replaced
with the charge of murder in order to try the case on its merits and later certify
it to the Supreme Court. The court upheld two of the counts, the first charging
a general conspiracy to deprive citizens of the right to vote and the last charging
a conspiracy to specifically injure Rainey on account of his having voted for a
particular candidate in a specific congressional election. The defendants pled
guilty to the charges, and the case was certified to the United States Supreme
Court under the name of James William Avery. Avery was Grand Cyclops of the
Klan for York County, South Carolina, and a prosperous merchant there.24
One week later, United States Attorney Corbin again tried to persuade the
court to accept federal jurisdiction over Bill of Rights guarantees in an
Enforcement Act prosecution. In United States v. Mitchell, Corbin charged the
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defendants with conspiracy to deprive citizens of their Second Amendment right
to keep and bear arms. Stanbery and Senator Johnson protested that the court
had already decided that Bill of Rights guarantees were restrictions upon
Congress and not authorizations of legislative enforcement of fundamental
rights. They reminded the court that it had already held that violations of Bill of
Rights guarantees did not constitute offenses under the Enforcement Acts.
Corbin rejoined by distinguishing between Second and Fourth Amendment
guarantees. Using Judge Bond’s concepts, Corbin argued that the right to keep
and bear arms, unlike the guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures,
was not a common law right but one granted and secured by the Constitution of
the United States. Senator Johnson denied this seemingly specious and artificial
distinction and insisted that the right to keep and bear arms and the conditions
under which it was to be exercised were to be determined and secured by the
states. Both Stanbery and Senator Johnson agreed that Bill of Rights guarantees
were among the privileges and immunities secured by the Fourteenth
Amendment, but they insisted that these guarantees could be secured under the
amendment only against the states.25
Judge Bond either accepted Corbin’s distinction between the Second and
Fourth Amendments, or, after more thoughtful deliberation than he had previously given, changed his mind concerning the jurisdiction of the federal courts
over Bill of Rights guarantees. He upheld the charge that alleged a violation of
the Second Amendment and the government’s authority to enforce that guarantee.
However, Judge Bryan disagreed. Hence, the case was certified to the Supreme
Court on that point and on the question of whether a felony under local law
could constitute a federally punishable offense under the Enforcement Acts.
Corbin urged Attorney General Williams to get a ruling from the Supreme Court
as soon as possible because of the great number of cases and defendants who
were affected by these issues. The Supreme Court decided the questions expeditiously. The case was argued on March 19 and 20, 1872, just months after it
was certified, and the Court returned its decision the day after arguments
were concluded.26
To have a case brought before and decided by the Supreme Court so quickly
shows its importance. However, the manner in which the case was handled by
the government and decided by the Court reveals their unwillingness to resolve
the issues raised. The attorney general himself presented the case before the
Supreme Court. He argued on highly technical grounds that the Court did not
have jurisdiction to decide it on its merits. The Court agreed with Williams and
refused jurisdiction on the grounds that it could not take cognizance of cases
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involving motions to quash indictments when the motions, as in this case, were
preliminary in nature and subject to the discretion of the lower court. The ruling
was somewhat ironic. The precedent upon which it was based had been written
by Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase, who dissented from the majority opinion in
this case.27
Subsequent attempts to get the Supreme Court to decide the issues also failed
despite the repeated efforts of Senator Johnson to bring cases before it. The
attorney general expressed astounding indifference to these test cases. He
asserted that he did not “perceive that the questions presented in them are of
such pressing public importance as to require immediate decision.” The importance of the issues presented in these cases was too obvious for Williams to have
believed this statement.28
The attorney general evidently wanted to avoid a final determination by the
Supreme Court. This might have been a reasonable strategy. Federal district and
circuit court judges had already upheld the constitutionality of the civil rights
legislation enacted by Congress, and the government’s enforcement program
was able to proceed uninhibited on the basis of these rulings. At best, the
Supreme Court could only affirm these lower court rulings. At worst, it could
reverse them. Why jeopardize the government’s civil rights enforcement program in litigation that risked all that had been won in the lower federal courts
with little, if any, return? The Court’s use of technical points of law to avoid a
determination of the broader constitutional questions that were presented in
these cases suggests that the Court was unwilling to decide the scope of federal
authority to enforce civil rights.
Through 1872, therefore, the lower federal courts continued to bear the
responsibility for determining the constitutionality and scope of national
authority to enforce civil rights in the face of local opposition. The anxiety
judges felt in bearing this responsibility is suggested in Judge Hill’s regret over
the Supreme Court’s failure to decide a test case on its merits: “it would have
thrown such light on all the questions here, that I could proceed with more
safety….” District judges understandably wanted to shed some of this responsibility. More ominously, Judge Hill interpreted the Court’s unwillingness to
decide these issues as “an indication against the jurisdiction claimed and so far
given by the Court here….”29
Discomfiture and uncertainty notwithstanding, federal legal officers and
judges consistently upheld broad civil rights enforcement authority through
1872. Up through that year, only two district judges had declared any of the civil
rights acts unconstitutional. They were John Cadwalader, Democrat of
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Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and Bland Ballard, Republican of Louisville,
Kentucky. All of the other district judges in the Southern states upheld the
statutes’ constitutionality even though some of them were reluctant to enforce
them. Judges in those states unanimously upheld congressional authority to
secure civil rights, including Bill of Rights guarantees in most instances, as rights
of United States citizenship. Although this authority created problems in fixing
jurisdictional lines that preserved state authority over ordinary crimes, federal
judges recognized a federal criminal police power that they applied to private
citizens as well as public officials. Asserting a virtually unlimited authority to
punish criminal offenses against civil rights, federal attorneys and judges sharply
increased the number of convictions under the Enforcement Acts in 1871 and
again in 1872, and they reached an apex in convictions in 1873. The federal judiciary thus succeeded where local law enforcement authorities failed, namely, in
curtailing and eventually destroying the Ku Klux Klan. Especially in light of the
circumstances under which they labored and despite the relatively few cases that
came to trial, federal judges in the early 1870s were decidedly more successful in
enforcing civil rights than the more recent federal judges who were charged with
dismantling the Jim Crow system.30
Still, federal legal officers and judges anxiously looked to the Supreme Court
of the United States to legitimize the nationalistic constitutional doctrines
espoused in the federal courts to protect civil rights. On the other side,
Democratic Conservatives looked to the Supreme Court with equal anticipation
in the hope that the highest Court in the land would correct what they perceived
to be a corruption of American federalism. Everyone knew that the Supreme
Court would ultimately decide the constitutional scope of federal civil rights
enforcement authority. But, with federal legal officers doing what they could to
punish civil rights violators, with the lower federal courts providing legal sanctions
for national civil rights protection, the public became increasingly conscious of
the powerful role the Supreme Court was to play in determining public policy
during Reconstruction.

7

T

The Supreme Court as
Legislature: The Judicial
Retreat from Civil Rights
Enforcement

he United States Supreme Court first explained its understanding of the
theory and scope of the federal government’s authority to enforce civil
rights in April 1873. The Court’s initial interpretation of congressional civil
rights legislation occurred the previous April when it explored the scope of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 in Blyew v. United States. By 1872 and 1873, the national political balance had shifted from what it had been in 1866, and the climate was no
longer favorable to civil rights enforcement. The political forces in Congress that
produced the Reconstruction civil rights enactments were fragmented. Many of the
political leaders and the shapers of public opinion who earlier had supported civil
rights protection were now opposed to Republican Reconstruction policies that
included the national enforcement of civil rights. Democratic Conservatives had
regained much of their respectability and power in national as well as local politics.
They, along with Liberal Republicans, exerted effective pressure upon the president
to curtail the exercise of federal power and to restore home rule in the South. The
Grant administration, struggling against charges of extravagance, corruption, and
military despotism, was waffling in its determination to protect civil rights in the
South. Northerners longed to forget the strife of the Civil War and Reconstruction.
As Attorney General Akerman put it in December 1871, the Northern mind was
“active and full of what is called progress….”1
The first civil rights case decided by the Supreme Court on its merits tested
the constitutionality of a federal prosecution for murder under the Civil Rights
Act of 1866. The case originated in 1868 when two white men, John Blyew and
George Kennard, brutally axed to death and mutilated the bodies of several
members of a black family in Lewis County, Kentucky. The ensuing investigation
by local authorities resulted in indictments for murder, and the defendants were
committed to the Lewis County jail to await trial at the next session of the
county circuit court. However, United States marshals removed the defendants
from local custody and placed them under federal arrest. Blyew and Kennard
were tried for murder before Judge Bland Ballard in the United States District
Court at Louisville. They were convicted and sentenced to death.2
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The executions were delayed to allow defense counsel, B. H. Stanton, to petition the district court for a motion in arrest of judgment challenging the federal
court’s jurisdiction over the prosecution. Stanton’s argument highlighted the fundamental conflict between federal and state jurisdiction over criminal violations
of civil rights that later plagued federal judges and attorneys in prosecutions
under the Enforcement Act of 1870. He noted that murder was a crime under the
laws of Kentucky. It was not an offense under the laws of the United States. He
insisted, therefore, that the prosecution of state-defined crimes in the federal
courts was an unconstitutional usurpation of the state’s exclusive jurisdiction
over offenses against its laws. He observed that, if the Kentucky legislature
were to repeal the statute defining murder to be a crime, the federal court
would be placed in the untenable position of prosecuting a crime without a
statute defining it as such.3
Judge Ballard upheld federal jurisdiction. He ruled that the Thirteenth
Amendment incorporated the personal rights to life, liberty, and property into
the nationally enforceable rights of American citizenship, and that the Civil
Rights Act was enacted to protect these rights. Since murder and other crimes
against persons and property violate these basic rights, the federal courts may
constitutionally exercise jurisdiction over their punishment. He conceded that
Congress had not enacted a criminal code that recognized such offenses as
crimes under federal law. Judge Ballard circumvented this problem by interpreting the congressional intent behind the Civil Rights Act as authorizing the
federal courts to try and punish civil rights violations according to the laws of
the states in which the offenses were committed. This legal reasoning is somewhat analogous to other interpretations of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 as prescribing a concurrent jurisdiction over civil rights that permitted the states a
role in establishing the conditions under which civil rights were to be exercised
and enjoyed.4
Judge Ballard’s decision was perceived by the Kentucky press as a usurpation of the state’s exclusive authority to enforce its own laws. The Louisville
Courier-Journal complained:
If the State has the right to say what are crimes, as no one disputes, it has a
right to punish them. The power to administer State laws, and punish crimes
committed under State laws, was never given to the Federal Government,
and the action of the Federal authorities at Louisville in this case is a bold,
unmitigated and wanton usurpation.

110

The Politics of Judicial Interpretation

The Maysville Bulletin noted that Judge Ballard’s decision was based on
Justice Swayne’s Rhodes opinion of the year before, and the editor warned that it
gave the federal courts “the whole power of the State, to administer by its own
courts its own criminal laws.” National jurisdiction over the administration of
local justice represented the deepest penetration of national power into state
authority. It therefore provided states’ rights advocates with the specific issue
they could present to the United States Supreme Court in their persistent resistance to the national government’s definition of American federalism. They
looked to the Supreme Court to establish the predominance of states’ rights over
national authority. The Maysville Bulletin thus urged the state government to
employ the most learned counsel it could find to bring a test case to the Supreme
Court to vindicate the usurped rights of the state.5
The Kentucky government needed little prodding. Following the recommendation of the governor, the state legislature appropriated funds to challenge the
constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 up to the Supreme Court of the
United States with the hope of reversing what they perceived to be a revolutionary
centralization of judicial power. The attorneys they retained to defend their
states’ rights-centered version of federalism included one of the foremost lawyers
of his day, President James Buchanan’s attorney general, Jeremiah S. Black, and
the locally prominent Isaac Caldwell. However, the attorneys were at first reluctant to use Blyew as the test case because they feared that the atrocious cruelty of
the crime of which the defendants were so incontrovertibly guilty would compromise their cause and the issues they wanted resolved. In the end it very well
may have been the notoriously adverse facts that recommended this case as the
one to challenge the Civil Rights Act of 1866, for it was the case on which they
carried their challenge to the Supreme Court. Once the case selection was made,
United States Attorney Bristow urged the attorney general to advance the case
as quickly as possible in view of the great number of similar cases that were
pending before the federal district court. Despite Bristow’s urgent plea for an
early decision, the petitioners’ counsel successfully delayed oral argument for
two years.6
The Supreme Court heard oral argument in February 1871. Opposing counsel
made the arguments concerning federal civil rights enforcement authority that
had been made in the lower courts since 1866. Neither Caldwell nor Black argued
that the fundamental rights to life, liberty, and property were not federally
enforceable rights of citizenship. On the contrary, their case was based on the
theory that the Civil Rights Act was unconstitutional precisely because Congress
attempted to revolutionize the constitutional structure of the Union by legislating

The Supreme Court as Legislature

111

to protect civil rights by conferring primary criminal jurisdiction on the federal
courts. Invoking the narrow states’ rights legal tradition concerning national
powers, they insisted that the Thirteenth Amendment did not authorize such
legislation because it merely abolished slavery. They also complained that the
exclusive jurisdiction conferred by the statute upon the federal courts in cases in
which a party claimed that his rights were not enforceable in the local courts
would eliminate state jurisdiction over local crimes.7
Caldwell resurrected United States v. Ortega by using another theory to challenge federal jurisdiction. Ortega held that a criminal prosecution was a case that
affected only the defendant and the state. In Blyew, the government claimed
jurisdiction under the provision of the Civil Rights Act that gives jurisdiction to
federal courts over “causes” affecting persons who are denied or cannot enforce
certain rights in the state courts. If the only persons affected by a criminal prosecution are the defendants and the state, Caldwell reasoned, then the Civil Rights
Act could not confer jurisdiction on the federal court because the black victims
of the crime were denied the right to testify in the state court, as the government
claimed. The black victims were not persons affected by the prosecution, according to Ortega. There was a problem in this argument, however. Justice Swayne
had already rejected it as circuit justice by ruling that Ortega did not apply to
the Civil Rights Act because Ortega referred to criminal “cases” while the statute
referred to criminal “causes.” Swayne ruled that the victims of a crime were persons affected by a criminal cause or prosecution within the meaning of the Civil
Rights Act. In pressing the point, though, Caldwell presented it for review by the
Supreme Court.8
Both Black and Caldwell attempted to persuade the Court of the impracticability as well as the unconstitutionality of the administration of criminal justice
by the federal courts. They skillfully used the floodgate theory to argue that the
application of the Civil Rights Act to this kind of prosecution would inundate
the federal courts with every case in which a party claimed he could not enforce
or redress his rights in the local courts. They tried to alarm the Court with the
revolutionary consequences that would follow if it affirmed the constitutionality
of the Civil Rights Act. Caldwell sounded the alarm that earlier had been
expressed by states’ rights-oriented judges when he warned that, “if Congress has
lawfully passed this [statute], then they have the power, to be exercised at will, to
cover the entire ground of legislation touching civil and political rights.”9
The government’s case was presented by Benjamin H. Bristow, who had been
appointed solicitor general of the United States. Earlier, as United States
attorney at Louisville, Bristow had successfully defended the constitutionality of
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the Civil Rights Act and federal jurisdiction in this case as well as the Rhodes case
in 1867. He held the distinction of being almost the only United States attorney
to attempt the systematic enforcement of civil rights under the Civil Rights Act.
He was well suited, therefore, to argue the government’s position before the
Supreme Court.
Bristow reduced the issues before the Court to two questions: Did the Civil
Rights Act confer upon the federal courts jurisdiction over the crime of murder
when committed by a white person upon a black person? If so, did Congress
possess the constitutional authority to confer such jurisdiction? Bristow insisted
that the Civil Rights Act did give the federal courts concurrent jurisdiction over
civil rights and criminal causes when citizens were unable to enforce their rights
in the state courts. He claimed federal jurisdiction in this case on the grounds
that black citizens in Kentucky were denied the right to give evidence in the
courts of the state in any case in which a white person was a party. Answering
the objection raised by Stanton in the district court concerning the exclusivity
of state jurisdiction over violations of the state’s criminal code, Bristow argued
that the Civil Rights Act incorporated the common law as modified by the constitutions and laws of the states. Federal courts were authorized to secure civil
rights by trying offenses against the laws of the state because “Congress made the
common law and state statutes the law of the United States,” at least in those
criminal and civil cases in which persons were unable to enforce their rights in
the state courts.10
Bristow recognized that the power of Congress to give federal courts jurisdiction in criminal cases, as well as the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act
itself, rested on the Court’s interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment. He
argued the broad nationalist interpretation of the amendment expressed by
Justice Swayne and other federal judges. Since the Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery, Bristow reasoned, it constituted a positive guarantee of the natural
rights that “belong to all free men in every free government.” He concluded that
Congress possessed the power to “confer on all citizens those rights
which…are…essential to the perfect enjoyment of freedom….” Thus, the Civil
Rights Act was constitutionally enacted “in the interest of freedom and civil liberty, under a radical change in the fundamental law.”11
The legal debate over the enforcement of civil rights begun by Congress in
early 1866 finally came before the highest Court in the land. The legal and political consequences of the Court’s decision were immeasurably greater at the time
of the Court’s deliberation in 1871 than they were when the Blyew case originated
in 1868. During the interim, Congress had enacted additional and more sweeping
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civil rights statutes that more explicitly conferred direct jurisdiction on the federal courts over offenses that were similar to the murders in the Blyew case. The
Enforcement Acts of 1870 and 1871 did not require a showing that the victim of
the crime could not enforce some right in the local courts before a federal court
could assume jurisdiction. These statutes directly conferred jurisdiction on the
federal courts by defining certain offenses as federal crimes punishable exclusively in the federal courts. Moreover, the federal administration of criminal justice had expanded beyond Kentucky and had become essential to the
preservation of law and order in areas of the South that were overwhelmed with
Ku Klux terrorism. While Blyew was pending before the Supreme Court, lower
federal courts were upholding the constitutionality of the administration of
criminal justice under the Enforcement Acts of 1870 and 1871 in decisions that
paralleled others asserting the primacy of national authority over citizens and
citizens’ rights. The Supreme Court’s acceptance or rejection of this radical legal
theory thus held grave implications for the Grant administration’s civil rights
enforcement policy and the course of Southern politics.12
The Supreme Court deliberated for more than one year. Just days before
announcing its decision in Blyew on April 1, 1872, the Court manifested its unwillingness to resolve these broad constitutional questions. It dismissed the first case
to present it with these issues on narrow procedural grounds rather than consider
the issues raised by the constitutional challenge to Ku Klux prosecutions that
emerged from South Carolina.13
Although the Court was unable to avoid a decision on the merits in Blyew, it
nevertheless sidestepped questions concerning the national government’s
authority over the administration of criminal justice. It therefore succeeded in
limiting the impact of its decision to the scope of one section of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866. The Court’s ruling on the Civil Rights Act was a compromise that
upheld the act’s constitutionality but eliminated the jurisdiction conferred on
the federal courts over criminal prosecutions of whites for crimes committed
against blacks. However, in upholding the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the Court
failed to affirm explicitly the broad legal theory of national civil rights enforcement authority applied by the lower federal courts. Consequently, the Court
failed to address, much less resolve, the urgent questions concerning the nature
and scope of the national government’s authority to secure civil rights.
At least two explanations may account for the Court’s reticence. It may have
wanted to avoid expressing a legal theory of civil rights enforcement based on
the Thirteenth Amendment when the Fourteenth Amendment had become the
primary constitutional authority for congressional civil rights legislation.

114

The Politics of Judicial Interpretation

Indeed, it may have wanted to avoid explicitly embracing the radical constitutional theory of national civil rights enforcement it would have had to affirm in
upholding the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 on the basis of the
Thirteenth Amendment.14
The Court’s opinion instead addressed narrow and technical issues and, with
respect to those issues, it largely followed the arguments of Black and Caldwell.
Speaking through Justice Strong, the Court rejected Justice Swayne’s decision in
Rhodes to the extent that it ruled that a criminal prosecution for a public offense
was a cause affecting the victim of the crime. On the contrary, Strong concluded
that “the only parties to such a cause are the government and the persons
indicted.” If federal jurisdiction could be invoked by merely claiming that potential witnesses, albeit victims of the crime, were precluded from giving evidence
because of their race or color, Strong reasoned, “there is no cause either civil or
criminal of which those courts may not at the option of either party take jurisdiction….” The federal courts could be saddled with any suit, even those involving
only white parties, whenever one of the parties alleged that a black person might
be an important witness. Strong expressed disbelief that Congress intended to
exercise national authority in this way.15
At the same time, the Court concluded that the Civil Rights Act was intended
to afford black citizens the protection of the federal courts by giving those courts
jurisdiction over cases in which a black citizen’s “personal, relative, or property
rights” could not be enforced in the state courts. The Court therefore upheld
federal jurisdiction over criminal cases in which blacks were defendants and
could not enforce their rights in the state courts. The Court interpreted the Civil
Rights Act as giving jurisdiction to federal courts when a party to the cause
merely claimed that his rights were infringed by, or could not be enforced or
redressed in the state courts. The petitioner did not have to first exhaust the
state’s appellate process. However, these concessions to national civil rights
enforcement authority were offset by the elimination of a vast area of protection
that had been exercised by the federal legal and judicial officers in Kentucky.
Blacks would have to look to hostile local legal officers and judges to prosecute
crimes committed against them.16
Justice Bradley, joined by Justice Swayne, wrote a stinging dissent. To say, as
the majority did, that prosecutions such as the one before them were not within
the scope of the Civil Rights Act, Bradley declared, was “a view of the law too
narrow, too technical and too forgetful of the liberal objects it had in view.” In
his opinion, those liberal objectives were to give to the federal courts jurisdiction
in cases such as the instant one and to provide a remedy whenever “the State
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refuses to give one; where the mischief consists in inaction or refusal to act, or
refusal to give requisite relief….” Although he conceded that the “technical parties” to a criminal prosecution were the defendant and the government, Bradley
looked beyond technicalities and insisted that the prosecution was a cause that
affected the victim. He chided the majority for effectively depriving blacks of the
right to testify and thereby subjecting them to “wanton insults and fiendish
assaults,” that would render “their lives, their families, and their property unprotected by law” and “brand them with a badge of slavery.” He warned that the
Court’s decision would invite “vindictive outlaws and felons to rush upon these
helpless people and kill and slay them at will, as was done in this case.”17
Because the Supreme Court’s decision represented a compromise that
resolved few of the major questions concerning the authority of the federal government to enforce civil rights, it satisfied no one. Judge Ballard reacted with
sarcasm: “Blessed are they who expect little for they shall not be disappointed.
But if Congress meant what the Court say they meant is not all of their legislation which relates to the negro a mockery?” He underscored the point with a
hypothetical consequence of the ruling:
Think of the President using the army & navy not to capture the desperado
who has committed numberless outrages on the negro & who sleeps secure
under State laws, but to arrest the poor negro & drag him before the United
States to be there tried & punished with high ceremony!!!
Ridicule might vent feelings of anger, but it did not alleviate the real difficulties that flowed from the decision. Future prosecutions of white offenders
under the Civil Rights Act were virtually eliminated. Previously convicted
defendants could not only gain release from prison, but they also conceivably
could have sued the responsible federal legal officers for false imprisonment.
Solicitor General Bristow therefore responded positively to suggestions for
their pardon. All of the defendants who had been convicted under the Civil
Rights Act at the previous term of the United States District Court for
Kentucky had their sentences set aside.18
Still, the decision conceded more to civil rights proponents than their harsh
criticism allowed. The Court upheld the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which could be
interpreted as an implicit acceptance of the broad nationalist interpretation of
congressional authority under the Thirteenth Amendment. At the very least, the
decision conceded to the national government a constitutionally prescribed role
in securing civil rights under that amendment. These concessions were potentially
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significant victories for proponents of civil rights, particularly since Congress
had enacted additional legislation under the broader Fourteenth Amendment to
counteract the growing menace posed by the Ku Klux Klan. Consequently, John
Marshall Harlan speculated that Black and Caldwell would find their fees
reduced since “the Democracy are [not] at all jubilant over the result.”19
Thus, the legal and political impact of the Blyew decision was ambiguous.
There seems to be no record explaining why the Court refused to resolve the
questions surrounding the scope of the federal government’s authority to
enforce civil rights.
The Supreme Court selected the Slaughter-House Cases as the instrument
for its interpretation of national civil rights enforcement authority. The
Slaughter-House Cases were argued in February 1872, just weeks before the
Court dismissed one civil rights case on narrow procedural grounds and
decided Blyew without resolving the constitutional issues of civil rights
enforcement. The litigants were white butchers and a New Orleans slaughterhouse corporation rather than blacks and Klansmen. The Supreme Court’s
selection of a case involving the civil rights of Southern white butchers as the
occasion for its initial determination of the national government’s authority
to secure civil rights is more than ironic. This decision appears to have been
a masterful political stratagem of the Court enabling it to decide politically
explosive legal questions in a seemingly nonpolitical way. The Court thereby
resolved many of the legal issues inherent in the national protection of civil
rights outside the political context that made their resolution so urgent and
controversial.20
Apart from their civil rights implications, the Slaughter-House Cases reveal
some of the political tensions associated with the economic development of
nineteenth-century America. Located next to the cattle ranges of Texas, New
Orleans was one of the cities through which animal products were transported
to the nation’s growing urban populations. As with industry generally, meatpacking was beginning to develop a modern corporate structure. Control over
the industry was becoming centralized in the hands of a few businesses.
Complementing and stimulating the centralization of control over meatpacking was the growing concern over health and sanitation that was reflected in
government-prescribed reforms designed to establish standards over the processing and distribution of food for human consumption. Several municipalities
around the United States enacted ordinances during the Civil War era confining
the processing of meat products to areas outside of their population centers and
under standards established by their legislative bodies.21
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The creation in 1869 of the Crescent City Stock Landing and Slaughter House
Company by the Louisiana state legislature was typical of economic and political
trends in other parts of the country. Legislatures in New York and Massachusetts
chartered similar corporations, giving them monopolistic control over the
slaughtering of animals, and state appellate courts upheld these measures.
However, the process of establishing the Louisiana corporation was distinctive;
it was riddled with blatant corruption, bribery, graft, and economic self-interest.
The butchers who were adversely affected by the corporation felt a double injustice. They were deprived of their own slaughterhouses, and they were forced to
ply their trade on the premises of a corporate monopoly for a fee. The monopoly
introduced the corporate form of business structure to the area’s meatpacking
industry and presaged the butchers’ demise as artisans and sole proprietors. It
also represented a notorious example of a favored interest group receiving special privileges through the political corruption of the Republican-controlled
state legislature. Given the circumstances that led to the creation of the slaughterhouse, the butchers and the New Orleans community generally were blinded
to the genuine health and sanitation benefits that it might have presented to the
city. Opposition to the monopoly as the creation of a corrupt Republican legislature, then, was stimulated by partisanship as well as by the portend of adverse
economic implications for established economic groups.22
The complicated and, at times, absurd history of the battle in the local courts
among the butchers, the monopoly, and the state of Louisiana has been ably told
by Professor Charles Fairman. It is enough to mention that the various parties
to the suits won conflicting and contradictory court orders from various state
district courts in the city of New Orleans. The butchers won a court order permitting them to continue slaughtering animals as they had before the enactment
of the law establishing the monopoly. The monopoly won an injunction against
the butchers and an order requiring the butchers to use the facilities of the
monopoly as provided by the 1869 statute. The state of Louisiana was enjoined
from building the facilities that were authorized by the law for slaughtering animals, while it in turn won a court order restricting the slaughtering of animals
to those facilities. The Supreme Court of Louisiana finally upheld the constitutionality of the statute and the corporation in April 1870, but its decision did not
end the litigation.23
When the Louisiana Supreme Court ruled against them, the butchers brought
their case into the United States Circuit Court at New Orleans. They hoped to win
an injunction to prevent the city police from enforcing a local court injunction
against the butchers that prohibited them from slaughtering animals in places
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other than the facilities of the corporation. The enforcement of this injunction
against the butchers created a severe meat shortage in New Orleans and
prompted public meetings to explore alternative solutions to the food crisis.
Needless to say, public interest in the outcome of the judicial fight was keen.
Great public pressure, mostly for a ruling favorable to the butchers, was exerted
on the newly appointed circuit justice, Joseph P. Bradley, and circuit judge
William B. Woods. Aware of the urgency created by the meat shortage, Justice
Bradley ordered the corporation to answer within two days the brief filed by the
butchers on June 6, 1870.24
Oral arguments were presented on the designated day. A packed courtroom
was on hand to hear Justice Bradley’s decision two days later. This case “excites
more general interest just now than any other,” the New Orleans Daily Picayune
commented, because of its importance to the city’s meat supply. Public reaction
to the circuit court’s application of the nationalist theory of civil rights enforcement authority to strike down the constitutionality of the slaughterhouse and to
enforce the butchers’ civil rights demonstrates that the decision’s impact upon
Reconstruction political issues was not evident to the public.25
The city’s conservative white community praised Justice Bradley’s strongly
nationalistic opinion. The Democratic New Orleans Daily Picayune complimented Justice Bradley and Judge Woods as persons “involved with a high sense
of uprightness, and a stern purpose to administer law impartially.” The suspicion with which the people of Louisiana initially had regarded them was
replaced with “universal respect for their learning, intelligence, courteous official manner, and regard for law in their decision.” However, the Republican
New Orleans Times caustically criticized Justice Bradley for his ignorance of the
scope of federal authority, which, in the editor’s opinion, Bradley stretched
beyond accepted judicial limits to “a vast and indefinite extension of the power
and authority of the judicial department of the Government.” The 800 shares
of stock the newspaper’s editor held in the corporation may have motivated
him to castigate Bradley for going out of his way to bring the case within the
authority of the Constitution and laws of the United States and thereby “‘convert our judges into constitution makers and amenders, with full power to lay
down and proclaim what are the “civil rights” of men….’” The only New
Orleans newspaper that commented on the implications of Bradley’s ruling for
the national enforcement of black civil rights was the New Orleans Bee. The
paper described the opinion as “‘one of the most luminous expositions of
American constitutional law….’” The editor of this black newspaper asserted
that not even the great Chief Justice John Marshall or Justice Joseph Story “‘ever
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uttered grander principles than did Justice Bradley yesterday, from the bench of
the United States Circuit Court.’”26
The practical effect of Justice Bradley’s decision was to permit the butchers to
continue their unrestricted slaughtering of animals and to enjoin the corporation from bringing any new suits against them. However, the ruling did not stop
New Orleans District Judge Henry C. Dibble, a Republican, from enforcing a
preliminary injunction against the butchers that was won by the state attorney
general in the Louisiana Supreme Court before Justice Bradley’s ruling in the
federal court. Judge Dibble was outraged by Justice Bradley’s revolutionary ruling, which he thought subverted the integrity of the state judiciary. Preserving
the integrity of the state judiciary was perhaps less important than preserving the
incorporator’s investment in the monopoly. Its stock plummeted from $30 a
share to $15 and remained below $25. Concern over the value of their investment
plagued the incorporators throughout the litigation.27
The confused political impact of the Slaughter-House Cases is manifested by
the attorneys who represented the litigants and by the positions they argued
before the Supreme Court. Legal counsel for the butchers were led by a former
justice of the United States Supreme Court who resigned his seat as a states’
rights Southerner when his native Alabama seceded. John Archibald Campbell
now argued the broad nationalist theory of national civil rights enforcement
authority that was associated with Northern Republican supporters of civil
rights. The corporation’s counsel included a Radical Republican who argued for
a more narrow interpretation of this authority. Democratic Conservatives and
others who opposed the slaughterhouse corporation as a monopoly created by a
corrupt Republican-controlled Louisiana legislature embraced the nationalist
theory of civil rights enforcement authority associated with the Republican
Party, while Republicans and others who wanted the slaughterhouse invoked a
more states’ rights-oriented theory of civil rights enforcement authority associated with Democratic Conservatives. Under these circumstances, the Court
could decide the constitutionality of the politically controversial national
administration of criminal justice in Ku Klux prosecutions without actually sitting in judgment of it, or of even giving the appearance of its having done so.28
The United States Supreme Court heard oral argument in the Slaughter-House
Cases on February 4, 1872. Campbell presented his legal position within the context of the recent history of the Civil War. Arguing that the war was a constitutional struggle between national supremacy and state sovereignty, he stated that
the Northern victory was translated into law and incorporated into the United
States Constitution through the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. He
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interpreted these amendments as lodging the locus of sovereignty in the national
government and, with it, primary authority to regulate and secure the natural
rights of citizens. The same point was argued by Campbell’s cocounsel, J. A. Q.
Fellows, who quoted from the congressional debates leading to the adoption of
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Fourteenth Amendment as authority for this
position. Campbell’s brief paralleled the interpretations of national civil rights
enforcement authority under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments
expressed by federal and most state appellate judges since 1867.29
However, Campbell overstated his case and thereby provided the Court with
grounds for rejecting his argument. He interjected a concept of dual citizenship
that characterized national and state citizenship as separate statuses under distinct and exclusive jurisdictions. He therefore implied that the Fourteenth
Amendment’s prohibitions against state infringements of citizens’ rights were
absolute. His curt recognition of the states’ police power to regulate the natural
rights of national citizenship was obviously negated by the emphasis he placed
on the exclusivity of national and state jurisdictions over the rights of their
respective citizens. Indeed, Campbell drew such an absolute and impenetrable
line of separation between national and state authority and jurisdiction that the
states’ police power, as it had traditionally been exercised, appeared to have been
transferred to the national government. To decide the case on this view of dual
federalism, the Court either would have had to sanction a revolutionary and
seemingly impracticable transfer of absolute and exclusive police powers from
the states to the national government or accept a virtually exclusive state
authority over natural rights. Opposing counsel were quick to pick up this
implication of Campbell’s argument and drive home the point, successfully as
it turned out.30
The corporation’s case was argued by Republicans Thomas J. Durant and
Senator Matthew H. Carpenter. They focused on the economic aspects of the
case rather than the implications it held for a redefinition of American federalism. They insisted that the law establishing the corporation did not create a
monopoly because it did not prevent the butchers from plying their trade.
Rather, it merely regulated the way in which they prepared meat for human consumption to protect the health and safety of consumers. They reminded the
Court of the long-established state practices of regulating the manufacture of
certain products and of conferring special privileges in corporate charters. A ruling for the butchers, they concluded, would not only impede the states from
licensing trades and products and regulating them, but it also would destroy the
corporation as a viable form of business organization.31
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Like defense counsel in Blyew, the corporation’s counsel did not argue that
natural rights were not protected by the United States Constitution. This line of
argument would have been the strongest one for the corporation. But, this point
would have been difficult for Senator Carpenter to press. Representing Myra
Bradwell before the same Court two weeks earlier, he had argued that natural
rights were secured by the Fourteenth Amendment. He also had expressed this
interpretation of the amendment in the United States Senate the previous spring
in support of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871. However, he discarded this interpretation of the amendment after the Supreme Court’s decision in these cases.32
The similarities between the corporation’s argument and that of the defendants in Blyew were not necessarily accidental. Jeremiah S. Black had been
retained by the corporation, but, for some unknown reason, he failed to appear
for oral argument. He may have suggested his strategy to Durant, for the latter
used the floodgate theory argued by Black and Caldwell in Blyew. Durant
warned the Court that if it adopted Campbell’s and Fellows’s interpretation of
national authority, it would assume “a jurisdiction over every case there can be
imagined in every court in every State in the Union.” Justice Samuel F. Miller
noted this danger in his Slaughter-House opinion. The points emphasized by
Durant were wisely geared to justices who felt increasingly burdened with backlogged dockets, who called for judicial reforms to curtail its jurisdiction and
relieve it of much of its workload, and who were struggling to determine the
proper relationships of the national and state governments to each other and to
their respective citizens. Still, Durant provided the Court with a legal rationale
for upholding the corporation’s charter as a legitimate police regulation without
having to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment so narrowly as to undermine
national civil rights enforcement.33
That neither the Democratic Conservative defense counsel in Blyew nor the
Republican corporate counsel in the Slaughter-House Cases proffered interpretations of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments that placed the natural
rights of citizenship outside the protective authority of the United States government suggests the degree to which the primacy of national citizenship and,
with it, the primacy of the national government’s authority to secure civil rights
had become associated with these amendments. F. J. Pratt, president of the corporation, instructed Black to inform him “ahead of all others” if Black succeeded in
his “‘flank movement’ and defined the Fourteenth Amendment in our favor….”
Black’s failure to submit and argue a brief in the Slaughter-House Cases may have
been due to his failure to devise a “flank movement” around the Fourteenth
Amendment.34

122

The Politics of Judicial Interpretation

The Supreme Court succeeded where Black failed in circumventing the
scope of the Fourteenth, as well as the Thirteenth, Amendment. However, it
struggled with the case for more than a year before Justice Miller announced
the 5–4 decision on April 14, 1873.
Miller’s opinion was a curious and contradictory mixture of nationalist
Republican assumptions about Reconstruction and the need for national protection of civil rights that led to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment
and of narrow conclusions that reflected the ideas of states’ rights Democratic
Conservatives concerning the scope of authority it conferred upon the
national government to protect civil rights. Justice Miller’s opinion overturned
the growing body of judicial interpretations of the impact of the Thirteenth
and Fourteenth Amendments upon American constitutionalism as fixing
sovereignty in the nation and as establishing the primacy of national citizenship and the concomitant national authority to secure the civil rights of
American citizens.
The majority’s immediate overriding concern seems to have been the
preservation of state police powers from what they perceived as a potential
usurpation by the national government. Justice Miller expressed a rigidly
exclusionary concept of national and state powers to hold that the regulation
of slaughterhouses was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the state and that
Congress could not interfere with this state regulatory authority. He adopted
this part of the opinion from former Justice Campbell’s characterization of
national and state powers as exclusive of one another. The opinion rejected
other points made by Campbell regarding the monopolistic character of the
corporation established by the Louisiana statute. Rather, it held that the corporation did not unconstitutionally engross trade, for, as the corporation’s
counsel had argued, the butchers were not prevented from plying their trade.
They were merely required to slaughter animals for human consumption
under conditions constitutionally prescribed by the state legislature. In short,
the Louisiana law regulating abattoirs was a constitutionally authorized exercise
of the state’s police power.35
Having resolved the immediate legal issues before it, the Court could have
ended its consideration of constitutional law by upholding the Louisiana abattoir statute and the corporation established under it. However, the Court
seized the opportunity to examine the other legal issues raised by the butchers’
counsel concerning the constitutional structure of the federal Union. “No
questions so far reaching and pervading in their consequences,” Justice Miller
proclaimed,
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so profoundly interesting to the people of this country, and so important in
their bearing upon the relations of the United States to each other, and to the
citizens of the United States, have been before this court during the official
life of any of its present members.36
The answers Justice Miller gave to the questions concerning the constitutional impact of the Civil War and Reconstruction on American federalism were
of profound significance. But their significance lay more in the Court’s reversal
of the constitutional developments in the nation’s courts than in the changes
they suggested had occurred in American constitutionalism. In order to defend
its states’ rights views, the majority minimized the development of federalism
during the Civil War and Reconstruction.
Miller premised his constitutional theories on an inaccurate history of the
Civil War. He asserted that the war’s primary objective was the abolition of slavery.
He completely ignored President Lincoln’s official characterization of the Civil
War’s primary objective as preserving the political integrity of the Union by
establishing the North’s idea of national sovereignty over the South’s idea of state
sovereignty by which the Confederate states had justified secession. The majority
was driven to this historical inaccuracy in order to separate the nation’s authority to abolish slavery and guarantee freedom from the constitutional authority
to secure the fundamental rights of freemen. Although Miller described the
Thirteenth Amendment as “the main and most valuable result” of the Civil War,
he undermined its value by eliminating much of the power attributed to it by
federal judges. He interpreted it as a mere abrogation of chattel slavery as
Democratic Conservatives and opponents of national civil rights enforcement
had unsuccessfully argued for seven years in the lower federal courts. Miller conceded that the amendment was a “grand yet simple declaration of the personal
freedom of all the human race within the jurisdiction of this government…,”
but, he ignored lower federal court precedents concerning its import. He concluded that it did not give Congress the constitutional authority to secure the
freedom it guaranteed by protecting the personal rights of which that freedom
consists. He also ignored the obvious contradiction this view of the Thirteenth
Amendment posed for the Court’s decision of the previous year sustaining the
constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which had been enacted to
enforce the Thirteenth Amendment.37
Miller similarly interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment more narrowly than
had lower federal court judges. He again predicated his interpretation upon a
misinterpretation of history. He noted that black Americans were intended to be
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the primary beneficiaries of the amendment’s guarantees because of unyielding
Southern refusals to respect black civil rights so “that their freedom was of little
value….” However, Miller overemphasized the racial context of the Fourteenth
Amendment and concluded that it was applicable almost exclusively to blacks
and other racial minorities who suffered from similar kinds of racial discrimination. In so narrowing the amendment’s application to racial discrimination,
he was able to minimize its impact on federal citizenship. He asserted that it
merely reversed the Supreme Court’s Dred Scott decision of 1857 by admitting
blacks to citizenship and thus prevented the Southern states from re-enslaving
blacks. However, Miller again ignored the lower court decisions that had interpreted both the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments as applicable to whites
as well as blacks. To have conceded this broader application of these amendments
would have undermined the plausibility of the Court’s view of the minimal
constitutional impact of the Civil War on the nature of federal citizenship.38
It is in Miller’s interpretation of citizenship that the Court’s solicitude for states’
rights is most clearly evident. He casually declared that the distinction between
national and state citizenship “is clearly recognized and established.” And, just as
these two statuses were distinct and clearly understood, so were the rights that comprised them and the jurisdiction of the national and state governments over their
citizens and citizens’ rights. Not only were their jurisdictions distinct, but they were
also exclusive of one another. In asserting that the Fourteenth Amendment was virtually inapplicable to white Americans who were already citizens, and in interpreting it as merely admitting black Americans to the citizenship that white Americans
had always enjoyed, Miller was able logically to conclude that the amendment did
not effect any changes in the nature of citizenship and authority over citizens’
rights.39
The interpretation of federal citizenship the Court adopted attributed to
the states exclusive primary authority over the fundamental rights of
American citizens. Recognizing that the term, “privileges and immunities,”
which the Fourteenth Amendment purported to secure, was defined by Justice
Bushrod Washington in his 1823 opinion in Corfield v. Coryell as “those rights
which are fundamental,” Miller agreed that it embraced “nearly every civil right,
for the establishment and protection of which organized government is instituted.” Miller nevertheless concluded that, with only a few exceptions, “the entire
domain” of these natural rights “lay within the constitutional and legislative
power of the states, and without that of the Federal Government.” In short, the
rights apparently secured by the Fourteenth Amendment’s privileges and immunities clause were not secured by it at all, for these rights pertained to the rights
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of state citizenship, not to those of national citizenship. In ascribing exclusivity
to the authority of the national and state governments over the rights of their
respective citizens, Miller virtually placed the natural rights of American citizens
beyond national authority and emasculated the amendment’s citizenship and
privileges and immunities clauses. More immediately, in placing these rights
within state authority, he enabled the states to accomplish precisely what he said
the amendment was intended to prevent: the destruction of the civil rights of
American citizens.40
If the fundamental rights of freemen constituted the rights of state citizenship, what were the rights of national citizenship? Justice Miller enumerated as
privileges and immunities of United States citizenship the right of habeas corpus, the right to petition the national government for the redress of grievances,
the right to use the seaports and navigable waterways of the United States, the
right to pass through and engage in trade in any of the states of the Union, and
the right to the protection of the national government when on the high seas or
in a foreign country. It is no small anomaly that Miller asserted that the United
States government could not do for its citizens within its jurisdiction what he
claimed it was authorized to do for them beyond it.
One might ask how Justice Miller could interpret the privileges and immunities of national and state citizenship in a manner that was so at odds with lower
federal court precedents. On a theoretical level, Miller incorrectly assumed that
the natural rights of citizenship were generally recognized as rights of state citizenship before the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. Given this
assumption, he asserted that the transfer of authority over these fundamental
rights was too revolutionary a constitutional change in American government
not to have been clearly expressed by Congress. “Was it the purpose of the
Fourteenth Amendment,” he wanted to know
by the simple declaration that no State should make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, to
transfer the security and protection of all the civil rights which we have mentioned, from the States to the Federal Government? And where it is declared
that Congress shall have the power to enforce that article, was it intended to
bring within the power of Congress the entire domain of civil rights heretofore
belonging exclusively to the States?
His answer was a resounding “NO!” If the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment had intended such revolutionary changes, he declared, that
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intention would have been clearly expressed. Yet, he did not look to the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment to discover whether such intentions had been expressed. Instead, he merely asserted without supporting
evidence that Congress did not intend such revolutionary changes in
American constitutionalism.41
Justice Miller’s interpretation of federal citizenship is remarkable for several
reasons. His assumption of the prior existence of a well-defined and distinct separation between national and state citizenship is contradicted by the ambiguity
that characterized views of federal citizenship before the adoption of the
Reconstruction Amendments. His assertion that the primacy of state authority
over the natural rights of citizens was well established and recognized is contradicted by the predominant antebellum view of citizenship and the post–Civil
War judicial interpretations of citizenship under the Reconstruction
Amendments. That the Court adopted this view of citizenship, so at odds with
prevailing legal theories and without citing any supporting authority, was astonishingly bold. It was especially so, in light of the profound political and constitutional consequences it entailed, and since none of the opposing counsel had
argued its adoption. Justice Miller perhaps attempted to assuage the expected
criticism of this decision when he observed that the justification for a judicial
determination “is not always the most conclusive which is drawn from the consequences urged against the adoption of a particular construction of an instrument….” He thus confessed the majority’s refusal to sanction those revolutionary
consequences for American politics, law, and constitutionalism that the lower federal courts had already declared were inherent in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments. Justice Miller made this clear when he rationalized that
when, as in the case before us, these consequences are so serious, so far reaching and pervading, so great a departure from the structure and spirit of our
institutions; when the effect is to fetter and degrade the state governments by
subjecting them to the control of Congress, in the exercise of powers heretofore universally conceded to them of the most ordinary and fundamental
character; when in fact, it radically changes the whole theory of the relations
of the State and Federal Governments to each other and of both these governments to the people; the argument has a force that is irresistible, in the absence
of language which expresses such a purpose too clearly to admit of doubt.
Interestingly, the lower federal courts were more willing to embrace these
revolutionary constitutional theories than was the Supreme Court. These roles
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were just the reverse of those taken by the lower federal courts and the Supreme
Court during the civil rights revolution of the 1950s and 1960s.42
Theoretical rationalizations of legal doctrine are also means to achieve
political objectives. The Court’s decision may thus be explained in terms of its
political goals. Miller was quite explicit about the majority’s desire to resist the
nationalizing impact of the Civil War by redefining American federalism as a
states’ rights-centered dual federalism. As a matter of legal theory, Miller speculated that if the Reconstruction Amendments empowered Congress to protect
the fundamental rights of citizens, Congress thereby could curtail the legislative
powers of the states and their “most ordinary and usual functions.” This national
power, he feared, would result in the replacement of state authority with
national authority. He insisted that the majority did not see “in those
Amendments any purpose to destroy the main features of the general system.”
On the contrary, the statesmen of the nation “still believed that the existence of
the States with powers for domestic and local government, including the regulation of civil rights, the rights of person and property, was essential to the perfect
working of our complex form of government….”43
The decisions and activities of the lower federal courts and other branches of
the national government may elicit some skepticism about the Court’s concern
for the continued existence of the states and their functions. Federal judges were
able to preserve ordinary state jurisdiction over fundamental rights while carving
out concurrent national authority. Congress had expressed its desire to preserve
the states’ powers and functions while providing the protection of personal
rights that the states failed to offer. The Department of Justice and the federal
courts despaired of punishing more than the most notorious violations of the
congressional civil rights acts; to think they would even consider assuming the
local administration of criminal and civil justice is absurd. In light of the administrative and judicial history of civil rights enforcement, one is forced to conclude that the United States Supreme Court simply refused to allow the national
government to assume the function of enforcing the fundamental rights of its
citizens. This is not to say that the Court shared the political objectives and values
of Democratic Conservatives of the South. Yet, the Court appears to have been
more concerned about preserving the states’ regulatory functions and police
powers than in establishing national authority to protect the civil rights of black
Americans. It achieved its purpose by articulating a states’ rights-centered theory
of American federalism. It rationalized its theory by raising a false danger to the
continued existence of the states’ police powers through a fallacious concept of
exclusivity in national and state authority.
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In addition to its ostensible commitment to states’ rights, the Court also was
troubled apparently by the specter of overloaded dockets. To concede national
authority over civil rights, Miller ominously predicted,
would constitute this court a perpetual censor upon all legislation of the
States, on the civil rights of their own citizens, with authority to nullify such
as it did not approve as consistent with those rights, as they existed at the time
of the adoption of this Amendment.44
Hence, Miller gratuitously interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal
protection clause in an unnecessarily restrictive way. He suggested that the
equal protection clause applied specifically, and therefore, only to state laws
“which discriminated with gross injustice and hardship against them [blacks]
as a class….” Only state laws that discriminated and were unjust and imposed
great hardship upon blacks as a class came within the scope of the equal protection clause. One need only note that this interpretation of equal protection of
the laws virtually precluded the national government from protecting or enforcing citizens’ rights when local authorities failed, or were unwilling, to do so. It is
no less ironic than it is remarkable that a Northern Republican–controlled
Supreme Court should have incorporated into the Constitution an interpretation of the Reconstruction Amendments that approximated the views of
Democratic Conservatives and thereby established the doctrinal basis for undermining the scope and effectiveness of national civil rights enforcement authority
for almost one hundred years.45
Four of the nine members of the Supreme Court rejected the majority’s decision and the historical and legal analysis on which it was based. Their dissents
were tinged with stinging rebukes that manifested their belief that the majority’s
decision was not simply a difference of opinion, but that it was clearly wrong
and improper. Their indignation undoubtedly stemmed, in part, from the legal
theory of national civil rights enforcement authority that had been expressed in
the courts of the United States up to the time of this decision, a theory they generally reflected in their dissents.
Ironically, Democrat Stephen J. Field espoused the broad nationalist and natural rights interpretation of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments and
national civil rights enforcement authority associated with the Republican Party.
Field quoted from congressional debates to argue that these amendments
established the primacy of national authority over citizens and citizens’ rights.
He recalled the ambiguous and conflicting definitions of the nature of federal
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citizenship before the Civil War. The Reconstruction Amendments, he insisted,
removed that ambiguity. The Thirteenth Amendment not only abolished slavery, but it also guaranteed to all citizens the natural rights of freemen.
Furthermore, under the Fourteenth Amendment, Justice Field asserted, a
“citizen of a State is now only a citizen of the United States residing in that
State.” He concluded, therefore, that the natural rights that “belong to him as
a free man and a free citizen, now belong to him as a citizen of any State.” He
added that these rights “do not derive their existence from its [the state’s] legislation, and cannot be destroyed by its power.” On the contrary, the
Fourteenth Amendment “places them under the guardianship of the national
authority.” Using rhetoric and constitutional theory reminiscent of the abolitionists before the Civil War and the Radical Republicans after the Civil War,
Field explained that the amendment was “intended to give practical effect to
the Declaration of 1776 of inalienable rights, rights which are the gift of the
Creator, which the law does not confer, but only recognizes.” If this was not
the result achieved by the amendment, he scoffed, then “it was a vain and idle
enactment, which accomplished nothing, and most unnecessarily excited
Congress and the people on its passage.”46
It would be a mistake to conclude that Justice Field embraced the nationalistic constitutional doctrines he expressed in his dissent for the same political
objectives as civil rights proponents. His concern focused on what he regarded
as an improper use of political power by the Louisiana legislature to create a corporate monopoly that violated citizens’ nationally protected right “to pursue one
of the ordinary trades or callings of life….” Field rejected the rigid exclusivity of
national and state powers in this area of civil rights enforcement advanced by the
majority. He insisted that the Supreme Court had the obligation to oversee the
manner in which the states exercised their police powers, because the states “cannot be permitted to encroach upon any of the just rights of the citizen, which the
Constitution intended to secure against abridgement.” Field argued for a nationalistic and centralizing idea of American federalism as a limitation upon the
abusive exercise of state powers.47
The legal reasoning and political values expressed in Field’s opinion evince
the paradoxical compatibility between a theory of broad national civil rights
enforcement authority and nineteenth-century American opposition to big government. Expressing his Democratic political values and commitment to a liberal laissez faire political system, Justice Field asserted a doctrine of broad
national powers over states’ rights in the interest of curtailing governmental
interference with individual liberties. This analysis suggests that Liberal
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Republicans who opposed the use of national governmental powers did not necessarily base their opposition on the philosophical purity of liberal political theory
and values.48
The two other dissenting opinions were written by justices who earlier had
affirmed the broad nationalist interpretation of national civil rights enforcement
authority while riding circuit. Justice Bradley’s broad nationalist interpretation
of the Fourteenth Amendment was predicated on a different view of Civil War
and Reconstruction history than that described by Miller. Bradley argued that
the amendment reflected the nationalism generated by the era. “[It] was an
attempt to give voice to the strong national yearning for that time and that condition of things,” he recalled, “in which American citizenship should be a sure
guaranty of safety…in the full enjoyment of every right and privilege belonging
to a free man, without fear of violence or molestation.”49
Miller’s opinion presented Bradley with an opportunity to refine his views
about citizenship, the rights of citizens, and the respective authority of
national and state governments to enforce these rights. Bradley rejected the
distinction Miller made between national and state citizenship. Because
Americans inherited traditional rights and privileges from their English forebears, Bradley reasoned, citizenship “has certain privileges and immunities
attached to it…,” and “these privileges and immunities attach as well to citizenship of the United States.” He explained that “to say these rights and immunities
attach only to state citizenship, and not to citizenship of the United States,
appears to me to evince a very narrow and insufficient estimate of constitutional
history and the rights of men, not to say the rights of the American people.”50
Bradley therefore disputed Justice Miller’s observations concerning the
comity clause and Justice Washington’s interpretation of the privileges and
immunities it secured:
[B]oth the clause of the Constitution referred to, and Justice Washington in
his comment on it, speak of the privileges and immunities of citizens in a
State, not of citizens of a State. It is the privileges, and immunities of citizens,
that is, of citizens as such, that are to be accorded to citizens of other States
when they are found in any State; or as Justice Washington says: “privileges
and immunities which are, in their nature, fundamental; which belong, of
right, to the citizens of all free governments.”
Bradley specified the rights to life, liberty, and property, the right to choose
one’s calling in addition to Bill of Rights guarantees as some of the rights of
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United States citizenship. He further maintained that even if a person was not a
citizen of any particular state, he could lay claim to these rights as a citizen of the
United States.51
Justice Bradley was not troubled by the “dire consequences” presented by the
recognition of broad national civil rights enforcement authority. He did not
think that this broad national power would interfere unduly with the civil and
criminal affairs and laws of the states or abolish “the state governments in everything but name,” because little if any legislation was required to implement the
amendment. He also rejected the concept of exclusivity in the powers of the
national and state governments over civil rights, and instead asserted that these
powers were concurrent and coequal. A more pressing concern was the prospect
of logjammed dockets in the federal courts suggested by Justice Miller. But, even
here, Bradley minimized his concern with the observation that, as questions
relating to these fundamental rights arose in the courts, they would become so
well defined and so well recognized and secured that violations would decrease
along with the necessity of litigating in the federal courts. Should this power over
civil rights increase the business of the federal courts, he suggested, Congress
could alleviate the burden by providing for additional and more efficient courts.
He closed his comments with a reproach to the majority:
The great question is, what is the true construction of the Amendment?
When once we find that, we shall find the means of giving it effect. The argument from inconvenience ought not to have a very controlling influence in
questions of this sort. The national will and national interest are of far greater
importance.52
Justice Noah H. Swayne expressed a view of legislative intent similar to
Bradley’s. He had been the first justice to judicially examine and assess the intent
of the framers of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Thirteenth Amendment in
an 1867 opinion he apparently wrote after consulting with the author of the Civil
Rights Act, Senator Lyman Trumbull, to determine its legislative intent.
Acknowledging the existence of dual citizenship, Swayne nevertheless recognized a concurrent federal authority over natural rights, which he insisted constituted nationally enforceable rights of national citizenship. The rights peculiar
to state citizenship were those special privileges given by a state to its citizens.
However, even these could be enjoyed by citizens of the other states, in Swayne’s
opinion, by virtue of the comity clause. The comity clause thus conferred upon
citizens of the United States an equality of state-conferred rights. He sharply
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criticized the majority for its fear of federalism presented by this novel and great
power. He retorted that “the novelty was known and the measure deliberately
adopted,” and insisted that “any government claiming to be national” that lacked
the authority to secure the rights of its citizens was “glaringly defective.” Turning
directly to the majority’s opinion, Justice Swayne censured his judicial brothers
for defeating “by a limitation not anticipated, the intent of those by whom the
instrument was framed and of those by whom it was adopted. To the extent of
that limitation it turns, as it were, what was meant for bread into a stone.”
Reserving his most acerbic criticism for last, he proclaimed that the United
States Supreme Court “has no authority to interpolate a limitation that is neither expressed nor implied. Our duty is to execute the law, not make it …”53
The dissenters’ accusations that Miller misinterpreted legislative intent was
supported by reactions to his opinion in Congress. Some of the framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment roundly criticized the opinion on the floor of Congress
in 1873. George S. Boutwell, William Lawrence, Benjamin F. Butler, Timothy O.
Howe, and Robert S. Hale insisted that the framers in 1866, as well as their
Democratic opponents, recognized that they were assuming authority to protect
the natural rights of freemen, and that they thereby produced the revolution in
American federalism that Justice Miller claimed they could not have intended.
James G. Blaine expressed the same view in his memoirs when he stated that the
Supreme Court had deprived the amendment of the power Congress intended
it to have.54
The Court must have known the debilitating consequence its decision would
have on the efforts of Department of Justice officers to enforce civil rights in the
federal courts of the South. The editor of the American Law Review, for example,
satirized the decision’s impact upon President Grant’s Southern policy by noting
that, while the executive department keeps Casey in New Orleans, and sends
its soldiers to regulate the internal politics of Louisiana, the judicial department remits to people of that State, to its courts and legislature, the custody
of the privileges and immunities of its citizens.55
Justice Miller, for one, was conscious of the eviscerating impact his opinion
had upon the president’s Southern policy. When Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase
died shortly after the decision, Justice Miller became the front-runner to fill the
vacancy. His legal acumen and experience on the bench made him the favorite
of the nation’s bar. However, the position went to Morrison R. Waite after Roscoe
Conkling, George H. Williams, and Caleb Cushing either refused nomination or
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withdrew after their nominations were sent to the Senate. Justice Miller blamed
his Slaughter-House decision and the intrigue of Justices Bradley and Swayne for
his being passed over by the president. He lamented to Justice David Davis that
this “will not be the first time that the best and most beneficial public act of a
man’s life has stood in the way of his political advancement.” Reviewing the
appointments of Chief Justices John Marshall, Roger B. Taney, and Chase, Miller
complained that the position had “always been the reward of political, I may say
partisan services.” Disclaiming any partisanship in his behavior on the Court, he
added, “it is perhaps looking for too much to expect Grant with these examples
before him, to look alone to the voice of the profession or to the qualifications
of the nominee.”56
Some newspaper editors also saw the Court’s ruling as a challenge to
presidential policy. The Chicago Tribune called the decision a needed check
“upon the determination of the Administration to enforce its policy and to
maintain its power, even at the expense of the constitutional prerogatives of the
States.” The New York World suggested that the reason the Court was not more
forceful “in declaring this sound doctrine is to be accounted for by their consciousness that they were running counter to the impetuous hostility of the
Republican Party to the constitutional rights of the States.”57
However, the decision’s impact on the politics of Reconstruction was not generally perceived. Considering its importance, it aroused surprisingly little controversy in the newspapers around the country. Curiously, the New Orleans
newspapers hardly noticed it. One explanation for this indifferent reaction was
suggested by M. F. Taylor when he wrote that the decision was not generally
understood. Public reaction reinforces the contention of this study that the
Court consciously may have chosen the Slaughter-House Cases to express its view
of national civil rights enforcement authority as the safest way to resolve the
intensely political and controversial constitutional issues created by Republican
Reconstruction policies and legislative enactments.58
The absence of controversy is also partially explained by the support the decision gave to the growing opposition of erstwhile Republican proponents of civil
rights to the continuation of national interference in Southern affairs. The constitutional formulation of that political opposition included a reaffirmation of
the primacy of state authority over citizens’ rights. Those political policies could
be defeated by eliminating the legal authority under which actions were taken to
achieve them.
The disaffection of Republican support from Republican policies is evident
from an analysis of the Republican press. Such an analysis reveals that the legal
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doctrine enunciated in Slaughter-House served other Republican political goals.
The Chicago Tribune, for example, strongly applauded the Court’s decision in an
editorial that demonstrated that the paper’s desire to control monopolies in
Illinois had displaced its earlier passion to protect civil rights in the South. The
timing and conclusions of the Court’s decision were most propitious to states
that were steeped in antimonopoly ferment. Paradoxically, the Supreme Court’s
sanction of a state-created monopoly in Louisiana implicitly acknowledged the
state’s power to destroy monopolistic controls in Illinois. The Slaughter-House
decision was therefore consistent with the Munn ruling four years later that
upheld Illinois’s antimonopoly Granger Laws.59
The revitalization of states’ rights was crucial to the success of Northern states in
their struggle to cope with the stresses of industrialization and urbanization. The
importance of the decision to the North, then, was not that it sustained a statecreated monopoly, nor that it curtailed national civil rights enforcement authority.
Rather, its importance to the North was that it endorsed the state police power necessary to control the growing concentrations of monopolistic power of rising business. Noting these implications, the Chicago Tribune’s editor declared that the
decision would put “a quietous upon the thousand-and-one follies seeking to be
legalized by hanging on to the Fourteenth Amendment.” He endorsed the states’
rights emphasis of the ruling by asserting that, although the amendment was
understood by its framers and the public at large as securing to blacks the rights
enjoyed by whites, “it had no power to interfere with municipal relations, however
unjust in themselves, or with previously-existing state rights….” The amendment
“only had binding force when the State sought to deprive the negro of his rights.”60
The Tribune’s hearty support of states’ rights in 1873 stands in sharp contrast
to the position it took in 1866 when it insisted on the necessity to interfere with
municipal regulations to protect civil rights. In a May 1866 editorial, the Tribune
dared the “copperheads” to campaign on “the proposition that local legislation
shall have the opportunity to abridge the rights of the citizens, as to deprive any
person of life, liberty or property without due process of law.” It claimed that
“Republican stumpers” wanted “no better fun than taking off the hides of
Copperheads on that issue….” Yet, in his approval of the Slaughter-House decision, the editor stated in 1873 that it was “only recently that…the people have
sought to override the acts of State Governments by appeal to the provisions of
this Amendment.” The Court’s ruling had been required to check the centralizing
tendencies of the national government that cut so deeply into the prerogatives of
the states. “The Supreme Court has not spoken a moment too soon,” it concluded,
“or any too boldly, on this subject.”61
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The Nation also reversed its support for the national protection of civil rights
through a curious recollection of legislative history. In 1866 it proclaimed that
protection of the personal rights of the freedmen was “the first duty of the
Government” and insisted that “Congress is directly invested with full power to
legislate to this end …” by virtue of the Thirteenth Amendment. The revolution
wrought by conferring the “legal condition of free citizens” on four million
slaves was secured, the editor proclaimed, when the guarantees of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 were incorporated into the Constitution by the Fourteenth
Amendment.62
Yet, The Nation withdrew its support of congressional Reconstruction and
federal civil rights enforcement as early as 1869. The reasons given for its change
in policy were the “corruption, injustice and ineptitude” of the Republican governments of the Southern states. The following year, this erstwhile defender of
civil rights condemned Justice Bradley’s circuit court ruling in the SlaughterHouse Cases. The focus of The Nation’s criticism was not civil rights protection.
Rather, the paper criticized the decision’s impact upon patents, railroads, canals,
in short, every private franchise in the nation. Seeing no distinction between the
slaughterhouse monopoly and other corporate grants, The Nation feared that,
under this ruling, corporate charters would be perceived as conferring special
privileges that benefited private individuals rather than the public and that most
corporations would be declared unconstitutional. Few corporations would withstand such a test, it predicted, and it hoped that a ruling that was so detrimental
to the economic interests of the United States would be rejected by the Supreme
Court.63
The Nation’s hopes were fulfilled in 1873. It observed that the Slaughter-House
decision demonstrated that the Supreme Court “is recovering from the War
fever, and is getting ready to abandon sentimental canons of [constitutional]
construction.” While it emphasized how the decision saved “almost every franchise in the United States” from destruction, it also commented on its civil rights
implications. Contradicting the views it held in 1866, The Nation in 1873 condemned the butchers’ contention that the civil rights of citizens were brought
under the protective power of the national government by the Fourteenth
Amendment. It characterized that notion as a “monstrous conclusion,” and
declared that the national protection of civil rights “would put an end to federal
government, do away with state courts, laws and constitutions, and throw pretty
much the entire business of the country into the hands of Congress and the officials of the United States.” Public reaction to Slaughter-House evinces Attorney
General Akerman’s observation of December 1871 that Northern support for
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civil rights protection in the South was being replaced by a greater interest in
“progress.”64
Some congressmen and senators also reversed their support for Republican
objectives of civil rights enforcement. These Republican supporters of civil
rights in 1866 manifested a curiously selective recollection in the 1870s of what
they had intended in their earlier legislative efforts to secure civil rights.
Congressman James A. Garfield, for example, opposed the Ku Klux Klan Act of
1871 because he insisted that the authority to protect natural rights was one of
the powers of the states, and it remained a state power despite the Fourteenth
Amendment. He recalled that in 1866 Congressman John A. Bingham had
opposed the Civil Rights Act of 1866 precisely because Bingham believed that
Congress did not possess the power to protect the natural rights that that legislation was intended to secure. Congressman Garfield reminded Bingham that
when Bingham introduced his proposed constitutional amendment to confer
that power upon Congress, it was rejected for a more limited proposal that
merely prohibited the states from infringing citizens’ rights.65
Congressman Garfield’s excursion into legislative history inadvertently supported the point he was attempting to disprove. In claiming that Congressman
Bingham opposed the Civil Rights Act because it was intended to protect natural rights, he unwittingly conceded that congressional intent in enacting the law
was actually broader than the intent he claimed led to the proposed Fourteenth
Amendment. He did not explain why Congress would enact a law to protect natural rights over the president’s veto with the expected result of irrevocably splitting the president and Congress politically, but limit a proposed constitutional
amendment to prohibitions against the states. Nor did he offer to explain how
the law and the amendment could be so fundamentally different in scope when
their framers, and the public generally, thought of them as identical in scope and
meaning.66
The extent of Garfield’s reversal is clear when one contrasts the views he
expressed in 1871 with those he stated in 1866. In 1866, he said that he intended
to “see to it that, hereafter, personal rights are placed in the keeping of the
nation…,” and that the rights to life, liberty, and property shall “no longer be left
to the caprice of mobs or the contingencies of local legislation.” He stated that
Congress “must make American citizenship the shield that protects every citizen,
on every foot of our soil.” He spoke these words in support of Senator Lyman
Trumbull’s Freedmen’s Bureau Bill, which he declared was “one of the means for
reaching this desirable result.” The other means undoubtedly included the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 since it was regarded as a twin of the Freedmen’s Bureau Bill
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and was intended by Senator Trumbull to make permanent and nationwide the
temporary protection offered by the Freedmen’s Bureau Bill in the South.67
Congressman Garfield did complain in 1866 that the Fourteenth Amendment
did not go as far as he would have liked. But, his complaint was not that the proposed amendment did not protect natural rights or that it was limited to state
action; rather, he would have added to the protection provided to natural rights
the same protection over voting rights. He stated that if suffrage was not itself a
natural right, it was so crucial to the enjoyment of natural rights and their security that it was virtually a natural right and should be included among the other
natural rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendment. He also acknowledged in
1866 that the amendment incorporated the Civil Rights Act to protect the statute
from being repealed. Garfield’s biographer has concluded that in 1866 the congressman had adopted a “thoroughgoing nationalism that would have made
even Marshall and Webster turn over in their graves and that might have done
credit to Theodore Roosevelt himself.” Observing that Garfield believed “that
Congress could and should enter within the limits of the individual State to
protect all persons against injustice,” his biographer concluded that
Congressman Garfield’s views were in the mainstream of Republican policy
in 1866.68
Senator Lyman Trumbull, author of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, also made a
weak and rather unpersuasive attempt to deny the past. Despite the statements
he made in 1866 expressing his intention to secure all of the natural rights of all
American citizens, he insisted in 1871 that his Civil Rights Act and the Fourteenth
Amendment that incorporated it applied only to racially discriminatory state
legislation. Further, in 1866, he had attempted to persuade Congressman Samuel
Shellabarger to withdraw another bill Shellabarger had introduced to secure natural rights absolutely. Trumbull insisted that his Civil Rights bill accomplished
this purpose. In 1871, however, Trumbull was equally insistent that this Civil
Rights Act and the Fourteenth Amendment applied only to black Americans and
merely secured to them an equality in state-conferred rights, and then only
against discriminatory state laws. The fundamental rights of citizens, he declared
in opposition to the proposed Ku Klux Klan Act, remained under the authority
of the states. The Fourteenth Amendment, he insisted, had “not changed an iota
of the Constitution as it was originally framed, in that respect.”69
This reversal of Republican supporters of civil rights enforcement even
affected the federal judiciary. The one federal court in which the Civil Rights Act
of 1866 was enforced with any significance in the 1860s was Judge Bland Ballard’s
District Court in Louisville, Kentucky. He concurred in the broadly nationalistic
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Rhodes opinion penned by Justice Swayne in 1867. He subsequently issued his
own rulings that interpreted national civil rights enforcement authority as
broadly. Judge Ballard’s court and the Civil Rights Act were of primary importance in prosecuting whites who committed crimes against blacks in Kentucky.70
By the early 1870s, however, federal legal officers in this overwhelmingly
Democratic state had grown weary of prosecuting ordinary crimes committed
against black victims, and they longed to be relieved of this burden. In a
February 1872 charge to a grand jury, Judge Ballard used Kentucky’s legislative
recognition of the right of blacks to testify in all state cases as an excuse to eliminate the jurisdiction over criminal cases that he had been exercising since 1866
under the Civil Rights Act. He also declared unconstitutional those portions of
the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 that “invests this court with jurisdiction of offenses
against the States.” Although he recognized the natural rights of citizens as the
rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendment’s privileges or immunities clause,
he nevertheless asserted that “to the State governments was left all matters relating
to the citizen, the protection of his life, liberty and property.” He stated that this
“form of government has not been changed.” In an apparent repudiation of the
jurisdiction he exercised under the Civil Rights Act in trying crimes committed
by whites against blacks, he denied that the federal courts possessed jurisdiction
even if the state courts did not bring the offenders to justice. “If we can try
offenses committed by marauders who go about committing outrages, because
the State Courts do not punish,” he explained, “then we can absorb to ourselves
the jurisdiction of the whole criminal law of the State for the same reason….”
Ballard anticipated subsequent Supreme Court decisions by narrowing the
authority of the federal government to secure civil rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment to state statutes that were racially discriminatory on their face.71
Furthermore, by the end of 1872 the Grant administration signaled a change
in civil rights enforcement policy. It announced to United States attorneys that
only those cases that were so outrageous and notorious that prosecutions could
not be avoided were to be brought in the federal courts. By the summer of 1873,
the administration abandoned its efforts to enforce civil rights by ordering the
cessation of new prosecutions under the Enforcement Acts and extending executive clemency and pardons for past offenses. While the Slaughter-House decision
was not responsible for this change in administration policy in 1873, it was
certainly parallel to the shift in the nation’s attitude towards civil rights enforcement that had prompted the administration to curtail its efforts to secure civil
rights. However, it was directly responsible for subsequent judicial rulings that
abolished essential constitutional authority on which the Department of Justice
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depended to enforce civil rights. The Slaughter-House decision served as judicial
precedent for decisions that halted later efforts by the Grant administration to
protect civil rights when it revived its policy of vigorous civil rights enforcement
to combat the renewal of Southern terrorism in 1874. Slaughter-House, therefore,
was a turning point in Reconstruction. The remainder of this study analyzes the
political and legal consequences of Slaughter-House.72

8

T

The Judicial Curtailment of
Civil Rights Enforcement,
1874–1875

he legal impact of the Slaughter-House Cases on the constitutional history
of Reconstruction was not immediately clear to contemporary
observers. Indeed, its impact on federal regulatory powers was interpreted in various and sometimes contradictory ways. One legal commentator,
for example, condemned the decision because he feared that it would impede
efforts to regulate monopolies. At the same time, another praised it because it
affirmed the nation’s authority to engage in such regulation.1
While the Slaughter-House decision was generally perceived as a revitalization
of states’ rights and a corresponding diminution in national authority, it left
unanswered many questions relating to national civil rights enforcement
authority. The decision, after all, involved a legal conflict between white butchers
and a corporation rather than the protection of Southern blacks and white
Republicans with which most lower federal court interpretations of the
Fourteenth Amendment were involved. The Supreme Court’s emasculation of
the amendment’s citizenship and privileges and immunities clauses so contravened the virtual unanimity of lower federal court interpretations that contemporaries plausibly could have assumed that the Supreme Court did not intend
its ruling to apply to civil rights violations arising from racial and political
vendettas.
Even if one concedes the emasculation of these clauses as constitutional
authority for national civil rights enforcement generally, the due process and
equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment remained unexplored by
the courts. The power to enforce civil rights that was eroded by the Supreme
Court’s interpretation of the respective rights of dual citizenship might conceivably have been restored through the due process and equal protection clauses.
Indeed, it was upon the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
that congressional supporters of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 based Congress’s
constitutional authority to proscribe racial discrimination in places of public
accommodations. Some of them even cited the Slaughter-House decision in
defense of the bill’s constitutionality.2

The Judicial Curtailment of Civil Rights Enforcement, 1874–1875

141

Because of its uncertain impact on national efforts to protect the civil rights of
Southern blacks and white Republicans, the Slaughter-House decision permitted
federal judges to interpret in contradictory ways the constitutional authority
upon which these efforts depended. Some judges circumvented or simply ignored
the ruling as they continued to exercise national civil rights enforcement authority as they had before Slaughter-House. Others cited the decision as precedent to
void national civil rights enforcement authority.3
The legal theory deduced from Miller’s opinion that characterized national
civil rights enforcement authority more narrowly than judges previously had
defined it eventually prevailed in the federal courts. This restrictive interpretation of national civil rights enforcement authority brought to a jarring halt the
Justice Department’s struggle to combat the renewal of Ku Klux terrorism in
1874. Inhibited by adverse judicial rulings, Attorney General Williams ordered
United States attorneys to stop bringing prosecutions under the Enforcement
Acts of 1870 and 1871 until the Supreme Court clarified the Justice Department’s
authority to secure civil rights. The department never again enforced civil rights
in the South under President Grant, in part because the Supreme Court’s
awaited clarification of national authority to secure the civil rights of Southern
blacks was not announced until 1876. This decision limited enforcement of the
Fourteenth Amendment to violations committed by the states and eliminated
the jurisdiction over civil rights that the lower federal courts originally had been
exercising.
Although the Slaughter-House decision complemented the Grant administration’s political decision to curtail Justice Department enforcement of civil rights,
the attorney general did not welcome judicial rulings that undermined the
department’s constitutional authority to protect civil rights. For example, Judge
Ballard declared the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 unconstitutional in his charge to
the jury in an October 1873 civil suit that was brought under the Civil Rights Act
of 1866. Although he acknowledged the impropriety of declaring a statute unconstitutional in a charge to the jury, particularly when the statute was not involved
in the case, Judge Ballard nevertheless disallowed the jurisdiction the statute purported to give to his court to punish what, in his opinion, were offenses against
state laws punishable exclusively in the courts of the state. Judge Ballard’s action
brought immediate angry denunciations from Attorney General Williams as well
as Judge Ballard’s political ally, former Solicitor General Bristow, for treating the
“legislation as a nullity without a careful and painstaking consideration of the
subject….” Williams expressed incredulity over Ballard’s opposition “to the suppression of the disorder now existing in Kentucky….”4
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Other judges also declared the 1871 statute unconstitutional. In another of the
ironies of this history, the case that ultimately decided the constitutionality of
national authority to protect citizens’ rights under this legislation, like
Slaughter-House, arose in Louisiana. The circumstances of the case, United States
v. Cruikshank, involved a level of violence tantamount to a localized civil war in
what was perhaps the bloodiest racial conflict in Louisiana history.5
The Grant Parish massacre was, in part, the product of the confusion following the state elections of 1872. Both the Conservatives, led by the incumbent governor, Henry C. Warmoth, and the Republicans, led by gubernatorial
challenger William P. Kellogg, claimed victory. For a time Louisianans experienced the political anomaly of having two governors and two legislatures
claiming and exercising governmental authority. Both claimants to the office
of governor appointed election returning boards whose functions included the
appointment of parish judges and sheriffs. The Conservative Warmoth board
appointed Alphonse Cazabat and Christopher Columbus Nash to the positions
of judge and sheriff of Grant Parish, which is located in the central portion of
the state. At the time of his appointment to the office of sheriff, Nash was
awaiting trial for the political murder of a white Republican leader in the area.
The Republican Kellogg board appointed R. C. Register and Daniel Shaw to
these offices.
The two pairs of appointees each claimed to be the legitimate officeholders
and maneuvered to gain possession of the parish courthouse. The Republicans
Register and Shaw succeeded in occupying it, and they reinforced it with armed
supporters determined to retain possession. On Easter morning, April 13, 1873, a
“veritable army” of “old time Ku Klux Klan” led by the Conservatives Cazabat
and Nash stormed the courthouse. Conflicting accounts of what transpired prevent a complete narrative of the fighting, but federal investigators sent from New
Orleans reported that the Conservative white forces had committed shocking
atrocities. At least sixty freedmen were killed after they had surrendered, and
their bodies were mutilated and left to rot in the parching sun. One of the federal deputy marshals was so affected by the slaughter that he could only compare
it to the massacre at Fort Pillow. Federal investigators reported that the
Conservatives viewed the conflict over the local political offices as a “test of
white supremacy,” and they were joined by men from surrounding parishes in a
determined effort to restore white rule. Government investigators put the onus
of blame for the violence on the white Conservatives. They concluded that the
Conservatives had massacred the black Republicans in a political vendetta
motivated by racial hatred.6
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The Justice Department’s reaction to the massacre reflected the administration’s
ambivalence toward civil rights enforcement. The massacre was simply too
notorious to ignore. So, the attorney general departed from his evolving policy
of nonenforcement of civil rights and instructed the United States attorney at
New Orleans, James R. Beckwith, to “spare no pains or expense to cause the
guilty parties to be arrested and punished….” He supported this instruction with
authorization for the use of troops and special detectives to assist in conducting
the investigation and in making arrests.7
The attorney general’s support quickly diminished when he was informed of
the amount of assistance required by the magnitude of the violence. Beckwith and
the United States marshal estimated that they would need some 150 soldiers to
arrest between 300 and 400 defendants who scoured the countryside in armed
bands prepared to resist arrest. Many had already fled to Texas to avoid arrest.
Williams sharply pared down his expectations because the prosecution of all the
defendants was impracticable within the limited amount of military and financial
resources the Grant administration was willing to commit. He radically revised his
instructions by directing the United States attorney to select only 6 to 12 of the
leaders for trial. The attorney general was apparently less interested in vindicating federal law and the dead victims of criminal violence by bringing offenders to
justice than in merely discouraging future crimes. He observed that “the conviction of the prominent men and leaders would have all the desired effect to vindicate the law and induce the future observance of it by the people.” United States
Attorney Beckwith implored the attorney general to authorize a more vigorous
enforcement of the law. He explained that he had never been connected with the
prosecution of a crime “so revolting and horrible in the details of its perpetration
and so burdened with atrocity and barbarity.” Beckwith’s supplications won the
attorney general’s promise to discuss the matter with President Grant, but, if he
did, he failed to inform Beckwith. The administration’s decision to prosecute only
a fraction of those responsible for the crimes represented cynical tokenism.8
On June 16, 1873, the federal grand jury at New Orleans indicted 97 defendants and accused each defendant of 32 violations of sections 6 and 7 of the
Enforcement Act of 1870. The first 16 counts charged that they banded together
and conspired to deprive Levi Nelson and Alexander Tillman, “being citizens of
the United States of African descent, and persons of color,” of various rights
secured by the Constitution of the United States. The specific rights included the
right of assembly; the right to keep and bear arms; the right to protection against
deprivation of life, liberty, and property without due process of law; the right to
the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons
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and property; and the right to vote. Beckwith seemed to be experimenting with
the language of specific counts, perhaps because of the uncertain impact of
Slaughterhouse on national civil rights authority. Some counts specified the federally enforceable rights that were infringed, while one count merely used the
general phrase “rights, privileges, immunities and protection granted and
secured to them as citizens of the United States and of Louisiana.” The counts
also varied with respect to the intent charges. The defendants were accused of
conspiring with “unlawful and felonious intent and purpose,” with the intent of
hindering, and conspiring to infringe, the victims’ rights secured to them “by
reason of their race and color, and because they were of African descent, and
persons of color.” The last 16 counts charged the defendants with murder in pursuing the conspiracy charged in the first 16 counts. They also were charged with
oppressing the victims for having voted in the November 1872 election. While
the circumstances of the crime were singular, the indictment was similar to so
many others that had been upheld in the federal courts prior to April 1873.9
Despite the number of defendants indicted, United States Attorney Beckwith
complied with the attorney general’s instructions and selected only 9 for the
trial that began on February 23, 1874. Louisiana Conservatives decided to use this
case to challenge the constitutionality of federal prosecutions of Ku Klux-type
crimes. Public donations and a benefit opera organized by prominent citizens of
New Orleans yielded sufficient funds to retain four lawyers to represent the
defendants. Two of the four, R. H. Marr and E. John Ellis, were leaders of the
Louisiana Conservative Party. Ellis was a member of the House of
Representatives who would play an instrumental role in negotiating the removal
of federal troops from Louisiana in 1877. The other two defense counsel were
William R. Whitaker and D. S. Bryan.10
The trial took two months. A certain symmetry characterized the trial before it
was given to the jury, for two days were required to impanel the jury and two days
were required to make closing arguments while two weeks were needed to examine
some 280 witnesses. The witnesses included local political leaders and state officers
such as state legislators. Significantly, Circuit Judge Woods presided, and, in his
charge to the jury, he asserted that every right mentioned in the indictment was
secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. His apparent defiance
of the Supreme Court is perhaps explained by his characterization of the case as
one of grave importance not only to the defendants and people of Louisiana, but
to the people of the United States as well. The jury evidently appreciated the
import of the case, for it deliberated for approximately six weeks. However, it
acquitted one defendant and failed to reach a verdict as to the others.11

The Judicial Curtailment of Civil Rights Enforcement, 1874–1875

145

The remaining eight defendants were retried within one month. When the
trial began on May 18, Justice Bradley was on the bench with Judge Woods at the
request of defense counsel. The defense’s strategy was to challenge the constitutionality of the Enforcement Act of 1870, and they hoped to divide Bradley and
Woods for the purpose of having the case certified to the United States Supreme
Court. Immediately after the jury was impaneled, Marr entered a pretrial
motion to quash the indictment on the grounds that the statute was unconstitutional. His argument was based on the Supreme Court’s Slaughterhouse opinion, parts of which he read to the court. However, Bradley refused to decide this
issue with the trial pending because the issues it raised were too grave to be
decided hurriedly. He instructed counsel to proceed with the trial, and, if it
resulted in convictions, the court would then consider a motion in arrest of
judgment based on Marr’s argument. He also promised to certify the case to the
Supreme Court if he and Woods divided.12
Examination of witnesses again required two weeks, but closing arguments
filled four days. The reason for the excessively long closing arguments, in the
opinion of United States Attorney Beckwith, is that Justice Bradley fell into a
trap laid by defense counsel by permitting the defense to argue against the constitutionality of the Enforcement Acts to the jury. This procedure was highly
unusual. This time, however, the jury reached a verdict as to all of the defendants, and after only three days. Three of the defendants were found guilty of
conspiracy as charged in the first 16 counts of the indictment, but not guilty of
murder as charged in the second 16 counts. The other five defendants were
acquitted.13
Beckwith was understandably discouraged with the poor results of two trials
that stretched over four months and consumed so much of his physical and
emotional energy and personal and financial well-being. He and other federal
officials were under constant attack by the local conservative press during the
trials, which emphasized the political and racial complexion of the grand and
petit juries in its insistence that the prosecutions were politically motivated proceedings before a politically biased court. “The trial has been unpleasant in the
extreme,” Beckwith complained to Attorney General Williams, “and my health
has been impaired by three weeks trial in this sweltering climate.” That only
three of nine defendants were convicted led him to the pessimistic conclusion
that the federal judiciary was unable “to make law respected.” “This difficulty
will be more marked in the future, as the jury which rendered the beggarly verdict in the last trial is intimidated,” he warned, “and I doubt if another jury can
be found with courage enough to convict under any pressure of proof.” The
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problems that confronted the federal courts in enforcing civil rights in 1874 had
not diminished from earlier years. In fact, they were about to get worse.14
As anticipated, defense counsel entered motions in arrest of judgment based
upon the unconstitutionality of the Enforcement Act of 1870. Reflecting the
influence of Justice Miller’s views of the Fourteenth Amendment, Marr argued
that the Enforcement Act was unconstitutional because the rights it attempted
to secure were rights of state citizenship and under the exclusive jurisdiction of
the states. He also maintained that the crimes it punished were offenses against
state criminal laws alone and punishable only in the courts of the states. In short,
Marr insisted that the statute attempted to give the federal courts jurisdiction
over crimes that were within the exclusive domain of the states. United States
Attorney Beckwith expected Justice Bradley, on whom he lost little love, to
affirm the defense’s position and declare the law unconstitutional. The common
opinion in New Orleans was that the Slaughter-House decision rendered the
Enforcement Acts unconstitutional and that Bradley wanted to certify the case
to the Supreme Court.15
Bradley had to leave New Orleans before he was prepared to decide the issues
raised by Marr, but he promised to return with his decision within two weeks.
True to his word, he was back in New Orleans to announce his decision on June
27. As United States Attorney Beckwith feared, Bradley upheld the defense’s
motion in arrest of judgment in an opinion that declared unconstitutional sections 6 and 7 of the Enforcement Act of 1870 and voided the indictment for
vagueness and for failing to charge crimes punishable under federal law.16
The Slaughter-House decision forced Bradley to change some of his earlier
views concerning national civil rights enforcement authority. Confronted with a
diminution in the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment because of the Supreme
Court’s interpretation in Slaughter-House, Bradley reasoned his way into contradictory and anomalous interpretations of the Thirteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments in an apparent attempt to preserve federal jurisdiction over civil
rights.
Bradley prefaced his interpretation of the Reconstruction Amendments with
a reassertion of the broad nationalist view of constitutional interpretation.
Citing Prigg v. Pennsylvania, as had so many other judges before him, he asserted
“that Congress has power to enforce by appropriate legislation, every right and
privilege given or guaranteed by the Constitution.” However, Bradley modified
this interpretation by immediately limiting its scope with the condition that the
“method of enforcement, or the legislation appropriate to that end, will depend
upon the character of the right conferred.”17
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Since Bradley’s original interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s
privileges and immunities clause as securing the natural rights of citizenship
had been rejected by the Supreme Court, he was forced to reinterpret the clause.
In changing “the character of the right[s] conferred” by the privileges and
immunities clause, Bradley also changed his view of the “method of enforcement” it authorized. The Fourteenth Amendment did not secure the civil rights
of citizens themselves, he noted, because these rights are protected and enforced
by the particular state of which the individual is a citizen. Rather, the
amendment “only guarantees that they shall not be impaired by the state, or the
United States, as the case may be,” since the sole right secured by the Fourteenth
Amendment’s privileges and immunities clause is the security from governmental
infringements of fundamental rights. Consequently, “there can be no constitutional legislation of congress for directly enforcing the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States by original proceedings in the courts of the
United States….” Rather, Congress may merely “provide a preventive or compensatory remedy or due punishment …” for state infringements of these rights.
“The affirmative enforcement of the rights and privileges themselves…belongs
to the state government as a part of its residuary sovereignty.”18
Bradley’s interpretation of the amendment’s due process clause was virtually indistinguishable from his interpretation of its privileges and immunities
clause. It, too, “is a guaranty of protection against the acts of the state government itself …, not a guaranty against the commission of individual
offenses ….” Therefore, the remedies Congress may provide must be directed
to the denial of due process by the state. The amendment does not authorize
“congress to perform the duty which the guaranty itself supposes it to be the
duty of the state to perform, and which it requires the state to perform.”
Bradley concluded that the “duty and power of enforcement take their inception from the moment that the state fails to comply with the duty enjoined,
or violates the prohibition imposed.” Under this interpretation, it was discriminatory state action rather than the infringement of a personal right that
constituted a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and that gave the federal
courts jurisdiction over the offense.19
Bradley did not mention the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection
clause. This omission is perhaps explained by the equal protection nature of his
interpretation of the amendment’s privileges and immunities and due process
clauses as directed exclusively to state infringements of citizens’ rights. Bradley
thus read into the Fourteenth Amendment a state action interpretation that virtually reduced it to an equal protection guarantee against racially discriminatory
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state legislation. The strengthening of the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment was a consequence of the emasculation of its privileges
and immunities clause.
That Slaughter-House was responsible for Bradley’s novel interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment also is evinced by his interpretations of the Thirteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments. Bradley attributed profound significance to the
absence in the language of the Thirteenth Amendment of any references to the
states. More than a mere “prohibition against the passage or enforcement of any
law inflicting or establishing slavery …,” he observed, the amendment “is a positive declaration that slavery shall not exist. It prohibits the thing.” Bradley
asserted that, in prohibiting slavery, the Thirteenth Amendment affirmatively
conferred on Congress “the power to give full effect to this bestowment of liberty.
…” Since “the character of the right” conferred was liberty itself, Congress was
authorized to legislate directly and fully to secure liberty. He therefore upheld
the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and its grant of citizenship
and punishment of individuals who interfered with the rights of citizens. He
characterized the statute as appropriate and legitimate legislation to achieve the
constitutionally authorized end of securing liberty. He quickly cautioned,
though, that the amendment “does not authorize Congress to pass laws for the
punishment of ordinary crimes and offenses….”20
The way Bradley distinguished between ordinary crimes punishable by the
states alone and nationally punishable civil rights violations was his second
novel interpretation of national civil rights enforcement authority. To be nationally punishable, the offense must have been motivated by racial animus. Neither
the amendment nor the Civil Rights Act was explicitly limited to racial discrimination, nor were they interpreted as applying only to racially discriminatory
infringements of fundamental rights until the Supreme Court’s Slaughter-House
decision. To a significant degree, the protection of white citizens’ rights under
the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments became casualties to the
Supreme Court’s recognition of the primacy of state authority over citizenship
and limitation of these amendments to racial discrimination.
The impact of the Slaughter-House decision on Bradley’s interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment is demonstrated even more clearly by his interpretation
of the Fifteenth Amendment. Bradley acknowledged that, like the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Fifteenth is worded as a negative prohibition of state infringements of voting rights. Moreover, the Fifteenth Amendment explicitly prohibited
racially discriminatory state denials of voting rights. He nevertheless concluded
that the Fifteenth Amendment “confers a positive right, which did not exist
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before.” It conferred upon blacks the “right not to be excluded from voting by
reason of race, color or previous condition of servitude….” Since it conferred a
positive right, the Fifteenth Amendment authorized Congress “to pass laws to
directly enforce the right and punish individuals for its violations, because that
would be the only appropriate and efficient mode of enforcing the amendment.”
Bradley emphasized that the amendment did not just apply to state action with
the declaration that it conferred upon Congress “the power to secure the right
not only against the unfriendly operation of state laws, but against outrage, violence, and combinations on the part of individuals, irrespective of the state
laws.” He saw “no essential incongruity in the coexistence of concurrent laws,
state and federal, for the punishment of the same unlawful acts as offenses both
against the laws of the state and the laws of the United States.” Racial animus
was again the factor that distinguished nationally punishable voting rights
infringements from those punishable by the state.21
Questions arise as to why and how Bradley could have interpreted the
Fifteenth Amendment as reaching beyond state action when he interpreted
the similarly worded Fourteenth Amendment as applicable only to discriminatory acts of the state. Doctrinally, the crucial difference was Bradley’s interpretation of the Fifteenth Amendment as conferring and, therefore, directly
securing a right itself and of the Fourteenth Amendment as not conferring
any civil rights and, therefore, not directly securing rights but only a prohibition against governmental infringements of rights. However, this was a distinction that Bradley was forced to read into the amendments, since they are
similarly worded as prohibitions against the states. Bradley attempted to
rationalize his interpretation of the Fifteenth Amendment by explaining that
it contained a double negative that created a positive right “to be exempt from
the disability of race, color, or previous condition of servitude, as respects the
right to vote.” The Fifteenth Amendment, however, does not contain a double
negative any more than the Fourteenth Amendment. It appears that Bradley
applied to the Fifteenth Amendment the analysis he originally had applied
to the Fourteenth but that he no longer could apply to the Fourteenth because
of Slaughter-House. Because the Supreme Court had not as yet interpreted the
Fifteenth Amendment, Bradley still was free to interpret it broadly. Thus,
he declared that when the Fifteenth Amendment provides that the right to
vote shall not be denied by the state, it means that the right shall be enjoyed.
Consequently, the only legislation that would give effect to this amendment is
legislation that directly enforces the right by punishing individuals who
infringe it.22
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Bradley found in the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Amendments much of the
authority to enforce citizens’ rights that the Supreme Court had extirpated from
the Fourteenth. He declared that “any outrages, atrocities, or conspiracies,
whether against the colored race or the white race” that were motivated by racial
hatred were within the jurisdiction of the United States. Ordinary crimes were
within the sole jurisdiction of the state unless “the state, by its laws, denies to any
particular race equality of rights, in which case the government of the United
States may furnish a remedy and redress to the fullest extent and in the most
direct manner.”23
Nonetheless, the recoupment of federal authority to enforce civil rights was
incomplete. The Fourteenth Amendment was narrowed to proscribe only
racially discriminatory state action. The Thirteenth and Fifteenth Amendments
were interpreted as applying to infringements of rights by private individuals,
but only infringements motivated by racial animus. Infringements of civil and
political rights that were not racially motivated could be punished in federal
courts only if state statutes were racially discriminatory.
The nuances of Bradley’s constitutional analysis were not clearly understood
by contemporaries, but the end result certainly was. He dismissed the indictment in Cruikshank because it attempted to punish the defendants for infringing rights that the national government could not directly protect and because it
failed to charge that the offenses had been committed with the intent to deprive
the victims of their rights because of their race, color, or previous condition of
servitude.24
United States Attorney Beckwith was irate over the decision. “It is clear from
the printed copy of his opinion,” he complained to Attorney General Williams,
“that he never had read the indictment, but has taken some person’s statement
of its substance.” Beckwith’s essential objection to the decision was that Bradley
“exhibited a determination to demolish the law where he…[felt] equal to the
task, and to demolish the indictment where he…[could not] wrestle successfully
with the law,” and that he failed to shed any light upon how a good indictment
could be framed. United States Attorney John A. Minnis also complained that
the ruling seemed to suggest that the Enforcement Acts protected only voting
rights. “It is absolutely necessary that these Acts should extend to the protection
of civil rights, through or by the Courts of the United States,” he insisted,
because to leave them to the state courts would render them worthless. Southern
Republicans were understandably demoralized by Justice Bradley’s decision.25
Louisiana Conservatives, however, were delighted. The New Orleans Daily
Picayune, which had praised Bradley’s nationalistic interpretation of the
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Fourteenth Amendment in the Slaughter-House Cases, found his Cruikshank
decision narrowing the Fourteenth Amendment and national civil rights
enforcement authority equally laudatory. It joyfully informed its readers that
the decision “virtually annuls and arrests all the proceedings in the Grant Parish
prosecutions,” which the editor insisted had been “conducted with a partisan virulence that has naturally excited the profound sympathies of our people for the
accused….” Looking beyond Cruikshank, the editor anticipated that the decision
would put an end to the troublesome meddling of United States Attorney
Beckwith and Judge Woods in Louisiana elections. The editor’s optimism was
due in part to his belief that Bradley’s opinion was the “authentic exposition” of
the statute, since he noted that Bradley had returned to Washington, D. C., during his two week absence and consulted with his brethren on the Supreme
Court. Beckwith apparently shared this view of the decision’s impact upon the
government’s ability to secure civil rights, for he predicted that the decision
would “cost five hundred lives between this time and November.”26
Bradley decided another case around the time of Cruikshank that further
eroded civil rights enforcement authority under the Civil Rights Act of 1866.
This case concerned white juries in the state courts of Texas. While Texas statutes
extended to black citizens the right to serve as jurors, blacks were effectively
excluded from local juries because the process of selecting venires was generally
in the hands of Democrats. In certain places, some of the very individuals who
were responsible for crimes against blacks and who should have been tried for
them were instead put on the juries that were to punish the crimes, according to
reports of federal legal officers. Similar problems affected federal juries. Blacks
were unable to receive justice in the state and federal courts even during the
period of Republican rule in Texas, from 1867 to 1872, despite attempted
reforms. The situation worsened after Conservatives won control of the state
government.27
The case that was presented to the United States Circuit Court, Texas v.
Gaines, involved an alleged politically and racially motivated prosecution of
Matthew Gaines, a prominent black state senator and Republican leader. Gaines
was charged with bigamy and was about to be tried in the local court at La
Fayette County, Texas, when he applied for removal of the case to the federal
district court under section 3 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 on the grounds that
he could not receive the full and equal benefit and protection of the laws because
of racial and political prejudice against him. He alleged that the prosecution
itself was nothing more than a racial and political vendetta to destroy his
political influence. Judicial precedents and practice clearly supported Gaines’s
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application for removal. However, the local court rejected his petition, and he
was tried and convicted. He then appealed to the Republican-controlled Texas
Supreme Court, and it reversed the judgment of the local court and directed it
to remove the case as requested.28
In the district court, Gaines moved to quash the indictment, but the United
States attorney, Andrew J. Evans, a black Republican, surprisingly asked the
court to dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction. Evans’s motion placed Gaines
in the novel position of having to persuade the federal court to enforce his rights
over the opposition of the United States attorney. Evans’s opposition to Gaines’s
cause seems to have been motivated more by political considerations than by
legal principles. Although Evans had been appointed to his office as a Republican
in 1872, he became a Fusionist candidate for the state legislature to which he was
elected in 1878. At the time of Gaines’s case, he was connected to Democratic
Party leaders by marriage, and he was one of the few Republicans holding an
office in the Texas federal courts. He reportedly held his office as a sinecure and
had no interest in furthering the fortunes of the Republican Party. Furthermore,
by opposing jurisdiction, Evans could gain additional political advantage with the
attorney general because he could meet the latter’s demand to curtail judicial
expenses and prosecutions.29
Bradley rejected Gaines’s petition in an opinion that was riddled with contradictions. On the one hand, Bradley premised his interpretation of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 on the Supreme Court’s 1872 ruling that only black defendants
in criminal cases have the right to remove cases from the state to the federal
courts under section 3. He then interjected an additional qualification on the
right of removal. He asserted that mere denial of the right to a fair trial, even
because of racial prejudice, was insufficient to remove a state prosecution to a
federal court. The right must be denied in a particular manner, he stated; it must
be denied by reason of a racially discriminatory state statute. Yet, the rationale
he offered for this departure from the general understanding and practices of
federal legal officers was based on a contradictory premise that actually conformed to those earlier interpretations and practices. “It must be remembered,”
Bradley cautioned, “that the privilege of removal is thus guaranteed to every citizen
of the United States, as well white as black.”30
Bradley could not have meant that a white defendant who was denied the
right to the testimony of a black defense witness was entitled to removal. The
Supreme Court had held in Blyew that witnesses to and, indeed, even the victims
of crimes were not parties to the prosecution; the only parties were the government and the defendant. Therefore, the only party to a criminal prosecution
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who could claim removal under the Civil Rights Act, the Court concluded, was a
black defendant. It is not likely that Bradley would have forgotten or overlooked
this holding, because he had written a bitter dissent to it.31
Moreover, when the Supreme Court narrowed the right of removal under the
Civil Rights Act to black defendants alone, it did not hold that only cases involving racially discriminatory state laws could be removed. On the contrary, the
Court expressly noted that the statute was enacted to protect black Americans
from rights infringements resulting from racial prejudice. The Court interpreted
the Civil Rights Act as conferring jurisdiction on the federal courts when a
defendant claimed that rights were infringed by, or could not be enforced or
redressed in, the state court. A defendant could remove his case at any stage of
the proceedings when he could demonstrate that he was unable to get justice in
the local courts. Neither the judicial interpretations of, nor the practice in the
lower federal courts under, the Civil Rights Act recognized the state action
limitation Bradley now read into it. There is a bitter irony in this. Bradley had
objected to the Supreme Court’s limitation of the statute’s right of removal to
black defendants. Now, when a black defendant sought to invoke this right,
Bradley restricted it even more by requiring that the petitioner’s motion be
based on a racially discriminatory statute.32
Bradley’s opinion in Gaines also contradicted his decision in Cruikshank.
In Cruikshank, Bradley virtually stated that the Civil Rights Act applied only
to black Americans. He also explicitly held that the statute protected blacks
from racially motivated actions of private individuals, from the inaction of
public officials as well as from racially discriminatory state statutes. These
contradictions, so obvious in retrospect, cry out for explanation.33
Bradley seemed to be struggling to reconcile contradictory judicial interpretations of the authority of the national government to enforce civil rights under
the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments on the one hand, and to delineate
national and state jurisdiction over civil rights on the other. In interpreting the
Fourteenth Amendment in Slaughter-House, the Supreme Court had affirmed
unambiguously the primacy of state authority over the enforcement and protection of citizens’ rights. The function of the national government under this theory was to ensure that the state was racially impartial and fair to all citizens. The
main question that this theory raised is the extent to which the national government would interfere with the states’ authority to ensure impartiality and fairness
before the law.34
However, the Thirteenth Amendment, as Bradley understood it, contradicted
this theory of national civil rights enforcement authority. He construed the
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Thirteenth Amendment as securing liberty itself; it was not just a guarantee of
the equal protection of liberty under state law. Hence, the Thirteenth
Amendment encompassed the virtually unlimited authority to enforce and
protect civil rights that the Supreme Court had rejected in its emasculation of
the Fourteenth Amendment. These conflicting theories somehow had to be
reconciled.35
In his Cruikshank and Gaines decisions, Bradley elaborated a theory of
national civil rights enforcement authority that was based upon the diminished
theory of the Fourteenth Amendment. Bradley seems to have been forced by the
Slaughter-House decision to limit national authority to protect civil rights to
state action as a way of delimiting the lines of national and state jurisdiction over
civil rights and of curtailing the national oversight of state civil rights enforcement.
In Gaines, he justified this diminution in national power with the assertion that
“litigants, especially of the criminal class,” would flood the federal courts if they
were permitted to remove their state prosecutions on the mere allegation that
they could not get a fair trial in the state court, regardless of how fanciful the
allegation.36
Bradley must have known that Senator Gaines was not “of the criminal class”
and that his petition was not a groundless legal tactic to escape deserved punishment. Bradley was well aware that blacks were effectively prohibited from
serving on juries in the Texas courts. Attorney General Williams brought the
problem to Bradley’s attention and asked him to devise some means of resolving
it. Nothing was done to rectify the injustice. Bradley also must have been aware
of the notorious efforts of Texas Conservatives to remove Radical Republicans,
such as Gaines, from state office. Yet, his decision in Gaines effectively precluded
the federal courts from providing the justice black defendants were denied in the
local courts. It also contributed to the expulsion of Matthew Gaines from the
Texas Senate.37
However meritorious Gaines’s petition might have been, Bradley evidently
believed he could not grant it without continuing the extensive involvement of
the federal courts in the administration of criminal justice that his brothers on
the Supreme Court had rejected. The limitation of federal jurisdiction to cases
involving state action was not predetermined by the legal theory of the
Slaughter-House decision. However, it was mandated by the states’ rights-oriented
focus of the opinion. In restricting national authority over civil rights to a guarantee of racially impartial state statutes, Bradley effectively precluded the federal
courts from intruding into local affairs to a greater extent than the Supreme
Court would tolerate.
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The impact of Bradley’s decisions was felt beyond Louisiana and Texas. It
reached across the South and into the nation’s capital. During the summer of
1874 his Cruikshank ruling was widely publicized as a decisive blow to national
civil rights enforcement authority. Democratic Conservatives became increasingly confident that the permanent elimination of Enforcement Acts prosecutions was at hand. Republican fears mounted that the Supreme Court would
declare these laws unconstitutional or at least interpret them so narrowly that
their effectiveness would be destroyed. This added to the fears Republicans
already held for their personal safety because of the administration’s policy of
leniency and clemency. Federal legal officers predicted that these rulings, combined with the administration’s weakened resolve, would constitute an irresistible
invitation to white supremacist Democratic Conservatives to renew their political
and racial terrorism.38
The violence anticipated by prescient federal officials exploded in the wake of
Bradley’s decisions. The period of relative calm won by the federal prosecutions
during the years 1871 to 1873 was shattered in August 1874 when violence, terrorism, and intimidation became so widespread that contemporary observers
described the mayhem as a new phase in the South’s rebellion against national
authority begun in 1861. Organized bands of guerrillas patterned after the Ku
Klux Klan sprang up to overthrow Southern Republican governments and
restore white rule. In some areas of the South, local government gave way to
conditions of near anarchy reminiscent of the period 1870–1871.39
Governor Kellogg informed Attorney General Williams that leaders of the socalled White League in Louisiana believed that Justice Bradley “acted on inspiration received from the Administration” when he quashed the indictments and
released the prisoners in the Colfax Massacre prosecutions. He complained that
the administration’s policy of leniency, “taken in connection with the decision of
Judge Bradley releasing the Grant Parish murderers, has had a very bad effect,”
for the White League was confident that the national government would refrain
from intervening in Louisiana affairs. United States Attorney Beckwith shared
the governor’s fears; he also reported that the Cruikshank decision “has led to
serious and lamentable consequences and is still accepted by those engaged in
that Massacre as conclusive against jurisdiction of the federal courts.”40
Similar reports poured into the attorney general’s office from other
Southern states. Judge Richard Busteed could not conceal his panic when he
informed Williams of the political murder of a prominent carpetbag Republican
leader in Alabama. He insisted that forceful federal action was required to stop
“the inauguration of the carnival of blood,” which the judge characterized as
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“the first fruits of the pardons secured by Alabama Congressmen for the Ku Klux
before me… .” If federal protection was not provided, he warned, “the life of
every prominent Northerner who belongs to the Republican party will be in
danger from way-side assassination.” Judge Busteed, who was from New York,
resigned from the bench two months after Attorney General Williams responded
that he did not see how the murder could be brought within federal jurisdiction.
Apparently, Judge Busteed’s resignation was prompted by more than the threat
of impeachment.41
United States Attorney Nick S. McAfee of the Southern District of Alabama
confirmed Judge Busteed’s warnings with even more alarming reports.
Announcing the revival of a Ku Klux reign of terror, McAfee admonished that if
the government abandoned Republicans “to work out their salvation as best they
may,” and if Democrats became aware of the government’s abandonment, “it
will be a little while till the American citizenship will be, in Alabama, the veriest
mockery of a name without a right recognized by a dominant Democracy
(rebels still) or capable of enforcement.” The chairman of the Alabama
Republican Executive Committee similarly complained that the combination of
the president’s Southern policy and Justice Bradley’s adverse ruling led
Democrats to believe “that the results which they endeavored to effect by the Ku
Klux conspiracy, can now be effected surely and with impunity…; the old Ku
Klux organization of Alabama has been revived…,” he lamented. The belief was
widespread in the state that “any man may murder a Republican, for political
reasons without the slightest reason to fear that he will be punished, but with
every reason to believe that he will be applauded for the act.”42
This flow of reports eventually persuaded Williams that vigorous civil rights
enforcement was again required to put down political terrorism. Noting that the
political assassinations of Republicans “are becoming quite too frequent in the
Southern States, and forebode evil times,” he concluded that Republican fortunes in the upcoming fall elections would depend upon the federal protection
of voters. Williams issued a circular letter on September 3, 1874, to the federal
marshals in Alabama, Kentucky, Louisiana, South Carolina, and Tennessee
exhorting them “to proceed with all possible energy and dispatch to detect,
expose, arrest, and punish the perpetrators of these crimes.” He added, “to that
end, you are to spare no effort or necessary expense.” He also informed them that
troops would be provided to assist them. Within eighteen months of its inception,
the administration’s policy of clemency and leniency collapsed, and it seemed to
return to the original policy of all-out civil rights enforcement inaugurated under
Attorney General Amos T. Akerman in 1871.43
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Nonetheless, United States attorneys who had been reprimanded for being
too conscientious in enforcing civil rights were very cautious in embarking on
this change in the administration’s policy. United States Attorney G. Wiley Wells,
for example, wanted assurance that the attorney general would support his prosecution suspects who intimidated black Mississippi voters in the 1874 election.
Williams was annoyed that Wells would doubt his support. “You are expected by
this Department to prosecute all violations of the laws of the United States with
all the energy and ability you can command,” he admonished. Yet, his instructions included a typically paradoxical statement of policy. He cautioned Wells
against involving the government in “groundless or frivolous prosecutions
which are not only an annoyance and an irritation to the people but are a matter of great expense to the United States.” Then, in complete contradiction, he
suggested that Wells prosecute only two or three of the most prominent leaders,
provided that he had enough evidence for certain conviction.44
Contradictory instructions were sent to legal officers throughout the states
affected with Ku Klux-type crime. The administration apparently wanted to
enforce the laws of the United States and protect citizens without incurring
expenses and without irritating the individuals who were directly and indirectly
responsible. What appeared to be a revival of the Justice Department’s original
policy of unrestrained civil rights enforcement turned out to be an ambiguous
modification of its more recent policy of highly selective enforcement of civil
rights. Federal legal officers soon discovered that their efforts to enforce federal
laws were ineffectual.45
Very few violations of civil rights were punished under the Grant
administration anywhere in the South after 1874. Violence and fraud characterized the fall 1874 elections, but federal authorities could do little to check this
lawlessness. Conservative terrorists were no longer fearful of punishment in the
federal courts, and, with the organization and power they had established, they
uninhibitedly intimidated Republican voters. Conditions were so poor in
Louisiana that federal legal officers there had to communicate with Washington
in code and feared that their lines of communication would be cut. Evincing a
siege mentality characteristic of belligerent armies during wartime, United
States Attorney Beckwith informed the attorney general that federal officers
“are surrounded by an armed camp with a force exceeding by far the federal land
forces now in the City [of New Orleans].” “Anarchy in January is inevitable,” he
predicted. Neither federal nor state law was respected in the state because neither
could be enforced against the White League. Threatened with personal violence
and unable to protect himself, his health impaired, his private law practice
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ruined because of the prosecution of the Colfax Massacre case, Beckwith asked
to be relieved of his office and tendered his resignation in December 1874.46
Conditions in Mississippi were similar. United States Attorney W. W. Dedrick
reported “that Mississippi was in a condition of more thorough and effective
armed insurrection against the Constitution and laws of the United States than
in 1861 when she raised the flag of rebellion.” Expressing the desire to enforce the
laws of the United States, he questioned “how much relief can be afforded
through the channels of the Courts in the present attitude of the Courts towards
certain acts of Congress….” Judge Hill advised him that recent rulings in the federal courts placed these outrages beyond federal jurisdiction, and he was
instructed not to begin any new prosecutions under the Enforcement Acts until
the Supreme Court resolved the uncertainties of federal civil rights enforcement
authority. “It is clear to my mind,” Judge Hill observed, “that the judgment of our
unseat republican jurists and Statesmen is now against Federal interference in such
cases, but to leave it to the State authorities and the good sense of the people.”47
The administration’s revivification of civil rights enforcement in September
1874 was quickly aborted. Attorney General Williams instructed United States
Attorney Beckwith as early as October not to take any further action in the
Colfax Massacre case, or in any other cases that involved the same questions of
law arising under the Enforcement Acts until the Supreme Court decided those
issues. Similar instructions were sent in May 1875 to United States Attorney
W. W. Murray in Tennessee, who urged the attorney general to permit him to
prosecute the defendants in the Gibson County murders. Although he agreed
that the murderers should be punished, Williams responded “that prosecutions
under the enforcement acts at this time will amount to very little so long as the
questions before the Supreme Court remain undecided.” He ordered a general
suspension of Enforcement Acts prosecutions in Tennessee “until it is known
whether the Supreme Court will hold them to be constitutional or otherwise.”48
Federal civil rights enforcement in 1874 and after was strikingly different from
that of the previous years. Earlier, Justice Department officers assumed jurisdiction over civil rights enforcement with confidence in their constitutional
authority. Federal judges broadly applied federal jurisdiction over civil rights.
The Supreme Court’s Slaughter-House ruling undermined the constitutional
theory that permitted federal legal officers to interpret their powers so broadly.
Thereafter, many judges retreated from the expansive interpretations of constitutional authority they earlier had believed were the intended meaning and
scope of national authority to enforce civil rights. United States District Judge
William F. Giles of Maryland, for example, observed in 1876 that the
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Slaughter-House decision deviated from the “mere literal meaning” of the
Fourteenth Amendment by calling “the attention of the people of this country
to the distinction between rights that belonged to citizens of the states, and the
rights which belonged to the citizens of the United States as such.” Although he
thought it was shameful that federal authority could not punish racially motivated crimes, Circuit Judge Halmer H. Emmons nevertheless charged a
Memphis federal grand jury in March 1875 that they could not assert such
authority to indict persons suspected of having committed such crimes:
In view of the judgments of the Supreme Court already rendered, that a
crime perpetrated by one citizen of Tennessee upon another, when it consists
in the violation of some right which is enjoyed solely as the citizen of the
state, depends in no degree upon the national constitution…
While some federal judges, such as Circuit Judge Hugh L. Bond, circumvented the Slaughter-House decision and applied the original broad nationalist
concept of civil rights enforcement authority, most federal judges limited their
jurisdiction to cases involving state action.49
By 1875, uncertainties concerning federal jurisdiction disposed the federal
courts and the Department of Justice decidedly against attempting to enforce
civil and political rights. District Judge John Erskine refused to try any
Enforcement Acts cases in the absence of a circuit judge. Another federal district
judge ruled that a racially discriminatory tax structure did not violate federal
laws, while still another denied the right of three black soldiers to remove their
prosecutions from a local court to the federal court because state laws did not
discriminate. Judge Hill’s directive to United States Attorney Dedrick against
further Enforcement Acts prosecutions was broadened to include all federal legal
officers and grand juries. By the spring of 1875, doubts concerning the scope of
national civil rights enforcement authority prompted the Justice Department to
suspend all prosecutions under the Enforcement Acts. In May 1875, Edwards
Pierrepont, Williams’s successor as attorney general, even suspended prosecutions of violations of federal laws committed by state officers who had acted
under state laws. He was fearful that even these cases did not fall within federal
jurisdiction.50
By the fall of 1875, then, the administration made no pretense of its capitulation to the political and legal climate that was clearly hostile to the federal
enforcement of civil and political rights. “The whole public are tired out by these
annual autumnal outbreaks in the South,” Attorney General Pierrepont retorted
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to Mississippi Governor Adelbert Ames’s request for federal troops to put down
violence, “and the great majority now are ready to condemn any interference on
the part of the Government.” Manifesting the era’s spirit of self-help individualism and laissez faire, he cynically suggested that Mississippi Republicans demonstrate to the rest of the nation that they “have the courage and the manhood to
fight for their rights, and to destroy the bloody ruffians who murder the innocent and unoffending freedmen.” The president’s entire cabinet endorsed this
attitude. In light of the consistent failure of local authorities to protect political
and racial minorities, this attitude constituted a cynical abandonment of
Southern Republicans, white and black. But, it was possible to hide the irresponsibility of this abandonment of erstwhile political allies with the expedient
rationalization provided by adverse judicial rulings concerning national authority
to enforce civil rights. Instead of continuing prosecutions until legal questions
were resolved by the Supreme Court, the Justice Department and the lower
federal courts suspended them. It was clear to observers that the Supreme Court
held the power to decide these questions of public policy, and attention focused
on it. But, Southern Republicans peered with waning hopes.51

9

I

The Reinstitution
of Decentralized
Constitutionalism: The
Supreme Court and Civil
Rights, 1876

n 1876 the United States Supreme Court finally consented to resolve the
decade-long judicial struggle over the scope of national civil rights enforcement authority. In retrospect, the Supreme Court’s interpretations of the
Reconstruction Amendments as guarantees of the civil rights of black
Americans appear to have been predetermined by its 1873 Slaughter-House decision and Justice Bradley’s 1874 opinion in Cruikshank. Both counsels’ arguments
and the Court’s 1876 decisions were predicated upon the legal assumptions of
these opinions. While hindsight is almost always clearer than foresight, the states’
rights emphasis of most federal court civil rights decisions after 1873 combined
with the Grant administration’s cessation of civil rights enforcement must have
suggested to contemporaries the probable outcome of the Supreme Court’s
deliberations.
However predictable the outcome, the need to resolve the constitutional
questions surrounding the congressional civil rights program prompted proponents as well as opponents to seek a quick resolution in the Supreme Court. The
Court’s interpretation of the Reconstruction Amendments as they applied to
black Americans would affect national policies. An adverse ruling could diminish the constitutional authority that permitted the Department of Justice and
the federal courts to intervene in Southern affairs. The elimination of that
authority held grave implications for the department’s political fortunes and the
subsequent nature of race relations. Defense counsel desired an early hearing
because of the uncertain fate of their clients and their rising expectations of a
favorable decision. United States attorneys urged the attorney general to advance
civil rights cases on the Supreme Court’s docket despite their pessimism about
achieving a favorable decision. The Supreme Court yielded to the litigants’
entreaties and accelerated the process by which the cases involving these issues
were heard.1
The Court’s determination of the authority of the federal government to
enforce voting rights became entwined with its authority to enforce civil rights.
Terrorist assaults on Southern blacks and white Republicans usually occurred
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during electioneering. As Judge Hill noted, the Fifteenth Amendment’s protection
of voting rights potentially could serve as the constitutional authorization for
federal intervention to protect Southern Republicans in the place of diminished
authority under the Fourteenth Amendment. However, in their arguments
before the Supreme Court, counsel on both sides advanced legal theories that
characterized voting rights and civil rights enforcement authority in similar
ways. The Supreme Court interpreted these amendments and their respective
scopes with a great degree of similarity. The history of voting rights before the
Supreme Court, therefore, provides some insights into the Court’s interpretation
of national authority to secure civil rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The case that tested the scope of national voting rights enforcement authority, United States v. Reese, grew out of the January 1873 Lexington, Kentucky,
municipal elections. State statutes required voters to pay a $1.50 capitation tax to
the city collector, who issued a receipt that had to be presented to election registrars before the elector was allowed to vote. However, the Lexington city collector
effectively disfranchised black voters by refusing to accept their offers to pay the
tax. When they presented themselves at the polls on election day, registrars of
election refused to allow them to vote because they did not have the necessary
tax receipt. Kentucky Republicans believed that Lexington election officials purposefully used the tax in a conspiracy to disfranchise black voters.2
A committee of Kentucky Republicans led by United States Attorney G. C.
Wharton decided to invoke the power of the federal courts to combat this official disfranchisement. Attorney General Williams supported this decision after
the committee consulted with him in the nation’s capitol. The federal grand jury
at Louisville indicted two Lexington inspectors of election, Matthew Foushee
and Hiram Reese, in February 1873 for alleged violations of the Enforcement Act
of 1870. The first count charged them with refusing to receive the vote of William
Garner, a qualified voter “of African descent,” because of Garner’s failure to produce the city collector’s receipt showing that he had paid the capitation tax. The
second count charged that defendants agreed not to allow black voters to vote
without the requisite tax receipt with intent to deprive them of their right to vote
because of their race and color, and that they demanded the tax receipt from
Garner in pursuit of this agreement in order to deprive him of his right to vote
because of his race and color. The third count charged that the inspectors
wrongfully refused to accept Garner’s affidavit stating that he had offered to pay
the required tax, but that his offer was refused by the city collector because of his
race and color. The fourth count simply charged that the defendants refused to
receive Garner’s vote because of his race and color.3
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Counsel for Reese demurred that the indictment did not charge an offense
punishable under the Enforcement Act of 1870 or within the jurisdiction of the
federal courts. They claimed that Garner’s mere offer to pay the tax was insufficient to discharge him from the statutory requirement of actually paying it,
because the city collector’s refusal to accept Garner’s offer of payment did not
satisfy the statutory obligation. Therefore, the defendants lawfully refused to
allow Garner to vote because of his failure to meet the statutory qualifications
for voting.4
The importance of the Lexington case is reflected in the attention it received
from supporters and opponents of national civil rights enforcement. The local
conservative press sensationalized the trial and complained that the defendants
were oppressively wrenched from their homes in Lexington and dragged all the
way to Louisville at great expense to themselves and the government to stand
trial before strangers rather then before their neighbors. The case was portrayed
as a politically motivated persecution of Democrats by vindictive Republicans
who invoked “the aid and vengeance of their ever willing friend, the Federal
Court” in an effort to prevent responsible individuals from being judges of election. According to these accounts, the bases of the arrests and charges were falsehoods and perjured testimony of Republicans who sought to overturn the
election results. The federal courts and the Justice Department were again confronted with politically explosive prosecutions that rendered them vulnerable to
accusations of partisanship.5
Attorney General Williams supported the Republicans’ cause by authorizing
special assistants. He allowed Wharton to hire two special prosecutors, William
C. Goodloe and future Supreme Court justice John Marshall Harlan. Williams
also sent to government counsel a copy of Justice William Strong’s opinion in a
similar case decided in the United States Circuit Court for Delaware just weeks
before the Supreme Court’s Slaughter-House decision. The Delaware case was a
criminal prosecution of a local tax collector who was charged with violating the
Enforcement Act of 1870 by preventing black voters from becoming qualified to
vote by a variety of means. The collector was tried and convicted, and his attorney filed a motion in arrest of judgment on the grounds that the law was unconstitutional. This action gave Justice Strong an opportunity to interpret the scope
of the Reconstruction civil rights enforcement program.6
Justice Strong became the third justice of the United States Supreme Court to
explore the legal theory encompassed in the Reconstruction Amendments. Like
his predecessors, he adopted the broad nationalist interpretation of these
amendments. He held that, despite their negative wording, these amendments
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recognized substantive rights, and, therefore, were positive guarantees of the
substantive rights of liberty, citizenship, and political participation that gave
Congress the necessary authority to secure civil and political rights against any
interference or infringement. However, the utility of this powerful expression of
the primacy of national civil and political rights enforcement authority was
undermined by the growing public awareness of other decisions restricting
national authority over basic rights to an equal protection guarantee against
racially discriminatory state action.7
The Lexington case was not argued before the federal Circuit Court at
Louisville until November 1873. Judge Bland Ballard delayed arguments until
Circuit Judge Halmer H. Emmons could participate in the decision because of
the “gran constitutional questions” it raised. Ballard and Emmons divided on the
first three counts. Ballard found that counts one and three were faulty for failing
to charge that the defendants acted with the intent of depriving Garner of his
voting rights because of his race and color. He found that count two could not
stand because it was based upon section 4 of the 1870 Enforcement Act, which
he thought was unconstitutional since it was intended to punish private individuals as well as governmental officials who interfered with citizens’ right to
vote absent a racially discriminatory intent. He held that the Fifteenth
Amendment, which purportedly was authority for section 4, applied only to the
racially discriminatory actions of state officers. However, he joined Emmons in
upholding the fourth count. United States Attorney Wharton did not want to go
to trial on that count alone. Consequently, the case was certified to the United
States Supreme Court on a division of opinion in the circuit court.8
The significance attributed to the case by the Grant administration is suggested by the rare appearance of the attorney general to argue it before the
Supreme Court on January 13, 1875. If Southern Republicans were to have any
meaningful participation in political life, state officers, such as the defendants in
this case, simply would have to be subject to prosecutions in the federal courts
for such overt violations of black citizens’ right to vote. Therefore, Williams
argued for the broadest scope of protection that could be brought within the
amendment’s state action prohibition. He insisted that the amendment protected the voting rights of all citizens; that it protected their right to vote in state
and local as well as national elections; that it protected voting rights from state
action whether the action was in the form of a racially discriminatory statute
enacted by the legislature, of a state officer acting under authorization of a discriminatory statute, of a state officer acting in violation of state authority, or of
the failure of state officers to protect citizens against the interference with their
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voting rights by private individuals. In the last situation, Williams argued, the
Fifteenth Amendment conferred jurisdiction on the national government to
punish the private offender. The rulings of both Strong in Givens and Bradley in
Cruikshank supported the government’s position. Williams concluded, then, that
the motion to quash the indictment should be denied.9
B. F. Bucknor argued the case for the defendants. He quoted freely from the
congressional debates leading to the adoption of the Fifteenth Amendment to
insist that the framers of the Fifteenth Amendment intended to preserve the
states’ primary authority over voting rights originally conferred upon them by
the United States Constitution. He asserted that the Fifteenth Amendment was
intended merely to protect black citizens against infringements of their stateconferred right to vote resulting from racially discriminatory acts of the state. He
narrowly restricted the scope of state action to racially discriminatory statutes
enacted by the state legislature. He submitted a separate brief that specifically
rebutted Justice Bradley’s Cruikshank interpretation of the Fifteenth
Amendment as conferring upon Congress authority directly to enforce voting
rights by punishing state officials for alleged violations. Bucknor reasoned that
the state can act in its official capacity only through the legislature; therefore, the
actions of state officers did not constitute official acts of the state. Consequently,
the Fifteenth Amendment did not reach the actions of state officers, particularly
when they acted to implement racially impartial state statutes. He conceded that
the amendment’s prohibition against state discrimination was a tacit recognition of the preexistence of the right to vote. Federal judges had made this observation in concluding that this negative prohibition against state infringement of
the right to vote was a recognition of the right by the United States Constitution
that gave Congress the authority directly to enforce the right in whatever manner it deemed appropriate. Bucknor, however, rejected this conclusion by insisting that the right to vote existed prior to the ratification of the Fifteenth
Amendment by virtue of the state’s grant of the right to qualified citizens.10
Two important conclusions of law followed from Bucknor’s analysis. Since
the state granted the right to vote, the state possessed primary authority to
enforce the right. If this right is recognized as a state-conferred right in the
Fifteenth Amendment’s prohibition against state infringement, then the mere
constitutional recognition of the right is insufficient to confer upon Congress
the requisite authority directly to enforce the right as previously held by federal
judges.
Bucknor concluded that the Enforcement Act of 1870 was unconstitutional,
first, because it attempted to punish the enforcement of racially discriminatory
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state statutes and racially discriminatory actions of state officers as well as the
actions of private individuals who interfered with citizens’ voting rights. Second,
the statute was unconstitutional because it purported to punish voting rights
infringements even when the infringements did not stem from a racial motive.
Hence, the indictment based on this statute should be quashed.
Bucknor also argued that the indictment itself was bad. Interpreting the
Fifteenth Amendment as only protecting black voters against racially discriminatory state action, he insisted that any state infringements of the right to vote
must be motivated by reasons of race, color, or previous condition of servitude
to constitute offenses under the amendment. The indictment against Reese was
bad, he concluded, because it did not aver, nor did the government show, that
their refusal to allow Garner to vote was motivated by racial prejudice.
If defense counsel in Cruikshank intended it, connecting the civil rights case
and the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment to the voting rights case and the
scope of the Fifteenth Amendment was a brilliant strategy. Aspects of each
amendment could be applied to the other to produce a narrow theory of
national authority to enforce citizens’ rights that was applicable to both
amendments. The theory of state action became the linchpin that joined the
similarly worded amendments. The Supreme Court had already suggested, and
Justice Bradley had already held, that the Fourteenth Amendment was applicable
only to discriminatory state statutes. This narrow view of the Fourteenth
Amendment could be read into the Fifteenth Amendment to curtail the more
expansive interpretation of the latter amendment proclaimed by Bradley and
Strong. If state action limited the Fourteenth Amendment’s application to
racially discriminatory statutes, state action logically would have the same limiting effect on the applicability of the Fifteenth Amendment, Justices Bradley’s
and Strong’s earlier circuit court opinions notwithstanding. Consequently,
Bucknor argued a narrow theory of state action in interpreting the Fifteenth
Amendment, and defense counsel in Cruikshank amplified the argument in
interpreting the Fourteenth as well as the Fifteenth Amendments.11
The Fifteenth Amendment also served to rationalize the Supreme Court’s
dicta in Slaughter-House suggesting a narrow state action interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Court had declared that the Fourteenth
Amendment was intended almost exclusively to protect black Americans from
racially discriminatory state laws. The amendment, however, is not limited on its
face to racial discrimination. However, the Fifteenth Amendment is explicitly
directed to racially motivated violations of voting rights. The explicit application
of the Fifteenth Amendment to blacks and racial discrimination could be used
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more convincingly to limit the application of the Fourteenth Amendment to
racial discrimination.
Moreover, substantial evidence was available to argue that Congress’s intent
with respect to the Fifteenth Amendment was merely to provide black
Americans with protection from voting rights denials rather than to provide a
general guarantee of voting rights to all Americans. This view was supported not
only by the language of the amendment and explicit statements of the framers
in congressional debates, as Bucknor argued in Reese, but also by the longrecognized primacy of state authority over voting rights. These considerations
could have been applied to strengthen the Supreme Court’s conclusion in
Slaughter-House that the Fourteenth Amendment was not a direct guarantee of
civil rights. The legal theories elaborated by counsel in Cruikshank expressed
these relationships between the two amendments. Interpreting both
amendments as mere prohibitions against racially discriminatory state
action and narrowly equating state action to state statutes deprived them of
the expansive authority that was earlier attributed to them by the courts of the
United States.
Legal arguments of both defense and prosecution in Cruikshank evince the
great impact of Slaughter-House on the understanding of the Fourteenth
Amendment as a guarantee of equal protection of the law. The Supreme Court’s
1873 interpretation of the amendment established a concept of the amendment
that has withstood subsequent attempted alternative interpretations.
Consequently, the decision in Slaughter-House concerning the personal rights of
white workers pointed to the outcome of the Court’s decision in Cruikshank
concerning the personal rights of black citizens.
As in Reese, the government’s argument in Cruikshank was again presented by
Attorney General Williams along with Solicitor General S. F. Phillips. However,
they capitulated to the opponents of national civil rights enforcement, for they
failed to propose a legal theory supporting the broad authority of the national
government to enforce civil rights. Williams and Phillips made no attempt to
offer an interpretation of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments that was
favorable to national civil rights enforcement or to provide a legal theory supporting the constitutionality of section 6 of the Enforcement Act of 1870 under
which the indictment in Cruikshank was brought. They conceded defeat on
fourteen of the sixteen counts of the indictment under which the defendants
stood convicted. They based the government’s case on counts fourteen and sixteen, which charged the defendants with feloniously conspiring “‘to injure,
oppress, threaten, and intimidate’” named citizens of the United States with the
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intent “‘to prevent and hinder’” such citizens in the free exercise and enjoyment
of their right to vote in any election and “‘of each, every, all and singular the several rights and privileges granted or secured to…[them] by the Constitution and
laws of the United States….’” They abandoned the effort to defend the other
counts charging the defendants with infringing specific Bill of Rights guarantees
of freedom of assembly and the right to keep and bear arms, and Fourteenth
Amendment guarantees to due process and equal protection.12
The contrast in the government’s argument before the Supreme Court in 1875
to the broad pre-Slaughter-House interpretations of the Reconstruction
Amendments and civil rights statutes is striking. The Supreme Court’s and
Justice Bradley’s interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment seem to account
for Williams’s and Phillips’s strategy. These decisions placed the fundamental
rights of citizenship and Bill of Rights guarantees beyond the scope of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s privileges and immunities clause. They also placed
racially motivated infringements of citizens’ rights by private individuals beyond
the amendment’s due process and equal protection guarantees. In short, the
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment seemed to limit
its application to racially discriminatory state action, which was not involved in
this case.
The government therefore shifted its argument to a theory of civil rights
enforcement under the Fifteenth Amendment. This theory was reasonable since the
Supreme Court had not as yet interpreted the scope of the power of the federal government to enforce voting rights, and Justice Bradley had interpreted this power
broadly enough to provide authority for these prosecutions. Still, the state action
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment in Slaughter-House was nonbinding
obiter dicta in a case that was easily distinguishable from Cruikshank. The attorney
general’s failure even to attempt to offer an alternative theory of the Fourteenth
Amendment to preserve the broad authority over civil rights is difficult to understand. It is also tragic. Black Americans did not have their “day in court” because the
attorney general of the United States did not present the Supreme Court with legal
theories of civil rights enforcement most favorable to their cause. This failure virtually ensured that the Supreme Court would adopt a states’ rights interpretation
that narrowed the scope and diminished the effectiveness of the Fourteenth
Amendment to protect the rights of black Americans.
Equally difficult to explain is the government’s failure to proffer a legal theory of civil rights enforcement under the Thirteenth Amendment. Williams and
Phillips argued for the constitutionality of the count charging the defendants
with infringing rights of citizens secured by the United States Constitution. This
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suggests that they may have hoped that the Supreme Court would broaden its
concept of nationally enforceable rights of citizens or to elucidate a legal theory
of national civil rights enforcement that was broader than that expressed in
Slaughter-House. Bradley had provided such a theory under the Thirteenth
Amendment in his decision in the court below.
Three possible explanations may account for Williams’s and Phillips’s failure
to base their case, at least in part, on the Thirteenth Amendment. First, the 1870
statute was primarily enacted to implement the Fifteenth Amendment.
Legislation, however, may be upheld as constitutional if authorization can be
found in any portion of the Constitution. Furthermore, the 1870 statute reenacted the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which offered evidence that it was based as
much upon the Thirteenth as the Fifteenth Amendment. If the Court had been
willing to adopt Bradley’s and other federal judges’ interpretations of the
Thirteenth Amendment, the relevant sections of the 1870 statute conceivably
could have been upheld.13
This observation raises the second possible explanation. The attorney general
and solicitor general may have been convinced that the Supreme Court was
unwilling to recognize the legal theory of national civil rights enforcement
implicit in the case under any theory. Bradley certainly had not used the
Thirteenth Amendment as authority for the statute in the circuit court, and his
opinion was regarded in New Orleans as an expression of the views of his judicial brothers whom he was thought to have consulted before writing it. The
Grant administration seemed to express pessimism about the Supreme Court’s
consideration of its civil rights enforcement activities when it ordered Justice
Department officers to cease those activities until the Supreme Court evaluated
their constitutionality.
Nonetheless, Williams’s and Phillips’s failure even to attempt to present a
legal theory of civil rights enforcement under the Thirteenth Amendment raises
a third and more cynical explanation. The administration may have welcomed a
Supreme Court decision that precluded the civil rights enforcement efforts that
had become so politically debilitating. The Justice Department could withdraw
gracefully from an undesirable policy under the semblance of a judicial mandate.
Yet, in basing its case on a theory of voting rights enforcement power, the administration not only could avoid winning more authority than it cared to exercise,
but it also possibly could preserve enough legal authority to punish rights violations that were potentially politically rewarding, such as violations arising from
elections and the exercise of political power. Whatever the explanation, the
government’s brief offered no legal theory of civil rights enforcement; it was
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directed primarily at justifying the legal and procedural adequacy of the language
of those counts of the indictment Williams and Phillips chose to defend.
The government’s anemic argument was sharply contrasted by the elaborate
and various theories presented by the defense. The seven attorneys who represented the three defendants predicated their legal theory of national civil rights
enforcement authority on a states’ rights concept of American federalism as
modified by their conservative conception of the Civil War and Reconstruction.
Their view of American federalism and recent American history contradicted
that expressed by federal judges prior to 1873, but it was consistent with the view
expressed by a majority of the United States Supreme Court. The defense’s legal
arguments again demonstrate that the Slaughter-House decision was clearly
imprinted on Cruikshank.
Defense counsel repeatedly reminded the Court that the issues posed by this
case held grave implications for the nature of American federalism. They characterized the primary issue to be decided by the Court as whether “power has
been conferred upon Congress to protect individual citizens by punitive legislation, against the violation of these [civil] right [sic] by individuals.” “In this
aspect,” John Archibald Campbell observed in complete contradiction to the
position he had argued before the Court in Slaughter-House, “this cause is one of
surpassing interest, and on its determination depends either the maintenance of
the government upon its ancient foundation, or a radical change in its entire
structure.” David S. Bryan agreed “that no greater or more important case was
ever brought before a court for judgment…. In truth, the [local self-] government which our fathers formed for themselves and their children, is on trial in
this case.”14
Using the theory offered by the Supreme Court to opponents of national civil
rights enforcement, defense counsel elaborated a states’ rights view of American
federalism that preserved local self-government as they conceived it. Bryan
expressed the defense’s fundamental premise when he stated that the regulation
and enforcement of such fundamental rights as Bill of Rights guarantees
“belongs to the police authority of the State, and it is a necessary power to be
exercised by the State for the peace of society and the safety of life and property[.]” Equally important was their second assumption that this power was one
“that the States have always exercised from a time before the General
Government was formed until the present, without gainsaying or dispute.”15
The defense’s argument is an interesting example of the interplay between
history and legal theory in trial advocacy. Implicit in Bryan’s historical argument
for the primacy of state authority over citizens and citizens’ rights is a state
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sovereignty conception of American federalism. David Dudley Field, brother of
sitting Supreme Court Justice Stephen J. Field, also appealed to history. The
Founding Fathers, Field observed, established the national government as a government of limited powers delegated to it by the Constitution of the United
States. All residuary powers of government were reserved by the states. He and
his colleagues insisted that the authority over citizens’ fundamental civil rights
was retained as an “essential attribute of the sovereignty of ” the states. R. H.
Marr supported this position by citing a number of pre–Civil War cases, beginning with Barron v. The Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, that held that Bill
of Rights guarantees are limitations upon the national government, not affirmative grants of legislative authority to enforce and protect the fundamental rights
of citizens. Defense counsel reasoned from this doctrine to the conclusion that
the Constitution of the United States, as it was originally framed, reserved to the
sovereign states exclusive authority over citizens’ civil rights. They audaciously
asserted as an undisputed fact of legal history what was actually the states’ rights
position in a hotly contested and unresolved antebellum constitutional question
of federal power.16
Field proffered a conservative theory of constitutional interpretation and a
conservative view of recent American history that, if accepted, unamendably
riveted this state sovereignty theory of American federalism onto the
Constitution. He asserted that the recent amendments to the Constitution did
not transfer the states’ sovereign power over citizens’ rights to the national government. He characterized the Civil War as an American struggle to abolish slavery and establish the indestructible unity of the nation as it had existed before
the war, as a union of sovereign and independent states. Further, he interpreted
the constitutional amendments that the nation had ratified to ensure the freedom of the liberated slaves within this concept of the Civil War. These amendments, therefore, left undisturbed the states’ “plenary power over the subject” of
citizens’ rights and merely provided that the states “should make no discrimination to their disadvantage.”17
Defense counsel denied the possibility that the Reconstruction Amendments
could have conferred concurrent authority over citizens’ rights upon the
national government. This conclusion was predicated on two assumptions. The
first is that Americans wanted to preserve a states’ rights-centered federalism.
The second assumption is that the concession to the national government of any
enforcement authority over citizens’ rights was incompatible with the continued
existence of sovereign and independent states. There could be “no middle ground
between giving Congress plenary power over the subject of those fundamental
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rights, and giving it none,” Field insisted, because the laws of Congress would
“supersede or exclude legislation by the States upon the same subject, the United
States would stand as the universal law giver of the country, and the laws of the
States would dwindle to the dimensions of corporation ordinances or regulations of county supervisors.” Concede this congressional power, Field warned,
and the “substance of American constitutional government, as received from the
Fathers, will have gone, and the forms will not be long in following.”18
Field’s colleagues also sounded this danger of revolutionary constitutionalism if the Court upheld broad national authority over civil rights. Campbell
asserted that the recognition of such power in the national government would
lead to the “entire subversion of the institutions of the States and the immediate consolidation of the whole land into a consolidated empire….”
American government will “have been completely revolutionized,” Marr
admonished the Court, “by the mere conferring of power upon Congress to
enforce the prohibitions of the recent Amendments.” Relying on Miller’s parallel conclusion in Slaughter-House and his conservative historical assumptions
about the nature of the Civil War, Field insisted “that such was not, and could
not have been the intention of the American people, in sanctioning these
amendments….” Deploring the revolutionary constitutional consequences of
the primacy of national authority over the enforcement of citizens’ fundamental rights, Field added that these amendments “should not be thus interpreted, even if the natural significance of their language were, as it is not,
favorable to such an interpretation.”19
Defense counsel reached four conclusions from their limitation of the scope
of the Fourteenth Amendment to racially discriminatory state action. Equating
the state to the legislature and state action to legislation, they reasoned that
national civil rights enforcement authority was triggered by, and could only be
directed against, racially discriminatory state statutes. Consequently, “the natural, the true, and the only constitutional mode of enforcement is by judicial
remedies…” declaring the state statute void. Moreover, since the Fourteenth
Amendment merely prohibits the states from legislating in a racially discriminatory manner, national authority does not apply if a state merely fails to protect
citizens’ civil rights. State inaction, in other words, “is no cause for federal action.”
Nor may the national government proceed against state officers or private individuals who violate citizens’ rights. Relying on the Supreme Court’s 1871 decision
in Collector v. Day, Field argued that the national government could not punish
state officers for failing to enforce, or for violating, citizens’ rights because the
national and state governments “‘are separate and distinct sovereignties, acting
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separately and independently of each other, within their respective spheres.’”
Federal prosecutions of state officers “would be incompatible with the independence of the State[s]…,” which, counsel argued, is “essential to the
sovereignty…of the States.” Similar considerations would preclude federal prosecutions of private individuals who infringed citizens’ basic rights. The protection of citizens’ civil and political rights is a part of the states’ police powers, and,
“in relation to these,” Campbell insisted, “THE AUTHORITY OF A STATE IS
COMPLETE, UNQUALIFIED, AND EXCLUSIVE.” In short, the national government could not constitutionally interfere with, or assume, the states’ exclusive jurisdiction over the administration of criminal justice.20
The 1870 Enforcement Act and the indictment brought under it were void,
defense counsel insisted. The rights that were allegedly violated were within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the states. The offenses that were charged were offenses
against the sovereignty of the states. The power and function of redressing these
rights and punishing these wrongs, therefore, were exclusive and essential
attributes of the sovereignty of the states. Indeed, the very existence of the states
depended upon their retaining control of the administration of criminal justice
and enforcement of citizens’ civil and political rights. Since congressional
authority generally is limited by the express and implied prohibitions of the
Constitution, Field observed, Congress cannot, “under color of preventing a
state from doing certain things, destroy the State, or any of its essential
attributes.” Not only is Congress thus limited, but also none of the departments
of the national government “has, expressly or by implication, power to destroy
any essential attribute of the sovereignty of ” the states. Field thereby cleverly confused a theory of congressional authority under the Reconstruction Amendments
with a more general principle of constitutional interpretation to insist that the
Enforcement Act of 1870 was unconstitutional. However, the more important
basis of the defense’s position was that Congress’s attempt directly to protect civil
and political rights so intruded upon the sovereign powers of the states that it
threatened their very existence. Their legal argument had come full circle.21
The issues raised in this case were too important for the defense to rely exclusively upon points of law. Although he conceded that “political argument
addressed to the Supreme Court would of course be out of place,” Field could
not resist remarking that anyone who “has carefully watched the political events
of the last decade must have seen a constant and constantly accelerated movement towards the organization and cumulation of Federal authority.” However
well meaning were the persons responsible for this steady accretion in national
powers, they nevertheless acted, in Field’s opinion, “in obliviousness of the truth
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that every new power added to the Nation is just so much subtracted from the
states.” Marr agreed that recent events had disrupted fundamentally American
conceptions of federalism and that the “time has come when the line of demarcation between State and Federal power must be plainly defined, and maintained
with a steady and an even hand, lest it be obliterated and utterly lost, to the ruin
of our institutions.” In what could be interpreted as a bold invitation to the
Supreme Court to assume a new function in formulating public policy, Marr
declared that “[t]his duty now devolves upon this Court, the great conservative
department of the government, made independent by the Constitution. Let us
hope,” he implored, “that the conclusion of the Court, in the Slaughter House
cases, will never be disturbed….” If that hope was dashed and congressional
authority to enact statutes such as the 1870 act was accepted, then, Bryan concluded, “[t]he original or inherent rights of the States are crushed out and
absorbed by a great central power—a revolution has been accomplished,
brought about by an Act of Congress and a judicial decree.”22
In Cruikshank and Reese, the Supreme Court was presented with legal questions whose importance greatly transcended the immediate issues in the cases.
The resolution of those legal questions concerning the power to enforce civil and
political rights would define anew the constitutional structure of the American
federal union by determining the primacy of national or state authority over the
fundamental rights of Americans. In resolving these legal questions, the Court
would be sanctioning or rejecting congressional Reconstruction. Ultimately,
then, the Court’s review of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and the
Enforcement Act of 1870 allowed it to determine public policy.
Chief Justice Morrison R. Waite delivered the opinions in both Reese and
Cruikshank on March 27, 1876. He wrote a relatively short opinion for the majority in Reese that quashed the indictment and found sections 3 and 4 of the 1870
Enforcement Act to be unconstitutionally overbroad. The chief justice affirmed
his earlier ruling in Minor v. Happersett and held that the Fifteenth Amendment
did not confer a general right to vote. Rather, it merely provided an “exemption
from discrimination in the elective franchise on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.” He concluded, therefore, that the third and fourth
sections of the Enforcement Act of 1870 were unconstitutional because they
attempted to punish every wrongful infringement of the right to vote, not only
infringements that resulted by reason of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude. He also declared unconstitutional the provision in the law that
required election officials to permit potential voters to vote upon their affidavit
stating that they had been wrongfully denied the opportunity to meet prescribed
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conditions for voting. “A citizen should not unnecessarily be placed where, by an
honest error in the construction of a penal statute, he may be subjected to a
prosecution for a false oath,” he reasoned, “and an inspector of election
should not be put in jeopardy because he, with equal honesty, entertains an
opposite opinion.” This provision was too ambiguous to stand the test of constitutionality, in the opinion of the chief justice. However, he implicitly
rejected the defense’s narrow interpretation of state action. Even so, he concluded that the indictment was faulty because it was based upon an unconstitutional statute.23
Justice Nathan Clifford wrote a concurring opinion that elaborated other reasons why the indictment should be quashed. Clifford stated that the indictment
failed to meet the requirement of all indictments, namely, that they allege every
element of the offense as defined by the relevant statute. He found the four
counts of the indictment deficient because they did not allege that Garner was a
qualified voter at the time he had attempted to vote; that they did not aver that
the rejection of Garner’s offer to pay the capitation tax resulted from the wrongful act of the city collector; that they did not specify all of the facts and circumstances that constituted the offense; and that the term “offer” to pay the tax was
too vague, uncertain, and indefinite to know what Garner’s “offer” was and
whether it was sufficient to constitute a wrongful denial of the opportunity to
pay the tax.24
Justice Ward Hunt alone dissented, and he wrote an opinion in which he
rebuked his judicial brethren. He described the majority’s criticism of the wording of the indictment as “almost ridiculous” and accused them of sacrificing
good sense to technical niceties in striking down the relevant sections of the
Enforcement Act. He censured the majority for unnecessarily declaring these
sections unconstitutional. He claimed this declaration was obiter dicta since the
majority had quashed the indictment because of its faulty technical construction. Hunt found the indictment sufficient under the 1870 statute, and he found
the 1870 statute sufficient under the Fifteenth Amendment, even though he
interpreted the amendment as applying only to state action. However, he
rejected Bucknor’s narrow theory of state action for a broad theory that
“include[d] the acts of all who proceed under the authority of the State.” Hunt’s
was the only analysis of state action in the two cases.25
Chief Justice Waite’s opinion in Cruikshank was more elaborate than his Reese
opinion. He prefaced his remarks concerning the specific issues presented in
Cruikshank with a discussion of the nature of American federalism and the division of powers between the national and state governments. His prefatory
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comments affirmed the antebellum states’ rights view of American federalism.
He betrayed an unyielding determination to perpetuate that view of the federal
division of powers over civil rights, for he ignored the antebellum nationalist
view of federalism as well as the vast changes in American federalism that
resulted from the Civil War and Reconstruction. Instead of exploring the impact
of these events upon the Constitution, the chief justice leapfrogged back in time
to the Founding Fathers and the purposes and ideas they held concerning the
federal union. Paralyzing the historical process of constitutional development,
he based his interpretation of American federalism in 1876 on those pristine
ideas as he understood them.
In a federal union such as the United States, Waite began, the people owe their
allegiance to, and can demand protection from, two governments, the national
and the state. He quickly cautioned that there need be no conflict between the
powers and functions of the two governments, since they were “established for
different purposes, and have different jurisdictions,” and therefore represented
different parts of a “complete government.” “The powers which one possesses,
the other does not,” the chief justice declared in an overstatement of the absolute
separation of national and state powers.26
Waite then characterized the respective powers and functions of the
national and state governments from the states’ rights view of American federalism. He asserted that the powers of the national government are delegated
powers, defined and limited by the Constitution of the United States. All
other governmental powers “are reserved to the States or the people.” Relying
upon the cases cited in Marr’s brief, he declared that Bill of Rights guarantees
are not enforceable by the national government because that authority was
originally reserved by the states, and “it has never been surrendered to the
United States.” Similarly, the natural rights of citizens, such as the rights to life
and liberty, were also reserved to the exclusive jurisdiction of the states. “The
very highest duty of the States, when they entered into the Union under the
Constitution,” Waite admonished, “was to protect all persons within their
boundaries in the enjoyment of those ‘unalienable rights with which they
were endowed by their Creator.’ Sovereignty for this purpose rests alone with
the States.”27
The chief justice based this view of the primacy of state authority over citizens’ rights on two theories. The first was a theory of constitutional delegation.
For the Constitution to affirmatively authorize Congress directly to enforce a
right, the right must have been “granted by the Constitution,” or it must be
“dependent upon that instrument for its existence.” Since the existence of the
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natural rights of citizens predated the formation of the Union, they were not
granted by, nor did they depend upon, the Constitution for their existence.28
The second theory was a convoluted concept of the kind of legislative powers
Congress was capable of acquiring. “No rights can be acquired under the
Constitution or laws of the United States,” Waite proclaimed, “except such as the
Government of the United States has the authority to grant or secure.” (Emphasis
added.) Since the Founding Fathers reserved to the states the authority to protect the fundamental rights of citizens, that authority could not be acquired by
the national government or deleted from the states except by explicit delegation
by the Constitution. “It is now too late,” Waite asserted, “to question the correctness of this construction.” It was not the rights secured by the Constitution
that determined what rights Congress was constitutionally authorized to
enforce; rather, it was the chief justice’s understanding of the original purposes
and powers of the national government that became the determining factor. The
chief justice’s conservative states’ rights theory of American constitutionalism
rejected the revolutionary impact of the Reconstruction Amendments that previously had been recognized by federal judges and legal officers. Instead, he
imposed his understanding of the intent of the Founding Fathers concerning the
division of federal powers in 1787 to conclude that the Reconstruction
Amendments did not amend the Constitution by conferring upon Congress
authority directly to enforce the civil and political rights of American citizens.29
Having already concluded that the Constitution had not been amended to
redistribute national and state powers over civil rights, Waite’s interpretation of
the Fourteenth Amendment was a foregone conclusion. He did not believe that
the amendment conferred upon the national government any authority directly
to secure natural rights or to punish criminal infringements of those rights.
Adopting the Democratic Conservative interpretation of the Bill of Rights as
limitations upon government, the Chief Justice asserted that the Fourteenth
Amendment simply furnished “an additional guaranty against any encroachment by the States upon the fundamental rights which belong to every citizen as
a member of society.” Since the Fourteenth Amendment could not be applied
directly against private citizens, the indictment against the defendants was
invalid. Furthermore, the offenses it charged were within the exclusive jurisdiction of the states. Although Waite refrained from explicitly declaring the
Enforcement Act of 1870 to be unconstitutional, that implication was so strong
that any observer was forced to conclude that the law was unconstitutional insofar as it attempted to punish private individuals who violated the civil rights of
other citizens. These crucially important declarations of federal civil rights law,
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however, were obiter dicta. The Court had voided the indictment because it was
“too vague and general” and, therefore, “not good and sufficient in law.” The chief
justice thus extended to the area of black Americans’ civil rights, in obiter dicta, the
narrow states’ rights interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment espoused by
Southern Democratic Conservatives that the Supreme Court, also in obiter dicta,
had engrafted upon the Fourteenth Amendment in Slaughter-House.30
More serious anomalies tainted the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment as it applied to the rights of black Americans. The
Court had held in Slaughter-House that the amendment was intended almost
exclusively for the protection of the rights of black Americans. The central legal
question decided in Slaughter-House was whether it conferred upon the national
government primary authority over civil rights. Yet, the Supreme Court had
refused earlier to decide this question when it was presented initially in cases
involving alleged violations of the civil rights of black Americans. The Court
consciously chose instead to decide this crucial question in the Slaughter-House
case, a case involving alleged violations of white Americans’ civil rights in a context that the Court acknowledged had not been contemplated by the amendment’s framers. The consequence of the Court’s case selection was that its
consideration of the scope of protection offered by the Fourteenth Amendment
to black Americans was preempted by its decision in Slaughter-House. The Court
similarly preempted its consideration of the scope of the Fifteenth Amendment’s
protection of blacks’ voting rights with its initial interpretation of this amendment in another case whose context was beyond that contemplated by the
amendment’s framers, Minor v. Happersett. Furthermore, the Court interpreted
the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of the civil rights of black
Americans without even having been presented with the legal theories that were
most favorable to the interests of black Americans. The Supreme Court’s handling of the Fourteenth, and, apparently, the Fifteenth Amendments suggests that
its decisions were a calculated effort to reverse the constitutionally centralizing
thrust of the Civil War and Reconstruction.
The public reacted to Reese and Cruikshank as welcome correctives to the centralization of power that was brought about by congressional Reconstruction.
Republican and Democratic Conservative newspapers applauded the Reese and
Cruikshank decisions for their alleged judiciousness, impartiality, and wisdom.
The Supreme Court was lauded for restoring the public’s confidence in the
national judiciary by correcting the imbalance in federal powers created by a
misguided Congress striving to maintain unworthy and corrupt politicians in
public office. The obviously devastating consequences for desperately needed
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national civil rights protection in the South were rationalized away by a cynical
justification of the decisions. The opportunity for renewed terrorism in the
South was characterized as merely an apparent injurious effect of the decisions. The Court’s reaffirmation of the “traditional” division of federal powers
was more important because it was in the best interests of all Americans.
Equally remarkable was the press’s acceptance of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the statutes and amendments that differed so fundamentally from
the meaning that uniformly had been attributed to them by federal, and most
state, judges.31
How can the Supreme Court’s emasculation of national civil rights enforcement authority be explained? Apparent public approval does not offer a satisfactory explanation. Nor do accepted legal theories of American federalism
alone adequately explain the Court’s action. A partial explanation was the need
to redefine the scope and limits of national and state powers because of the disruptions to federalism caused by the Civil War and Reconstruction and the
modernizing forces of industrial capitalism. Changing needs and novel situations produced by the integration and nationalization of American life
demanded a restructuring of the lines of national and state authority. Stanley
Kutler has demonstrated that the Supreme Court’s response to legal questions
relating to American federalism was “pragmatic in nature and attuned to the justices’ conception of the economic and social needs within the federal system.”
Kutler argues that since the justices were neither states’ rights advocates nor
nationalists, they looked favorably upon state police powers while they remained
“alert to the possibility that such legislation could unduly burden the national
market or the instrumentalities of the national government.”32
The decisions of the Supreme Court during Reconstruction nevertheless
were at least partially consistent with prior rulings. The Court desired to preserve the judicially established powers of the respective governments of the
United States and of the states in considering legislative applications of those
powers to new situations. It refrained from diminishing or departing from preexisting constitutional principles and definitions of national and state powers
whenever it believed it could avoid doing so. The Supreme Court’s rulings, then,
were conservative during an age of far-reaching changes in the conditions of
American life. However, the Court was guided by two overriding principles in
its application of established legal doctrines to new situations. When it decided
conflicts between national and state authority and jurisdiction, it carefully
considered whether the power in question was essential to the functioning of
the national or state governments as governmental agencies. It was also guided
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by the principle that many of the respective powers of the national and state
governments are exclusive.
Essentiality and exclusivity, concepts applied by the Supreme Court in its civil
and political rights decisions, were determining factors in the Court’s decisions
relating to federalism in other areas of law during the period. An 1869 case, for
example, involved a clash of the right of the states to charter corporations, the
property rights of state-chartered banks, and the authority of Congress to regulate the currency. The Supreme Court interpreted broadly Congress’s exclusive
authority to regulate the currency in sustaining a federal lax levied against state
bank notes. The Court conceded that the tax discriminated against state bank
notes in favor of national bank notes and therefore infringed the power of the
states to charter corporations. Yet, it upheld the tax because it was deemed to be
essential to Congress’s functioning as regulator of the national currency. The
Court thus gave precedence to congressional authority to regulate the currency
over the right of the states to charter corporations and to protect the property
rights of state banks.33
Although the Court upheld a federal tax on state bank notes, it struck down
a federal tax upon the incomes of state officials two years later. Speaking for the
Court, Justice Samuel Nelson declared “that the means and instrumentalities
employed for carrying on the operations of their [the states’] governments for
preserving their existence, and fulfilling the high and responsible duties assigned
to them in the Constitution, should be left free and unimpaired….” He added
that without this protection “no one of the States, under the form of government
guaranteed by the Constitution could long preserve its existence.” Justice Nelson
applied a nationalist ruling of Chief Justice John Marshall that had struck down
a state tax levied against a nationally chartered bank to void a national tax upon
state officials. He also based his opinion on the theory that the national and state
governments are “separate and distinct sovereignties, acting separately and
independently of each other, within their respective spheres.” If one compared
this case, which voided a federal tax on state officials’ income, with the case
upholding a federal tax on state bank notes from the perspective of nationalism
versus states’ rights, they would appear inconsistent. However, if they were analyzed from the perspective of essentiality and exclusivity, they would appear to
be consistent.34
Exclusivity in national and state powers was a basis for the Court’s decisions
in several cases involving state regulation of interstate commerce. In one case,
the Court struck down a state tax levied against freight carried by railroads
engaged in interstate commerce. Justice William Strong affirmed Congress’s
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exclusive power over interstate commerce in an opinion that echoed the 1852
decision in Cooley v. Pennsylvania Port Wardens. He declared “that whenever the
subjects over which a power to regulate commerce is asserted are in their nature
national, or admit of one uniform system or plan of regulation, they may justly
be said to be of such a nature as to require exclusive legislation by Congress.”35
However, the Court applied the principle of exclusivity in Congress’s authority over interstate commerce with flexibility. It allowed the states to use their
police powers to regulate interstate commerce whenever it considered state regulation to be essential to the functioning of state government. The constitutional
principle that permitted the states to regulate interstate commerce was again
taken from the Cooley decision. The Court declared that the states may regulate
interstate commerce when the subject of the regulation was local in nature and
Congress had not already legislated. While the Court voided a state tax on freight
carried by railroads engaged in interstate commerce, it upheld another state tax
imposed on the revenues of an interstate railroad. Justice Strong explained in the
latter case that the power to tax “may be essential to the healthy existence of
state governments and the Federal Constitution ought not to be so construed
as to impair, much less destroy, anything that is necessary to their efficient
existence.”36
In a similar vein, the Court affirmed a principle enunciated in the License
Cases of 1847 and upheld a state tax levied against wholesalers engaged in the sale
of interstate goods. The specific issue presented to the Court was whether local
wholesalers who sold imported goods in unbroken packages were subject to
local sales and other taxes. In upholding the tax, Justice Samuel Miller observed
that the
merchant of Chicago who buys his goods in New York and sells at wholesale
in the original packages, may have his millions employed in trade for half a
lifetime and escape all state, county and city taxes; for all he is worth is
invested in goods which he claims to be protected as imports from New York.
If the merchant could thus escape local taxes, Justice Miller concluded, “the
grossest injustice must prevail, and equality of public burdens in all our large
cities is impossible.”37
The Supreme Court sacrificed doctrinal consistency in its desire to uphold
state laws that it considered essential to a proper exercise of state police powers.
In one of the most important cases of the decade, it upheld state statutes regulating the operation of grain elevators in Illinois and other states and held that
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the storage of grain, even when the grain was sold to buyers in other states, was
only indirectly involved in interstate commerce. Grain elevators were considered
to be local businesses that were subject to the regulatory authority of the states
until Congress legislated on the subject. The Court was evidently unconcerned
with the apparent contradiction with its own definition a year earlier that “commerce” is “intercourse for the purpose of trade in any and all its forms.” It circumvented the principle of exclusivity in federal powers to accommodate what
it considered to be state police powers that were essential to the states’ function
of promoting commercial progress.38
However, the Court did not give the states carte blanche. It struck down a New
York law that required a bond of $300 or a cash payment of $1.50 for every immigrant coming into the country through its ports. The Court declared that the law
went beyond the legitimate purpose of indemnifying the state against pauperized immigrants. It also voided a California statute that imposed a bond of $500
upon “lewd and debauched” women who entered the state from foreign countries. The Court saw through this thinly veiled discrimination against female
Chinese immigrants. It characterized the bond as “systematic extortion of the
grossest kind” and declared that the determination of criminal, lewd, and
debauched interstate passengers was a function of the national, not of the state
governments. Although the Court upheld other state taxes levied against wholesalers dealing in interstate goods, it struck down a Missouri tax on such goods
because it considered the tax to be a discriminatory burden on those goods since
locally produced goods were not similarly taxed. In this case, the Court emphasized the inhibiting effect of the tax on interstate commerce.39
In these cases, the Supreme Court exhibited a desire to preserve principles of
constitutional law while it also strove to preserve the powers it considered essential to the functioning of the national and state governments. These same concerns and principles were present in its Slaughter-House, Reese, and Cruikshank
decisions. To a large extent the Court was impeded by its conservatism and logic
from sanctioning the radically new congressional applications of civil rights
enforcement authority. The Court’s concerns expressed in these other decisions
predisposed it to emasculate these far-reaching powers over civil rights because
those powers previously had been exercised by the state governments. In the
opinion of the Supreme Court, Congress had assumed an area of authority that
was essential to the existence of the states as independent governments. The
Court expressed the fear that a recognition of Congress’s concurrent authority
over civil rights would destroy the states and change the nature of American federalism beyond recognition.
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The Court’s revival of states’ rights reflected attitudes and views expressed in
legal commentaries on the Fourteenth Amendment. Legal writers feared that the
Civil War and congressional Reconstruction had pushed the nation too far
toward centralized government. William L. Royall reported in 1878 that “the
minds of patriotic men were filled with alarm at the centralizing tendency of the
government…and…the prospect that the ancient landmarks of the states were
to yield before the advancing strides of an imperial despotism.” He suggested
that “patriots” rejected a broad interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment
because “privileges and immunities” were thought to “include every conceivable
right,” and, if Congress possessed the authority to secure those rights, then that
authority “would give Congress the constitutional power to legislate in respect
to every matter which ought to be under exclusive state control, and would practically obliterate all state lines, and make one central government in
Washington.”40
The Supreme Court’s unwillingness to accept the primacy of national authority over civil rights, then, was not simply the product of racism. It expressed the
fear that its recognition of the primacy of national authority over civil rights
enforcement might result in the national government’s replacing the state governments in the actual administration of law, both civil and criminal. The Court
seemed to have been unable to devise a theory for primary national civil rights
enforcement authority that would have permitted the states to continue to fulfill functions that the Court believed were essential to the survival of American
federalism.
One endangered state function that the Court deemed essential to the wellbeing of the Union was the regulation of the economy. Northern reform during
the 1870s focused to a great degree upon state regulation of what the public perceived as monopolistic control of important segments of the economy by large
corporations, particularly the railroads. Antimonopolists agitated for state regulation of corporate practices, mergers, and, in the case of railroads, rates charged
to shippers. At the same time, states were assuming increasing control over professions, such as the practice of medicine, trades and occupations, the manufacture of dangerous substances, and the sale of alcoholic beverages through licensing
requirements. The Slaughter-House Cases involved such state regulation.41
The states’ legal authority to regulate economic activities was based on their
police powers. States claimed the constitutional power to regulate economic
activities as part of their authority to promote the health, safety, and welfare of
their citizens. Moreover, they claimed the authority to engage in such regulation
even though it restricted the exercise of fundamental rights because of their
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authority to determine conditions under which these rights could be enjoyed
and exercised.42
The opponents of such state regulation largely based their legal arguments on
a natural rights legal theory. They claimed that such state regulation violated
corporations’ and individuals’ fundamental rights. If these rights were recognized as nationally enforceable rights, then the states could be precluded from
exercising a regulatory function that the Chase and Waite Courts had deemed
essential to the existence of the states and the prosperity of the nation. Invoking
the theory of exclusivity, corporations argued that state economic regulation
infringed rights that were protected under the United States Constitution. Thus,
national civil rights enforcement authority could be applied to negate state regulatory power. This legal theory was the butchers’ argument in Slaughter-House.
Indeed, the doctrine of substantive due process that the Supreme Court adopted
in the 1890s to void state regulation of property rights originated with the butchers’ argument, which the Court rejected in Slaughter-House. The Court’s rejection of the primacy of national civil rights enforcement authority in
Slaughter-House, therefore, provided the legal foundation for its affirmation of
state economic regulation under the police power in Munn.43
Within this context, Slaughter-House also ordained the outcome in Cruikshank.
Once the Supreme Court affirmed the primacy of state authority over the butchers’ fundamental rights, it could not easily assert the primacy of national
authority over the fundamental rights of the freedmen. This difficulty was due
to the absence of a legal theory that might distinguish between the two and to
nineteenth-century political values and political realities.
Nineteenth-century legal theory did not readily offer a theoretical basis for
the primacy of national authority over the rights of black Americans as distinguished from the rights of white Americans. American liberalism abhorred artificial classifications among, and favored treatment of, similarly situated groups.
To single out blacks for special treatment after their transition from slavery to
freedom would have been contrary to predominant values of equal opportunity
and self-reliance. This was particularly true in this era of European immigration
because “Americans” regarded Southern and Eastern European nationalities as
inferior, along with blacks. Black Americans, then, were no more entitled to special treatment than “inferior” immigrants.44
Nor did nineteenth-century legal theory distinguish between the economic
rights of corporations and workers and the personal rights of individuals. To the
nineteenth-century mind, property rights were central to American freedom
because personal freedom and independence were thought to be inextricably
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connected to the ownership of property. Nineteenth-century Americans did not
place greater value upon noneconomic rights, such as First Amendment guarantees, than they did upon property rights. The contrary was true. Justice Harlan
Fiske Stone’s 1937 “preferred freedoms” distinction between personal rights and
economic rights would not have made much sense to Americans in the 1870s.45
If the Court had affirmed primary national civil rights enforcement authority, it would have been presented with difficult problems of legal theory. The
Court would have been required to devise some theoretical basis for distinguishing between national and state authority over civil rights. Such a theoretical distinction might have been impossible in light of the Court’s assertion of the
mutual exclusivity in national and state powers. The Court’s legal theory of
American federalism placed civil rights under the exclusive authority of either
the nation or the states. The Court believed that, at a functional level, the administration of justice was simply too central to the states and too difficult for the
nation to undertake. The Court’s principles of exclusivity and essentiality in the
distribution of federal powers may have rendered impossible its recognition of
the primacy of national civil rights enforcement authority.
Problems of legal theory may have been unsolvable even if the Court had recognized a concurrent national and state authority over civil rights violations.
The theories worked out by federal judges and United States attorneys that
attempted to distinguish between federal crimes and ordinary crimes may not
have been sustainable in all situations. The tenuousness of distinguishing federal
crimes by virtue of the intent of the offender is suggested by the existence of state
crimes of intent. For example, it is difficult to perceive the difference between the
federal crime of assault with intent to deprive the victim of his or her nationally
protected right to life and the state offense of assault with intent to kill.
Moreover, trying the same defendant for the same act under the parallel offenses
in the federal and the state courts would seem to violate the spirit, if not the
letter, of the Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy.
Requiring state action to violate nationally enforceable civil rights avoided
these difficult problems of legal theory and federalism. Moreover, it was easier to
administer and enforce in the federal courts. Racially discriminatory state action
was a relatively convenient and facile legal theory for defining the scope of
national civil rights enforcement authority. The presence or absence of racially
discriminatory state action, particularly in the form of discriminatory statutes,
was a relatively simple means for determining whether national authority was
applicable to an alleged civil rights violation. Furthermore, this theory possessed
the additional allure of justifying the preservation of the states as the primary
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guarantors of civil rights by providing a legal remedy that offered the appearance
of a national guarantee that the states would perform this function with fairness
and impartiality.
Still, James G. Randall long ago observed that principles of constitutional law
frequently serve as rationalizations to achieve desired political and social goals.
Randall’s observation is applicable here, for the Court had devised theories of
constitutional law that established concurrent jurisdiction between the national
and state governments in areas of law, such as interstate commerce, that seemed
to be within the exclusive authority of one or the other. Legal theory alone,
therefore, does not account for the Court’s rejection of the primacy of national
authority over civil rights. In addition to the intricacies of legal theory, political
considerations prompted the Court to reach its decisions in Slaughterhouse and
Cruikshank.46
Concerns over judicial administration motivated the Court to curtail national
civil rights enforcement authority. Burgeoning case loads and backlogged dockets pressured the justices to cut back the exploding scope of federal jurisdiction.
Legal journals observed that the docket of the Supreme Court was two years in
arrears, and they foresaw little hope of improvement without judicial reform.
Justice Miller publicly declared that the problem of overworked judges was so
acute that it endangered the very viability of the federal judiciary. Diminishing
federal jurisdiction was one of the reforms he proposed. The state action theory
curtailed federal jurisdiction and, therefore, could be viewed as a reform in
judicial administration.47
The state action theory served interests of federal comity as well as judicial
efficiency. Predicating national authority over civil rights upon racially discriminatory state action served to minimize the intrusion of the federal courts into
the state administration of justice. Indeed, restricting state action to racially discriminatory state statutes avoided federal inquiries into the impartiality of the
local administration of justice and consequent evidentiary problems and complicated and vexatious trials. Federal courts thus could be completely relieved of
the protection of civil rights if the states replaced their racially discriminatory
statutes with racially impartial ones and avoided blatant racial unfairness in
other respects. The state action theory of national civil rights enforcement
authority thereby could curtail jurisdictional clashes between federal courts and
local authorities and contribute to the improvement in the relationships
between federal and local officials. Ultimately, then, the Court’s civil rights rulings facilitated the healing of the breaches caused by the Civil War and accelerated
the return to normality.48
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The elimination of primary federal jurisdiction over civil rights served other
political purposes. The enforcement of civil rights in the federal courts exposed
and intensified the political aspects of the judicial process. Curtailment of this
function produced a corresponding depoliticization of the federal courts. The
elimination of national enforcement of civil rights thus paradoxically improved
the reputation of the federal courts among white Americans and contributed to
the public’s acceptance of judicial authority. It deprived Democratic
Conservatives of the opportunity to use judicial decisions as evidence of partisanship in the Southern federal courts, for they could no longer claim that the
courts merely implemented the political will of Republican-controlled
Congresses. Furthermore, the Supreme Court’s decisions diminished the need to
select federal juries on the basis of political affiliations, for its decisions largely
eliminated the possibility of federal prosecutions of Democratic Conservatives
on behalf of Republicans. The state action theory contributed to the restoration
of the legitimacy of the federal judiciary by precluding functions performed, and
legal theories espoused, by the federal courts that were vehemently opposed by
dominant local groups. This theory helped the Southern federal courts again
accommodate both national policies and local interests.
By the mid-1870s, the Northern public understood civil rights enforcement to
be a partisan device to buttress waning Republican interests in the South. The
idealism of the 1860s that motivated Republican-inspired legislation to secure
the freedom of the former slaves appeared to have been replaced during the
Grant administration by the president’s venal self-interest in protecting the
Republican Party. Even some Northern Republicans who earlier had supported
civil rights enforcement had come to oppose such a perceived abuse of power. In
a formalistic way, state action limitations of the Fourteenth Amendment could
be rationalized as providing impartial justice by placing blacks and whites,
Republicans and Democratic Conservatives on the “same” basis before the law.
All races and all parties would have to look to local legal institutions to enforce
and redress their rights. However, this equality before the law would be an equality in form, not an equality in substance.
These political and administrative benefits, then, were based upon political
priorities that relegated the protection of black rights to a relative unimportance. The black American was the primary beneficiary of national guarantees of
civil rights. The black American was therefore the main victim of their destruction. The far-reaching civil rights enforcement authority that judges in earlier
cases found in the Reconstruction Amendments was ultimately destroyed by the
growing disinterest in the plight of black Americans. National enforcement of
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civil rights presented the Supreme Court with difficult problems of legal theory
and federalism. The Court failed to find solutions to these problems that preserved effective national authority to protect citizens’ rights. This judicial failure
was partially due to the temper of the times. The racism, economic self-interest,
partisanship, and liberal ideology that characterized the political order of the
1870s promoted a callous disregard among Northern Republicans toward
Southern violent oppression of black Americans. The Supreme Court reflected
this political order in emasculating the Reconstruction civil rights program in
the 1870s.
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(1867); State ex rel. Garnes v. McCann, 21 Ohio St. 198, 211 (1871); People ex rel. Dietz v.
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18. Rhodes, 27 F. Cas. at 786, 788; Washington, 36 Cal. at 666–667, 669–670. See also the
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26. Hall, 26 F. Cas. at 81.
27. Ibid., pp. 81–82; Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (No. 3,230) (C. C. N.J. 1823). The
Supreme Court decision that held that the determination of citizens’ rights is to be made
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F. Cas. at 788–789, 790–791. In addition, see the cases cited in nn. 11 and 12; Mall, 26 F. Cas.
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(C. C. Cal. 1874). The Louisiana Supreme Court similarly ruled in 1874 that the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 “declares who shall be citizens of the United States, what shall be their
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48 Cal. at 49–50; State ex rel. Garnes, 21 Ohio St. at 210. For Negro testimony cases see
Rhodes, 27 F. Cas. at 787; Sommers v. Powell, McPherson, ed., Scrapbook on the Civil Rights
Bill, pp. 114–115; Ex parte Warren, 31 Tex.: 147; Kelley v. Arkansas, 25 Ark. 392; Underwood,
63 N.C. 98.
30. For decisions commenting upon political rights, see Rhodes, 27 F. Cas. at 794;
United States v. Crosby, 25 F. Cas. 701, 704 (No. 14,893) (C. C. S. C. 1871); Given, 25 F. Cas.
at 1325–1327; Canter, 25 F. Cas. 281; United States v. Anthony, 24 F. Cas. 829, 830 (No. 14,459)
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(No. 16,036) (C. C. E. D. Va. 1874); Washington, 36 Cal. at 661–662, 670; White, 39 Ga. at
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7,825) (C. C. E. D. Va. 1879); Ex parte Francois, 9 F. Cas. 699 (No. 5,047) (C. C. W. D. Tex.
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Tenn. at 287; Green v. Alabama, 58 Ala. 190 (1877); Frasher v. State, 3 Tex. Ct. App. Reps. 263
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and laws of the United States. They were Burns v. Alabama, 48 Ala. 195 (1872) and Hart,
26 La. Ann. at 90. Even the State of Maine’s antimiscegenation law was upheld by the state
courts. Boston Post, Aug. 31, 1867, in McPherson, ed., Scrapbook on the Civil Rights Bill, p.
136. Also see The New York Times, June 13, 1869, p. 1.
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31. Actions to enforce an equality in state-conferred rights were not brought in the federal courts before the Supreme Court’s Slaughter-House decision. The reason appears to
be that the civil rights asserted in the federal courts were presumed by federal judges and
the petitioners to be federally protected rights of national citizenship. As such, they were
directly secured by, and enforceable under, the Constitution and laws of the United States.
We must look to state appellate decisions, therefore, for pre-Slaughter-House rulings on
this point. It appears that state courts were prompted to explore this issue precisely
because the natural rights of citizenship were presumed to fall within federal jurisdiction.
See Washington, 36 Cal. at 669–670; State ex rel. Garnes, 21 Ohio St. at 209–211; People ex
rel. Dietz, 13 Abb. Pr. at 164–165. When the Supreme Court restored the natural rights of
citizenship to exclusive state jurisdiction, federal courts were forced to distinguish
between federally enforceable civil rights and state, protected civil rights. Still, some
judges continued to insist that the privileges and immunities of United States citizenship
included the right to an equality in fundamental rights. See Blackburn, 24 F. Cas. at
1159–1160; Petersburg Judges, 27 F. Cas. at 507–509; In re Fong, 1 F. Cas. at 218; Cully v.
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judges to uphold the constitutionality of the Enforcement Act of 1870. Although he was
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